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ARCHBISHOP WHATELY'S

COMMONPLACE BOOK.

Preparing for Publication.

LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

RICHARD WHATELY, D.D.

LATE ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.

BY MISS E. J. WHATELY.

London: LONGMAN and CO. Paternoster Row.

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NEW-STREET SQUARE

MISCELLANEOUS REMAINS

FROM

THE COMMONPLACE BOOK

OF

RICHARD WHATELY, D.D.

LATE

ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.

BEING A COLLECTION OF NOTES AND ESSAYS MADE DURING THE PREPARATION OF HIS VARIOUS WORKS.

EDITED BY MISS E. J. WHATELY.

NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.

LONDON:
LONGMAN, GREEN, LONGMAN, ROBERTS, & GREEN.
1865.

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PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

THE additions to this volume of Archbishop Whately's Miscellaneous Remains require some little explanation. It was not till the 'Remains' were actually in the press, that the remaining portions of the 'Commonplace Book,' which I had believed to be destroyed, were placed in my hands. They comprise the results of my father's private intellectual efforts at a period just before that at which the other volume commences; and though these earlier productions are, many of them, marked by a crudeness of style which would naturally belong to a younger and less practised writer, still many papers contain matter of so valuable and interesting a character, that it has been thought a selection from the best of them would form an acceptable addition to the later written, though earlier published, volume.

It was at first intended to publish the 'Additions' as a separate volume; this plan, however, was given up, as there was not enough matter for such a purpose; but a certain number of copies of the 'Additions' have been printed separately, to meet the require ments of the purchasers of the First Edition.

The spirit in which my father, at the commencement of his literary career, entered on a work which was to be carried on at intervals throughout his life, is sufficiently shown in the solemn opening dedicative of the MS. volume, written in his earliest youthful hand, and dated New Year's Day, 1809. 'Let the words of my mouth, and the meditations of my heart, be always acceptable in thy sight, O Lord, my strength and my Redeemer!'

I wish to state, with respect to the numerous errors of the press in the First Edition of this work, that this has arisen from circumstances which could neither have been foreseen nor prevented. A heavy and sudden family affliction necessitated my hasty departure for the continent while the sheets were still in the press; and they thus unavoidably passed without regular or careful inspection.

To obviate as far as possible this evil, a separate sheet of corrigenda has been printed, which can be appended to the copies of the First Edition by those

who possess them. I wish to take this opportunity of stating that I am now engaged in preparing a memoir of my father, which I hope will be published early next spring. I shall be much obliged to any persons who may possess letters from the Archbishop if they will forward them to me under cover to my publishers.

E. J. WHATELY.

DUBLIN: *November* 1864.

PREFACE

TO

THE FIRST EDITION.

In laying before the public some extracts from Archbishop Whately's 'Commonplace Book,' an explanation may appear necessary. The readers of his works, though they will find papers that have not before appeared in print, will yet recognise much with which they are familiar in other forms. The substance of the earlier articles may be found dispersed through the 'Logic,' 'Rhetoric,' and other *early* works of the writer; while parts of the *later* articles have been embodied in the editions of Bacon and Paley.

Still, much remains that may be new to all readers; and what these articles lose in elaborate arrangement and finish of style, they gain, in the opinion of many, in freshness and ease. They are to his more finished works what the rough charcoal sketches of the great masters, which many of us have

admired in galleries of art, are to their more finished productions. There is often a peculiar pleasure in contemplating the rough draft of a great work, in seeing, as it were, the process by which the first conception had grown and matured in the mind of the originator, and in comparing the gem in its ore with the same gem cut and polished. To those unacquainted with my father's literary habits, it may be necessary to premise that from a very early period of his life he had commenced the practice, which he always earnestly recommended to young students, of keeping a 'commonplace book,' or record of thoughts and ideas upon various subjects. He always considered this practice to have been highly beneficial to his own mind. It contributed undoubtedly to the clearness and correctness of his style; and by thus working out, correcting, and revising the results of his own reflections and studies, a vast body of materials was prepared for future works.

Several articles have been added to this collection which were contributed, during the last year or two of his life, to periodicals, without having passed previously through his 'Commonplace Book,' but which bear the same character and stamp.

With regard to the arrangement of matter, the great variety of subjects embraced makes it impossible

to classify by any order except that of time, which has been adhered to as closely as possible; and thus these remains form as it were an outline of the literary history of a life-time. But wide gaps will be observed in this chronological arrangement; for instance, hardly any articles can be found bearing a date between 1836 and 1843. It appears that a large portion of the papers in the 'Commonplace Book' were destroyed in the writer's life-time: the parts retained being probably such as might be useful for reference.

The deep and lively interest which he retained through life in natural phenomena, in facts connected with social science, statistics, and everything tending to throw light on the history of man as such, will be exemplified in the subjects of many of the articles before us. To some they might be thought trifling; but to his mind nothing appeared a trifle which could illustrate a general principle. Viewed in this light, the essays on Popular Superstitions, on Food, and on the Habits of some Animals, may be read both with interest and profit.

E. J. W.

DUBLIN: *May* 1864.

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MISCELLANEOUS REMAINS

FROM THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THE LATE

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY.

APOPHTHEGMS.

1. He who sees not his friend's faults, loves not him, but a phantom.

2. It is likely that friendship may be immortal, because it does not interfere with general charity.

3. The loss of a friend is like the amputation of a limb: the soreness is transitory, but the mutilation, permanent.

4. Reproof is often called and accounted, not a painful duty, but a privilege.

5. The closer two bodies act together, the more they will want oiling to prevent friction.

6. Conscience is an upright judge, but not a law.

7. Virtue is goodness in a state of warfare.*

* As he often remarked, this is why the term *virtue* cannot be applied to God.

8. Virtue is higher or lower, according to its possessor, and so is vice.

9. Virtue and vice are not the fundamental distinctions of character.

10. To choose always the least of two evils, requires a union of courage, wisdom, and good temper.

11. Beware of the bed of Procrustes.

12. Pride is properly the delight in conscious excellence; vanity the delight in admiration; ambition the desire of it.

13. Pride is the more odious, vanity the more contemptible.

14. Pride is the best cure for vanity.

15. Conceit is always at the bottom of pride, and generally of vanity.

16. The love of cleanliness is a social feeling.

17. In mental exertions, two and two do not make four.

18. The use of hyperboles is like dram-drinking: as they lose their force, we use them stronger.

19. The diligence, candour, and judgment requisite to make a full use of ths discoveries of others, are perhaps as rare, and quite as useful, as originality. The flint and steel would be of little use without the tinder and match.

20. Verbal paradoxes are as trifling, as real ones are important.

21. Those are accounted the worst, who wear their faults on the outside.

22. Slowness of thought is a habit which fits a

man well for the office of instruction, and which is often produced by it.

23. A month's reading in Natural Philosophy may make a finer show than a life in Ethics and Metaphysics.

24. Ethics and Logic should be the most generally studied, because all practise them whether they have studied them or not.

25. Self-love is not so much a separate passion, as a compound of all.

26. A man is called selfish, not for pursuing his own good, but for neglecting his neighbours'.

27. It is a paradox that those who have the least to look forward to, viz., the old, should be the most provident.

28. An old man more readily looks forward ten years than a young one, because ten bears a less ratio to his whole life past.

29. Most naturalists arrange the volumes of the great book of nature, and then forget to peruse them.

30. The virtue of adhering to character, consists, like all others, in a mean: the excess is self-partiality; the defect, inconsistency.

31. A writer without much originality or eloquence may be both entertaining and instructive, by mere force of arrangement.

32. Εὐτραπελία would perhaps be more common if we had an English name for it.

33. It is very dangerous, in declaiming against a vice, to underrate the temptations to it.

34. There is great difference between *an* art of reasoning or composing, and *the* art.

35. Those who get through the world without enemies are commonly of three classes; the supple, the adroit, and the phlegmatic.

The leaden ruler surmounts obstacles by yielding to them; the oiled wheel escapes friction; the cotton sack escapes damage by its impenetrable elasticity.

36. There are vices in which it is in vain to point out the preponderance of pain, because men do not fall into them for the sake of pleasure, but from passion.

37. If free agency does not consist in acting from your own will, what is it?

38. As far as any one can influence the will, so far he can predestinate, without encroaching on free agency.

39. Men's actions are the result of their character, which wholly depends on, first, nature; second, education; third, circumstances. Voluntary actions, therefore, originate with what is not voluntary; *i.e.* we did not make ourselves.

40. Nothing can be in itself uncertain; it is we that are uncertain.

41. Chance is a name given, for convenience, to a modification of our own ignorance.

42. The disputes between Calvinist and Arminian are wholly verbal.

43. The identity of a body consists in its union to, and fitness for, the same mind. Vid. Locke.

44. Those men complain most of their memory in whom it is the chief faculty; for they most feel its failures, since they have nothing else to trust to.

45. The effect follows from the cause really; the cause from the effect logically.

46. All moral reasoning seems resolvable into four sorts of argument: 1st, from cause to effect; 2nd, from effect to cause; 3rd, example; and, 4th, testimony.

47. Trite descriptions lose most of their force because they remind us, not of the reality, but of some other description.

48. The chief circumstance which modifies an hereditary quality, is the cross of a different one; that which heightens it, is the similarity of both parents.

49. A bad cross will produce madness or folly, and a good one will eradicate it.

50. Every man views externals through an atmosphere of his own passions and interests, which refracts the direct rays of truth and justice.

51. If every one would record his experiments and observations, science would be much benefited.

52. Physiognomy has just enough truth in it to make it deceitful.

53. Physiognomy has two branches: that which concerns the natural, and that which concerns the acquired, varieties of feature. The latter has cer-

tainly a real foundation; the former is more doubtful.

54. Curiosity is the desire of knowing what is unknown, for that reason alone.

55. The most convenient habit you can acquire, is that of letting your habits sit loose upon you.

56. There are many who could display great genius in writing if they could venture to throw off the shackles of judgment.

57. Good breeding is to politeness what a soldier's exercise is to courage.

58. The pleasure of exciting sympathy is the foundation of friendship.

59. To learn a man's character, mark how he takes a favour.

60. Pride combined with feeling smarts under a favour: Senseless arrogance takes it as a due: Stupidity does not perceive it: Levity forgets it: A broken spirit is surprised and humbled by it: Suspicion misinterprets it: Crafty selfishness seeks for more: A generous spirit feels it without humiliation, and returns it without impatience.

61. The chief use of Mason's Self-knowledge is to show, by his example, the inconvenience of wanting it.

62. There is not so much pleasure in gain as in the act of gaining.

63. If a man is not too mad to intend what he does, he is not too mad to be punished for it.

64. No knowledge is more useful or more difficult than that of your own ignorance.

65. A strong sense of the uncertainty and shortness of life, tends to make a man either a complete thoughtless voluptuary, or a complete Christian.

66. To teach one who has no curiosity to learn, is to sow a field without ploughing it.

67. The analytical method is the best to introduce knowledge, the synthetical to perfect and retain it.

67B. Many are saved by the deficiency of their memory from being spoiled by their education.

68. Some pursuits are more valuable themselves than the object which is pursued, and which gives them all their value.

69. It is not denial but doubt that is opposed to credulity. To disbelieve is to believe.

70. For a colony to prosper, it should not be a mere shop.

71. To lay aside the outward visible sign is to endanger the inward spiritual grace; we are not heroes enough to dispense with discipline.

72. Take care of the easy things, and the hard ones will take care of themselves.

73. A statesman without wisdom does mischief in *proportion as he is clever.*

74. To learn a thing because it is easy is like buying a bargain.

75. He who knows two languages is a higher

being than he who knows but one; and the more dissimilar the better.

76. Many an elaborate work would the author burn if he could but see it translated into Greek.

77. One great use of a foreign language is to observe the various modes of thinking in different nations.

78. The chief use of the classics is that they afford a fixed standard of taste.

79. The power of duly appreciating little things belongs to a great mind: a narrow-minded man has it not, for to him they are *great* things.

80. Aristotle has the eye of a bird, both telescopic and microscopic.

81. We often understand Aristotle better than he did himself.

82. Abstain from the amusements which are the most congenial to your disposition. Cultivate not only the cornfields of your mind, but also the pleasure grounds.

83. Most heretics are made so by the orthodox.

84. Nothing is harmless when it is mistaken for a virtue.

85. The ordinary effect of reading '*a good book*' is merely to make a man shake his head.

86. 'Words,' says Hobbes, 'are the counters of wise men and the money of fools.' Hence the latter can never distinguish a verbal from a real question.

87. Men are never so ready to study the interior of a subject as when there is something of a veil thrown over the exterior.

88. The more a man knows, the more he will feel admiration, and the less surprise.

89. The office of a philosopher is to infer; of an advocate to prove.

90. Mathematical reasoning is like a long flight of steps; moral, like a short clamber up a craggy rock.

91. Observation digs the materials; reasoning erects the building.

92. To love both power and liberty is not very consistent.

93. To know your ruling passion, examine your castles in the air.

94. Men's sentiments in general are like P. Pindar's razors—made not to shave, but to sell.

95. That is suitable to a man in point of expense, not which he can afford to *have*, but what he can afford to *lose*.

96. Hard labour is not whenever you are very actively employed, but when you *must* be.

97. A man is admired for what he *is*, macarized for what he *has*, *praised* for what he *does*.

98. Some speak and write as if they *wanted to say something*; others, as if they *had something to say*.

99. To be always thinking about your manners

is not the way to make them good, because the very perfection of manners is not to think about yourself.

100. Cause and effect are always simultaneous.

101. Selfishness is very different from want of feeling.

102. Stingy people are not always selfish.

102B. Selfishness is caught from those who have least of it.

103. There is no flattery like domestic.

ON TEMPTATIONS TO CERTAIN FAULTS.

THE following error in Moral Philosophy is equally common and dangerous. Moralists, in their eager declamations against some fault, forget to mention the temptations to it, and consequently do not prepare their hearers to encounter them. E. g., Suicide is commonly considered as an act of absolute madness: I do not see that it even indicates folly, setting a future state out of the question; if existence is become an evil and is not likely to mend, it is wisdom to get rid of it. Again, swearing has been spoken of as a vice to which there is no temptation whatever; but the desire of appearing manly and knowing, and above all of adding a degree of force to one's expressions, which has no small influence on the lower orders, is surely no slight temptation, when aided by the infection of example.—Other instances of the same error

might be given. Objection: Does not 'setting a future state out of the question' indicate madness? To this it may be fairly answered, that as vice depraves the judgment, a man may disbelieve a future state; or the punishment due to suicide therein: which, though absurd enough, is surely not madness. But omitting this argument, the same objection will apply in some degree to the sanity of any criminal; since it is an absurdity, or, if you will, infatuation, to commit murder, for instance, knowing the punishment which awaits it. Objection: But the absurdity is greater where a man is on the brink of eternity. Be it so; still the infatuation is the same in *kind*, though greater in *degree*; so that by this argument you will make the absurdity of vice the same in *kind* with that of madness, though the latter is greater in degree. But surely they differ in *kind*.

Johnson seemed to think the difference was that the less common absurdities were called madness. 'If,' said he, 'a man kneels and prays in the street, we call him mad; now it certainly is much greater folly not to pray at all; only that is a more *common* case.' But this is hardly deep enough; for *why* is it more common? The difference between that absurdity which we call lunacy or fatuity and that of an imprudent or vicious man is perhaps this: the latter acts from a natural motive, though a weak and wrong one: the former from no conceivable motive at all; that is, from none which arises from the general constitution of the human mind. Be this right or wrong,

there is no doubt (as is plain from the use of the words), that vice and madness are ἑτερὰ τῷ εἰδεῖ, not different degrees of the same thing.

Dec. 1810.

INGRATITUDE.

INGRATITUDE, like many other vices, frequently proceeds from want of thought. I do not mean to justify them, but to point out how they may be avoided. For what can be more culpable than not to think about our duty? since we know, or ought to know, that unless we are careful to cultivate virtues, vices will spring up of themselves.

If men would but *reflect* on the benefits they receive, they would not be so often unthankful. As a proof of what I have said, the benefits we receive from the Almighty are infinitely greater than all others; yet upon the whole we feel less gratitude for them; because their multitude causes them to be received as things of course,* without exciting much

* One great foundation of gratitude is vanity. If we are *selected* to receive a favour, we feel the honour done us often more even than the benefit. Hence those who are kind to many, have the least gratitude in proportion. It does not seem a *personal* favour so much as a mark of philanthropy. In the same manner ill usage, shared with many, excites rather hatred than resentment.—Vid. Arist. Rhet. ὀργὴ and μῖσα.

attention.* An unexpected favour excites usually the most gratitude. As another proof: An *intended* service, which *happens* not to be executed, seldom excites much gratitude; the kindness in reality is no less; but the actual benefit received, which is what fixes our *attention* on that kindness, is wanting. Happy are they who are devoted to the service of Him, who alone always takes the will for the deed.

1810.

OF ENEMIES.

WHAT is the reason that some men get through the world without enemies? Certainly, virtue will not secure men; nor yet does it necessarily and constantly *produce* enemies. Again, this advantage does

* Doubtless there is another reason for this in the exalted nature of the Deity; and the impossibility of sympathising with Him, or making Him any return. But the chief, I still think, is the multitude and commonness of His benefits; for a sudden escape seldom fails, by rousing our attention, to excite thankfulness. Many a man has felt gratitude at being saved *in* a shipwreck who had never felt any at being saved *from* it. The chief point, however, that makes singular and marked kindnesses striking is, perhaps, their gratifying our vanity (taking the word in its widest possible sense). He who confers favours extensively (especially if on *classes*, not individuals), honours and *flatters* nobody. If, therefore, gratitude and popularity are your object, take care that every one who receives your favours shall feel himself *distinguished* by them and selected.

not appear to be wholly the gift of Fortune. I am, however, convinced that, though good luck is never the only cause of avoiding enemies (for some people *will* make enemies in any situation), yet it is necessarily an assisting cause; for in some situations no one can avoid them. Allowing, then, for good luck, there appear to be three principal classes of men who avoid enemies: 1. Pliant, flattering, spaniel-like, Parson-Supples, who always swim with the stream, and have no opinion nor will of their own. 2. Men of address. There are some whose insinuating manners, prompt and sound judgment, and command of temper, are such as to render them favourites of all, even without their stooping to baseness.* But the first character, tempered with this, is a recipe for popularity. For skilful flattery never fails to please, even when it is known to be flattery; because men are pleased to think that you consider them worth flattering. This address requires not only a natural genius for it, but considerable experience (in the *course* of which, sometimes, enemies are made), and also close attention. Lord Chesterfield told his son to study the world diligently, but to read Homer and Virgil only when he had nothing else to do. Hence it is that so few who possess this address possess anything else. 3. Men of phlegm. Having no strong feelings, they seldom give provocation; they have seldom enough ardour of temper to be officious or trouble-

* Suaviter in modo, fortiter in re.

some. By the vulgar they are admired as good-natured; by superior minds their characters may be perhaps despised, or even disliked. Though they avoid enemies, they are incapable of a high degree of friendship; but their persons can seldom be hated. If, however, a certain degree of this character be united with considerable merit, or, above all, with a spice of the two former, it not only prevents enmity, but generally secures popularity. Those, then, who are calculated to avoid enemies under *trying* circumstances (for others may escape in ordinary cases) are those who possess one or more of the above three qualifications. The supple man is like the leaden ruler which *avoids* obstacles by *yielding* to them, and assumes the shape of whatever body it is applied to.

The man of address is like those parts of a machine which, though they often have to overcome a considerable resistance, yet avoid friction by being *oiled.* The phlegmatic man resembles bodies possessed of great *elasticity*, a quality which at once secures them from receiving any injurious or permanent impression themselves, and from making any such upon others.

Jan. 1811.

OF REPROOF.

THE duty of reproving a friend for his faults is the most difficult, and at the same time one of the most important, in friendship. Unhappily, most people

consider it rather as a privilege than as a task. For my part, I should as soon call the office of Jack Ketch a privilege. But whence arises this feeling? to which it is owing that the office is in general so ill performed. There does appear to me to be a pleasure in giving pain, even (I had almost said especially) to those we love. More causes than one may combine to produce this pleasure; but I think one of the chief must be the *feeling* of *power*, than which nothing is more gratifying. Be that as it may, the temptation I am certain exists, and the first step is to be aware of it; the second to reject with abhorrence so base and so inconsistent a feeling; the third, to guard watchfully against it.

Now for the rules for telling a friend of his faults. The points to be aimed at are the same as in a surgical operation; viz., to do the business effectually with the least possible pain and injury. 1st. Do it in the gentlest manner possible, nor ever suppose that friendship dispenses with politeness and delicacy; it is there called for most, lest familiarity should breed contempt, and frankness excite irritation; and it is there the most difficult to practise, because the *common rules* of formality are laid aside, and they were invented to facilitate the exercise of politeness. But it is certain that the closer together two bodies act, the more will they want oiling to prevent friction. And do not suppose that it can be agreeable to any one to be told of his faults: gild it as you will, it is a bitter pill after all; so make the best of it.

2nd. Watch for the *mollia tempora fandi*; and bring in what you have to say in a round-about manner. 3rd. Temper your admonition with praise *quant. suff.*, and if you can, include yourself in the same blame. 4th. Never perform this office when he is performing the same for you; to which you will very naturally be led by an imitative feeling of irritation. It generally ends in an altercation. If *he* is so imprudent as to do this, stop immediately. 5th. Never give a direct reproof if you can accomplish your end by a hint. You may sometimes mention what you have to say as the opinion of others, not your own. 6th. Never reprove him before company. 7th. Never betray the least symptom of peevishness, conceit, or, above all, *pleasure in the office*; it is better to pass over a trifle than to appear as if you delighted to set him to rights. 8th. *Cet. par.* You had better tell him of a fault afterwards than at the time he commits it; for you will be more fit to speak, and he to hear. For yourself: 1. Do not expect your friend to observe all these rules, but take what he says in good part, at any rate; and encourage him to speak freely. 2. Do not imagine that a fault is amended when it is merely confessed.

January 1811.

ON DISPUTATION

DISPUTATION for the sake of victory, or ill-conducted disputation, is very hurtful. It may exercise the ingenuity, and may, in some respects, qualify a man for a pleader; but it gives him a habit of confounding truth and falsehood, and fills his brain with fallacies, till, from perplexing his opponent, he comes at last to have no clear ideas of anything himself. I may add, that disputes ill conducted produce ill-breeding, ill-temper, and quarrels. The main points on which it depends to secure the good and avoid the evil are undoubtedly candour, goodness, good-breeding, and good-temper; but I think some useful rules may be laid down for disputing—rules, indeed, which may help to secure the points above mentioned.

For *politeness'* sake: 1. Avoid anything that may be even construed into personality, and be very cautious of using an *argumentum ad hominem*.

Above all, do not compliment your opponent's skill in disputation; which is a hint that your opinion is right, but that he is the more cunning sophist.

But if your opinion be in your view an important truth, do not dispute about it with an adversary whom you hold to be greatly your superior; but merely protest against his opinion and be silent. If he urge you, you have a right to state your reason. In this case you cannot benefit the good cause, but may hurt it greatly; as a defeat, however incurred, may shake the faith of others or yourselves.

2. A matter of fact which he states on his own authority never attempt even to doubt, even though you should feel convinced that it is false; for the only way by which he can properly reply to such an objection is by knocking you down (his best way, therefore, will be not to reply at all). But if this matter of fact stands in your way, drop the argument and give your reason.

3. Do not assert your opinion peremptorily nor in a loud voice.

4. Do not interrupt him if he is unwilling. And here observe that interruption is improper when a person has not stated the whole of his argument; but if he has, and is proceeding to further conclusions, he ought to be interrupted, if there is any objection to the argument he has used.

5. Do not manifest any contempt of his opinions, nor begin by charging them with blasphemy, Jacobinism, &c. If they really are open to such objections you can easily make it appear from your arguments.

6. Never, by way of proving any opinion, support it by your own authority, saying, 'I think.' 'What business have you to think?'

7. If your opponent transgresses the rules of good-breeding or fair disputing, do not you do the same, but drop your argument and state your reason.

8. Never commit any of these faults in *joke*; it is an *ill-timed* joke: you might as well play at picking pockets in a crowd.

Now for the rules of *fair disputation*.

1. If you perceive a proposition to be false, or an argument fallacious, do not use them, unless for the sake of exemplifying to him the fault he has committed.

2. Aristotle's rule for refuting probable arguments. —*Rhet.* b. 2.

3. If he uses an example, you must show that it differs from the course proposed in that point where the resemblance is essential to the argument; for διάφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει is a fallacy.—*Rhet.* b. 2.

4. Beware of *ignoratio elenchi*. State your own proposition clearly and keep to it steadily, and your opponent to its contradictory.

5. Use words in their commonly received meaning, and do not attempt to substitute an arbitrary one of your own, or an etymological one. If a word has several meanings, do not play upon them.

6. Never presume to object to enthymeme or illustration, unless you can point out the fault; or to his explanation of a term, unless you can give a better.

January 1811.

ON FABLES.

A FABLE, as D. Stewart observes, is a mode of expressing a general truth, well suited to uncultivated minds, because you use, instead of general terms, a particular case, whose general application is obvious.

(This definition, however, will comprehend fictitious stories *directly* resembling the circumstances of real life (not by analogy); and these are not among us called fables). But note that this truth is not to be *stated* merely, but, in some degree at least, *proved*. Hence there are two principal requisites for a fable: 1st, that it be true (i.e. the truth well established); 2nd, applicable to many cases. According to the first rule, we may object to all fables where the event does not follow probably (for the same rules will apply here as in tragedy, &c.). Such is that of Jupiter and the Husbandman, where nothing is proved. The Marriage of the Sun and some others are perhaps condemned by the second rule.

It is much better that irrational beings be used than men: for then you have the resemblance of analogy, which is much more striking. (This has been remarked in poetical similes: if you compare a hero to a torrent or a lion, you have a new image, and enjoy the τὸ μανθάνειν; but if you compare him to another hero, you are never the forwarder.) But the fault is the same even when irrationals are introduced, if they do just what men might have done: as in the Fox and the Mask, or the Fox and Wolf going to law, &c. To make the analogy perfect, the brutes, &c. should act in some degree conformably to their habits: let them speak indeed and reason; but 'prefer an impossibility which appears probable to a possibility which appears improbable;' it is easier for an ox to graze than to speak, but it would not do

so well in a fable. Those, then, are best in which the actors conform together to their nature, as in the Sun and the Wind, the Reed and the Oak, &c.; the next are those in which there is a certain mixture of their own nature, as in the fox without a tail, the pigeons who had a kite for their king; and most in short that are (these are even the better as they approach the first): the worst are those in which the actors go against their nature, as in that where a sheep, stag, &c. are represented as joining with a lion in hunting.

April 1812.

N.B.—A fable spun out too far, runs into something like an allegory, which is generally insipid. A novel, &c., on the contrary, where the resemblance is direct, should be done at much greater length. For the resemblance being much less *striking* (in the sense of this article) requires that the fiction be of sufficient length to produce poetical belief.

Whereas a fable is little more than a mere comparison, and aims not at being interesting in narrative, only striking. It may be compared to a device or hieroglyphic; the novel, to a picture.

A good example is the fable of the Bundle of Sticks compared with the Iliad; the moral of both is the same.

OF CURIOSITY.

Curiosity is generally used to signify the faulty excess; but existing in that moderate degree which is the most common, it produces more benefit as well as amusement than is generally supposed. Those are best enabled to judge of this in whom (which is not common) this passion falls short, as in myself.

By curiosity, I mean the desire of knowing a thing merely for the sake of knowing it; not for the sake of any utility or other interesting quality in the thing, but merely because it is unknown. I am aware that the word is often used more laxly, but this is certainly the strict meaning.

Now, if we consider how seldom any object of great dignity or beauty comes across us, and how few there are that can be expected to seek out such objects among the depths of study, we must admit that it is a bountiful provision of our nature, which thus supplies, by means of curiosity, a ready fund of amusement from all around us, and gives life a continual interest.

In the next place, how much valuable information is accidentally gained which was sought for merely to gratify curiosity; and which in many cases, valuable as it is, could never have been sought on any other account. E. g. How useful is it to know the number of miles from one place to another, when you are about to travel that road, and have no opportunity of enquiring at the time. Yet who ever thought

of storing his mind with this kind of knowledge for the sake of its possible future utility? But men enquire into those things merely for the sake of knowing them. Equally useful is it on some occasions to know about people's families and connections, &c.

Though I have said that curiosity is the desire of knowing things not interesting in themselves, yet it is certain that different things excite the curiosity of different people, and few are quite indiscriminately inquisitive. But on the whole those things which are not interesting, which are not agreeable objects of reflection, *after they are known*, those, in short, to which novelty alone gives a charm, these are what would be commonly reckoned objects of bare curiosity.

To most of these I am unfortunately indifferent, and by this means I believe I lose more amusement, and suffer more inconvenience than if I was indifferent to many dignified and excellent subjects of enquiry which I delight in. I have no relish for ordinary chat, which consists in the reciprocal gratification of the above passion; nor consequently for the company of a great part of the world, who have little to say that has anything but novelty to recommend it. It gives me no sort of pleasure to be told who is dead and who is married, and what wages my neighbour gives his servants.

Then, for the inconvenience, I am ignorant of the streets and shops and neighbouring villages of the town where I live. I very often know a man, with-

out being able to tell any more about his country, family, &c., than if he had dropt from the skies. Nor do I even know, unless I enquire and examine diligently and with design, how far it is from such a place to another, what hour the coach starts, or what places it passes through. I am frequently forced to evade questions in a most awkward manner, from not daring to own, nor indeed being able to convince any one of, my own incredible ignorance. If I had had no uncle nor aunt I should probably have been ignorant of my mother's maiden name.

August 1812.

OF HABITS.

Doubtless it is good to contract convenient, and avoid inconvenient, habits; but some carry this so far as to subject themselves to more inconvenience in acquiring certain habits than they would ever feel in the want of them. Such, I mean, as dare not take a pinch of snuff, &c., lest they should get a habit of it; nor shave with warm water because they may sometimes be compelled to use cold; and who wait upon themselves because they may sometimes have no servant. I would object to this habit, 1st. That the plan is in itself imperfect; for they ought in consistency to live like the wild Arabs, as we know not to what destitution we may soon be brought. If then they are deprived of any of those comforts

which they have reserved, they will feel it doubly from their not even pretending to forego their accustomed enjoyments with a good grace. They confess themselves, as it were, to be the slaves of their habits. 2nd. They suffer, as has been said, as much or more by this anticipated abstinence than they would have done by waiting till the necessity came, for though it may be harder to break off a habit on the spur of the moment than at your leisure (which is sometimes the case, though frequently the contrary),* yet if you prepare yourself for *many* privations, of which only a few actually take place, you make these numerous petty mortifications worse than a few greater. 3rd (lastly). You are the less prepared for a *sudden* sacrifice on a sudden occasion; not of this or that which you were prepared for, but of anything whatever. You will be the less likely to form that far better habit of letting all your habits sit loose upon you. This manly independence will not only allow you to enjoy the comforts of the present, but to look forward without dismay to contingent future privations; which cannot be done (this last, I mean) in the other way, for the first reason mentioned. It is a timid kind of hardihood that

* For it is much harder to leave off wheaten bread, e. g. when you have it before you, than when only barley. Again, when the occasion comes, it may chance to be such as to make the privation little thought of: in the ardour of war, a man would much less regard sleeping on the ground, or going without a clean shirt.

does not indulge, that cannot be independent of comforts, but by renouncing them. It is not only convenient, but dignified, to say, 'I know both how to abound and how to suffer need;' ἔχω Λαΐδα, οὐκ ἔχομαι.

'Omnis Aristippum decuit color, et status, et res.'

Use yourself, therefore, to bear vicissitudes; to drink claret, or port, or porter, whichever comes in your way; to be waited on when you have servants, and when not, to make your own bed and dress your own dinner. The exception to the rule is, when anything is to be *learnt* which is likely to be suddenly called for; as Lord Nelson is said to have practised writing with his left hand before he lost his right.

Dec. 1812.

OF REGRET AND OPPORTUNITY.

REGRET I take to be, in the most proper sense, 'the painful feeling which arises from the loss of an opportunity;' I mean an *apparent* opportunity, for we often feel regret at having missed doing or obtaining something which was not *quite* in our power, but *would* have been only for some obstacle, which, perhaps, we could not have removed. Thus, there may be regret where there is not, properly speaking, any repentance. Now, opportunity implies, not merely that we have it in our power to do or to obtain something (for, then, we might be said to

have a constant opportunity of breathing), but that we have it at that particular conjuncture which we cannot create at pleasure.

The desire of taking advantage of this opportunity seems to be a peculiar principle of our nature, and I do not know that it has been noticed by philosophers. It seems to be recognised in the vulgar proverb that 'opportunity makes the thief,' which implies, I conceive, not that a man can only steal when it is in his power, for then it would be a mere truism, but that he will be tempted by an *opportunity* to do what he would not have done if he had had it always in his power. It is, indeed, a common remark that people never go to see sights which they may see at any time, i.e. they have not what is strictly called an opportunity, which occasional visitors have. (I do not mean that they have *no opportunity*, for that implies that they have it *not at all* in their power, *not even* on any particular occasion.)

Every good, when lost, appears greater; and the pain felt for this loss is sorrow. That particular kind of sorrow which is properly called regret is for the loss of an opportunity; and it is the dread of this regret that makes us so unwilling to lose an opportunity. For we feel that, though we care not much about it now, yet we shall, perhaps, highly value it when irrecoverably gone by.

We are apt to reproach ourselves (not avowedly, but, as it were, involuntarily) for not having done what, if we had done it, we should have reproached

ourselves more for. 'It was such an opportunity let slip!' we cry; and thus, too, when, perhaps, it was an opportunity only of some present gratification, which would, at best, have been over at the time we feel the regret.

It appears, then, that the opportunity of obtaining any apparent good is a strong temptation, distinct from our mere desire for that good, and often prevailing when that desire alone would not. It is a great point gained to be aware of this, lest, trusting to our capability of standing a regular siege, we should be taken by a *coup-de-main*. I conceive it would be a good discipline to put to one's self, frequently, imaginary cases of this kind; reflecting on the temptingness of the opportunity and the anticipation of regret, and resolving to stand firm if any such case should occur.

June 11, 1813.

Thus a kind of castle building, if rightly conducted, may be a very wholesome exercise.

July 1814.

OF THE STYLE OF FOREIGN WRITERS.

I AM convinced that much may be gained in point of style from the study of a good writer in a foreign language. Not so much, I grant, as from one in our own; but then, to make up for that, you are not so

likely to catch his faults, or to copy his merits so as to make them faults.

The difference of idiom in the languages would prevent a man from being so very servile a copier of Thucydides as many are of Addison or Johnson; and yet many beauties may be caught from another language. The author's manner of arranging his matter in the various clauses, his contrasts, and other transitions, may be very closely imitated; in short, his manner may be caught in a great degree, as, indeed, is done by a skilful translator. There are many figures which will bear translating, and some which one can hardly avoid in a translation, such as anithesis, climax, that metaphor (as Aristotle calls it) which puts a species for genus, which is so common in Scripture, &c. Other metaphors may also be translated frequently, as also the peculiar force arising from the order of the words, though in this we are a good deal cramped by our language. On the whole, therefore, I look upon good classics as pretty good, and exceedingly safe models of style; and, moreover, the beauties you learn of a foreign writer are of the most important and substantial kind. Hence, I approve translation very much by way of learning style; that is, if it be done with great care and accuracy. Among other things, it gives you more leisure to mind the little niceties, while the matter and the general cast of the language are ready provided for you. It is like writing upon lines; which enables learners to form

their letters more perfectly till they have sufficient practice.

I think I derived great benefit from translating Cicero in this manner.*

June 1813.

OF FAVOURS.

It is no bad way of gaining an insight into a man's character to confer a favour on him, or watch him when another does it.

1. If he be overbackward to receive it, and when he does receive it, shows by a profusion of thanks uttered with a kind of solemn formality, and by anxiety to return it, that he feels the obligation a burden, this indicates either that he is proud, or that he dislikes or despises that particular person who has sought to oblige him.

2. If he seems (without appearing insensible of the service) to receive a favour as a thing of course, and as if it was an honour to serve him, this is a sign of a more complete, extravagant, selfish, and senseless pride:

* Writing a little with great exactness, and having the matter found for you, is likely to give a very *finished*, but not perhaps an *easy* and at the same time *nervous* style. For that purpose the best practice probably is writing something of your own, in as small a compass as you can, without the least thought of style, but that it be perspicuous. Now this practice I had by writing in this book; and I think this and the translation were corrections to each other. It is certain I had scarce any other practice in 1809, during which year I improved greatly.

by senseless I mean insensible as well as silly; for where there is much feeling, the pride will be of the former kind, and will make a man *smart* under a favour; which kind of pride, if it be extreme and joined with a malevolent temper and bad principles, produces complete ingratitude; i.e. evil for good. There are some, I believe, who are willing to make an adequate return if they can; but if the favour is altogether above that, they are so mortified by the load of obligation as to be driven into ingratitude. Be cautious, therefore, of obliging (openly) some men too much.

3. But if he seems *not* to feel the favour, or very inadequately, it is a mark of stupidity (i.e. want of intelligence and of feeling) rather than anything worse; and this is in general the ingratitude of the lower orders, savages, &c.

4. But if he seems to undervalue an obligation, not from this, but from suspecting some private end, this shows a mean, selfish, suspicious character, not likely to do a kindness himself.

5. If he be vehemently grateful at first, and soon forget the favour, it indicates thoughtless levity and unsteadiness, rather than a bad heart.

6. There is also an *asking* sort of gratitude, which is in general piled on very profusely; as a good farmer spreads the dung thick on his field in hopes that *justissima tellus* will repay him with the more corn: this indicates an entirely selfish and covetous disposition.

7. There is some care requisite to distinguish this from another description, who are over grateful from a sort of extreme humility, or rather *μικροψυχία*, their thanks are mingled with a sort of wonder, which indicates that such kindness surpassed their expectation; which may be either from a mean opinion of human generosity in general, or of yours in particular; or else from a sort of broken spirit, so that they cannot conceive how any one should think it worth while to serve them.

8. Lastly, if a man's gratitude kindles into love; if, without seeming sorry to have received a favour, he yet seeks opportunities of returning it; if he seems of too lofty a spirit to think that he can be lowered by receiving a favour, but rather compliments you on your discernment in fixing on a grateful object, and shows more anxiety to convince you of this than to get free from the obligation; these are signs of a generous spirit, and, in short, of the very best disposition, both generally, and towards you.

But how, you will ask, are all these things to be ascertained? They cannot always, but accidental circumstances and watchfulness will discover them. I have, at least, shown what you are to watch for; and some preceding articles may afford hints how to watch. 1. It may make a great difference, who and what the person was who conferred the favour, and what it was. 2. Some men's disposition is so backward that they do not express what they feel; others, without dissimulation, express more, &c.; so

that you must study as well as you can the other points in the character of the obliged. 3. Kind things done and said, *out of sight*, in return for a favour, indicate a mixture, at least, of love.

After all, to make friends, it is but a clumsy way to do services. There are so few that you can really serve, in comparison of those whom you may please by little acts of complaisance, and by these a person is never burdened. But the others are, perhaps, the firmest friends, for the reasons in the beginning of this article; and, if you fail to make many *friends*, you will, at least, *do good.*

November, 1813.

OF IGNORANCE.

'NON parvum est scire quid nescias.' Indeed it is one of the most difficult as well as valuable of all species of knowledge. I have studied hard for some years, and the further I proceed, the more 'darkness visible' do I discover. This might prove discouraging to young students; but they should remember that by a confession of real ignorance must real knowledge be gained. Still, even the knowledge of your ignorance is a great thing in itself; so great, it seems, as to have constituted Socrates the wisest of his time.

These are some of the chief sources of *unknown ignorance* that I have noticed:—First, we are not aware, 1. How inadequate a medium language is for

conveying thought. (Hence come undetected ambiguities, verbal disputes and cavils, &c.)

2. How inadequate our very minds are for the comprehension of many things.

3. How little we need understand a word which may yet be familiar to us, and which we may use in reasoning. This piece of ignorance is closely connected with the two foregoing. (Vid. D. Stewart.) (Hence frequently men will accept, as an explanation of a phenomenon, a mere statement of the difficulty in other words.)

4. How totally ignorant we are of efficient causes; and how perfectly the knowledge of philosophers resembles *in kind* that of the vulgar. (Vid. D. Stewart.) E.g. when a stone falls to the earth, which a peasant would say is *the nature of it*, and a philosopher refers to the *principle of gravitation*, many are not aware that he no farther explains the phenomenon than that the stone obeys the *same* law to which *all other* bodies are subject, and to which, for convenience, he gives the name of gravitation. His knowledge is only more *general* than the peasant's, which, however, is a vast advantage.

5. How many words there are that express, not the nature of the things they are applied to, but the manner in which they affect *us*; and which, therefore, give about as correct a notion of those things as the word 'crooked' would, if applied to a stick half immersed in water. (Such is the word *chance*, with all its family.) Vid. p. 141.

6. How many causes may, and usually do, conduce to the same effect. Vid. p. 248.

7. How liable the faculties, even of the ablest, are to occasional failure; so that they shall overlook mistakes (and those often the most at variance with their own established notions) which, *when once exposed*, seem quite gross, even to inferior men. Vid. Campb. 132.

8. How much all are biassed, in all their moral reasonings, by self-love (or, perhaps, rather, *partiality to human nature*), and other passions. The errors arising from these causes, and from not calculating on them, in short from ignorance of our own ignorance, have probably impeded philosophy more than all other obstacles put together.

9. (D. Stewart would add very justly) How little we know of *matter*; no more, indeed, than of mind, though all are prone to attempt explaining the phenomena of mind by those of matter; for what is *familiar*, men generally consider as *well known*; though the fact is often otherwise.

January 1814.

VOLUPTUARY AND CHRISTIAN.

THERE is a very remarkable coincidence in these two characters, in one point, viz.—a strong impression of the uncertainty of human events. No man is altogether indifferent about the real goods, as they are

called (in opposition to transitory pleasures) of life; the chief reason why the pursuit of them is so little attended to by the thoughtless voluptuary must, in many cases at least, be their uncertainty. He sees that the best laid schemes often fail; that life itself is precarious; and so he determines to enjoy the present moment (however trifling in comparison) because it is the only thing he can be sure of. Now this same temper of mind, when impressed with a firm belief of a future state, will be very likely to fix his thoughts entirely on that. Accordingly, the shortness and uncertainty of life are dwelt upon as motives alike by the sensualist and the preacher: parallel passages without number might be quoted from Horace and St. Paul. The latter seems to have been so fully impressed with the feeling I speak of, as to consider these two courses of life the only alternative. His inference from the supposition of no resurrection is, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' I do not mean that there are not strong motives for the practice of virtue independent of a future state; but they are all addressed to men in proportion as they *look forward* to the future part of their life; and therefore must ever have the less influence in proportion as men are more strongly impressed with the uncertainty and shortness of life. And this impression, I contend, forms a good foundation on which to build the character of a thorough-going Christian, who is quite absorbed in the expectation of a future state, and estimates all things on earth according to

the degree of concern they have with that state. I will not deny that in some the appetite for pleasure is stronger than in others, and, when a man is a voluptuary from this cause, the case is altered; but I am convinced, that in many instances, such conduct is not owing to the strength of this one principle of action, but to the weakness of the others, viz. desire of wealth, of reputation, &c., which must always act most weakly on those who are least disposed to *look forward* with confidence on human affairs.

To prove the similarity of disposition from which such opposite effects may arise, let us view cases in which whole bodies of men are brought to this disposition; e. g. a pestilence. This caused at Athens a complete and general sensuality: being now fully impressed with the uncertainty of life, they resolved to enjoy it while they could. The same cause produced in London quite the opposite effect. There is every reason to suppose, that had the Athenians been as firmly convinced of a future state as we are, they would have acted as we did. Those, therefore, who are habitually in something of the same state of mind—viz. those I have been speaking of—may be reasonably expected to follow the one or the other of these two courses, according to their belief or disbelief of a future state. When Christianity was first proposed to one of our Saxon Heptarchs, one of his nobles compared the life of man to the flight of a sparrow through the warm and brilliant hall of state on a winter night; and concluded by welcoming with

eagerness the introduction of a faith which promised something more permanent than earthly objects. I cannot conceive a man of this turn of mind being very diligently devoted to the pursuits of wealth, power, &c.; but I can easily conceive him a voluptuary; for, supposing he had a contempt for *all* earthly enjoyments, this will never hinder one from gratifying his *present inclination*, however weak; it will only hinder him from pursuing *remote and hard-earned* gratifications.

It may be urged, that religion calls on the voluptuary to forego present gratification for the sake of something remote, of whose reality he can never be so certain as of the reality of present pleasure. Doubtless, those whose sensuality proceeds rather from the strength of their appetites than from the feelings I have described, and those, again, who have but a faint belief in a future state, will not be disposed to listen to the call, or else we should not see so many voluptuaries; but still I can conceive it a probable, and I believe it a frequent case, that a man may be loth to trust so much to the future events of *this* life as to sacrifice present gratifications on that ground, and yet may be ready to sacrifice them for the promise of a future state. The expectation of future worldly events, e. g. the success of our schemes, &c., *never exceeds*, and very often falls short of, a strong probability; whereas, I do believe that most men have a moral certainty, or something very near it, of a future state of rewards and punishments. The great

difficulty is, not to make men *believe* this, but to make them *seriously* and earnestly think about it; and this I conceive will be the hardest task in the case of those whose *serious* thoughts are taken up with worldly pursuits. I, for my part, should have had more hope, if I had been an apostle, of converting a sensualist than an avaricious, or ambitious, calculating, worldly man.

Accordingly, our Lord and his followers do seem to have succeeded better with publicans and sinners than with such men.

I believe the voluptuary does very often heartily despise the whole world, and everything in it, his own pursuits included. One reason, indeed, for this may be, that he has *tried* the value of his own objects; whereas, those who are pursuing *distant* objects are always likely to overrate them, from the dazzling colours in which hope decks them out.

January 1814.

OF GENEROSITY.

If a man who feels himself capable of generous and exalted conduct (I don't mean, feels that he shall always act thus, for who dare promise himself this? but who feels that 'tis not beyond his conception, or immaterial to him), measures others by his own standard, he must be first disappointed and then dissatisfied with almost all the world * For

* A celebrated ancient (alluded to in Butler's Sermons on

very few (I do not say, are capable, but) have even any conception of, or any pretension to, real heroic generosity.* To enter fully into the feelings and interests of others, to sacrifice the most important and darling objects, for the sake of some duty whose omission would not be considered as very culpable, if at all; especially where there is no one to look on and applaud; such conduct as this, if they do not absolutely deride it as romantic, they at least regard it as that ἡρωϊκὴ ἀρετή which is ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπος, and can't fairly be expected of them.

Forgiveness) says, that as he never excused a fault in himself, he could not tolerate any in others.

* On generosity, see A. Smith, Mor. Sent.

It seems to consist chiefly in standing by, as it were, to contemplate all your own actions in the character of an unconcerned and judicious spectator; imperiously dictating to yourself, in spite of all individual feelings, that conduct which would appear to such a spectator the most beautiful. A generous man forgives injuries, is warmly grateful for favours, serves his enemies, is firmly attached to his friends, does good out of sight, and is above all motives of petty vanity and other selfishness, and stands ever ready to make the greatest sacrifices to duty, and to go through with it, *coute qui coute*, without hesitation. To take any unfair advantage, or even to take all his fair ones—to press his rights to the utmost—to press close to the limits of what is wrong, and anxiously consider whether he may not be allowed to do this or omit that, he disdains, and feels degraded by it: in short, he is like a very neat and cleanly man, who does not merely dress for company, but even when alone is disgusted to find himself slovenly, or such as he would be loth to be seen by one of his own exact taste.

If, again, such a man, finding it is in vain to expect such generosity, even from the better sort, and that they do not expect it of him, comes to measure himself by their standard, and to be content with coming up to it, it is evident he will act below what he is capable of, and what is consequently expected of him; for the same thing, which may be very excusable, and even right, for others to do or omit, may be far otherwise to a person of more exalted sentiments. 'Every man shall be judged according to that he hath, and not according to that he hath not.'

His only way, then, is to *fancy himself the only generous being in the world.* I say to *fancy*, because there is no reason he should not *believe*, in the abstract, that there are others; but he should never *expect* it in any one instance, till it has been most copiously and clearly proved by experience.

Objection: 'This will make him think over highly of himself, and despise others.' I deny both; for, 1st. He is not to think his *conduct* better than others, only his *capabilities* (for by a generous character I mean what I have been all along speaking of); and thus, feeling that more is required of him, as being placed in a higher walk of duty, he will even be the less satisfied with his conformity to so lofty a standard. 2nd. By not expecting of men in general virtues of which they are incapable, he will be the more ready to do justice to their real good qualities and their conformity to their own standard; whereas,

had he expected more of them, the disappointment would have produced far more contempt and, withal, indignation, for what most moves these feelings is what *falls below expectation.* A man of any sense does not despise a peasant or mechanic at all in the same way he would a gentleman who should have the mind of a peasant.

Still, it may be thought that, in spite of his frequent failures, which humble him, still the consciousness of his *high station*, if I may say so, must beget, at least, a certain kind of pride. Be it so. As a gentleman, a peer, a king, have a consciousness of superior station to others, and as that sense of dignity, or proper pride,* as it is sometimes called, which arises from that consciousness fairly and duly, is not only right, but is needed to make them fill their stations gracefully: so it is here. That proper sense of his own dignity, which may be called μεγαλοψυχία, is necessary for a great and generous disposition if he would act up to his character. The excess thereof is to be checked principally by

* It is remarkable that generous and ungenerous pride are not only different (as all would allow), but in most points opposite: a man of the former character makes allowances for others which he will not for himself; the latter allowances for himself which he will not for others: he is ready enough to think that this and that is not good enough for him; but the other thinks a base action not good enough for him, and does not regard his superiority as a privilege to act in a manner which, in his view, would place him on a level with, or beneath, those he despises.

habits of piety. He who reflects much on religious subjects cannot but feel his own littleness in the strongest manner; and by continually asking himself 'who made thee to differ from another? or what hast thou that thou didst not receive?' he will be guarded against despising his inferiors. So much for pride; and, as for vanity, no one will be less liable to it. Vid. Arist. on this subject.

A man, then, of this temper and this rule will do the most generous actions himself, as things of course, and yet will make the readiest allowance for others' deficiencies; he will do good without calculating upon much gratitude, yet will be grateful with most generous ardour himself; with the most inexhaustible and good-humoured benevolence, he will take men as he finds them, doing justice to their merits, and not despising them for the want of heroic generosity, but making allowance, as we do for the want of reason in brutes; and when he does meet with a thoroughly congenial character he will be the more pleased:

Grata superveniet quæ non sperabitur.

February 1814.

OF ATTENTION.

It is a fact, and a very curious one, that many people find they can best attend to any serious matter when they are occupied with something else

which requires a little, and but a little, attention; such as working with the needle (which, by the bye, gives the women a great advantage over us), cutting open paper leaves, or, for want of some such employment, fiddling anyhow with the fingers (which most are prone to when earnestly engaged), or watching birds building nests, &c. Now, as the best philosophers are agreed that the mind cannot actually attend to more than one thing at a time, but, when it so appears, is, in reality, shifting with prodigious rapidity backwards and forwards from one to the other, it seems strange that attention to one train of ideas should be aided by this continual, though unperceived, distraction to another. The truth is, I conceive, that it is next to impossible to keep the mind closely fixed to any one train of thought, except for a very short time, and that when we suppose this to be the case there are, in reality, continual little digressions, which frequently do not (often do) leave a trace on the memory, which are excited, either by some casual association with one of the ideas of the train, or by bodily sensations, and from which the attention is continually returning to its former course. (Vid. D. S. Ph. c. 6,§ 1, p. 410.) If I first attend to any subject, as I think, exclusively, and afterwards, beginning to cut open paper leaves, find that I attend no worse than before, it seems quite evident that I *did not* before attend *more exclusively* than after, and consequently that I had then, though I knew it not, my attention as much drawn off by extraneous

objects. Taking it, then, for granted that we seldom or never can prevent entirely these occasional wanderings of attention, let us consider how to make the best of the case. We find our attention most broken when it is called off by things interesting, or things which introduce others that lead us into a train from which we are some time returning to our main object, and these our roving senses are perpetually apt to present to us. The best way must be, therefore, since our thoughts cannot be confined wholly to the main object, to present to them some subordinate object (and confine them to it) which shall be just interesting enough to withhold our attention from those which present themselves to our senses, and yet not enough to draw off much of our attention (such is needlework to one who is familiar with it, but not to a child who is first learning it); and this subordinate object will not only draw off our attention from the surrounding objects of sense, but will also check those wandering thoughts which are suggested by the principal train of ideas; for, being associated with this principal train, it will form a sort of topical memory, and will thus perpetually recall us to what we are about.

Thus, by it we have arrived at the very same expedient which experience has shown to be so useful; for instance, the great advantage of some such employment as needlework, turning, &c.*

* Hence too, though it is reckoned uncivil, when another is reading or speaking to you, to look out of the window or play

Hence, too, the chief advantage of meditating on paper. The act of writing withholds the attention, as before, and the words written are more even than the above topical kind of memory, for they present to you the past part of the train: 1st, in regular order; 2nd, connected with them, not by an extemporaneous association, as above, but by an established and habitual one.

March 1814.

ON RELATIONS AND FRIENDS.

I THINK men's *first* and *last* regard is generally bestowed on their relations; the inside space on other friends. Young people at first confine their regard in great measure to their own family, because they know not much of others, but are used to these, and also are taught that they ought to love them. Afterwards they begin to form exalted, and sometimes romantic, notions of friendship; they find that their relations have many faults, perhaps, from which others have been exempt; they consider that chance makes relations, and choice friends; and they think it would be strange if, out of the whole world, they cannot select some who are more deserving of regard, and more suited to them, than those few who have happened to be born of their single race; and these

with a dog, &c., as implying inattention, yet we should be aware that in reality it does not necessarily imply any such thing.

they hope not only to meet with, but so to conciliate as to form a connection not less strong than that of blood.

But as they advance in years, these notions frequently alter, from various causes.

1st. Their friends often turn out cold or treacherous; which lessens their expectations of friendship in general, but does not proportionably lower their regard for their kindred; which is in a certain degree compatible with considerable distrust and dislike of mankind, and coldness of heart; there is, in short, something of *selfishness* in the feeling.

2nd. From finding how rare those generous sentiments are, which are the only bond of friendship, they conceive that they hold their friends by a more precarious tenure than they formerly conceived; and this turns their minds more towards their relations, on whom (though they do not, perhaps, think more highly of them than of others) they have some kind of *hold*. A man may cease to be your friend, but not your relation; therefore, as he cannot easily break off all connection with you, he will generally be induced to make the best of it. In this respect a relation is to a friend as a wife to a mistress; husband and wife are often induced to agree tolerably from the difficulty of parting. Relations are also not likely to quarrel with you so heartily as friends, because any ill they may say of you, or that befalls you, reflects some discredit on themselves.

3rd. As men grow older, they are apt to lose their

high and generous notions of acting according to the καλὸν καθ' αὑτό, and rather go by what is decent and proper in the opinion of the world; now the world do not expect much of a man in the way of friendship, but are scandalised if he neglects his relations.

4. The children and connections of your relations are also your relations, but not so with your friends; this gives you another superior hold on the former, as a friend is more likely to be completely drawn away from you by marriage than a relation. I may add that as men grow old, and lose the friends of their youth, they do not often make new ones for whom they have the same warm attachment; whereas children, grandchildren, nephews, &c., have as strong a claim upon them as brothers, cousins, &c., had; so that relationship is usually better *kept in repair* than friendship. It is evident, from what has been said, that the nobler kind of men are generally less under the influence of these causes.

July 1815.

OF TOTALITY OR EUSYNOPTICITY.

THERE is a faculty, or, if you will, a quality of the faculties, which well deserves a distinct name; for it is itself distinct, i.e. is not implied in any other, it is of great practical value, and it forms a striking feature in the character of those who profess it. I have heard the word 'grasp' used to express it; perhaps totality would be the most readily understood;

but any name, if once agreed on, would be better than none. It is the power of taking in the whole of a subject *as* a whole; of contemplating many things together in their mutual relations, of referring any individual object presented to the mind, to the system, &c., with which it is connected, just as Cuvier, from a single fragment of a bone, can describe the whole animal; it is a power, not merely of collecting and recalling the various parts of a subject, but of so arranging and combining them as to contemplate a single whole. This talent may be compared to that of a general, in whom, perhaps, the chief point of skill is, not to let his troops fight in detail, but to bear in his mind at once the situation of each separate corps, absent or present, their means of communication and mutual support, and the hostile position which they may command, or be exposed to. There is, perhaps, no faculty so much the gift of nature as totality; it may be improved by education, but when it is deficient, all the pains that can be taken will go, I think, a less way towards remedying that defect than almost any others. And persons of no education at all will frequently possess it in a high degree, though, of course, from their limited knowledge and want of cultivation, they have much less opportunity of using and displaying it. If such a person receives education, you will, of course, perceive more and more—every fresh pursuit he applies to, every fresh point of knowledge he acquires—the employment and seeming development of this faculty; but I

doubt whether it is the faculty itself that is improving all this time; probably no more than a man's eyesight is improved, when he is placed a top of a hill. The difference that may be perceived in respect of this power in those who are on a level in point of intellectual cultivation (viz. those who have none at all), sufficiently proves that at least nature has a great share in it. Now, I have heard it remarked by a very acute observer that sometimes one person will be struck with several brilliant passages in a sermon, and perhaps be able to repeat them, without having the least notion of the general outline of argument; while another, though he cannot repeat a single sentence, will be able to give a correct account of the drift of the whole discourse. For it is not in general found that this talent is united with a particularly quick perception and ready recollection of particulars, *as* such; though it will enable its possessor most wonderfully to outdo those of far better individual memory; it is the attainment and retention of things which can be formed into a system, and, as it were, tied together in a bunch. (In this respect it is like an ear for music (which, indeed, in its own way, may be called a species thereof), for I do not know that those who have an ear retain single sounds better than others; but they are enabled to retain a vast number, by means of their mutual relation in a tune. That their remembrance of a tune is not the collective remembrance of the *individual notes,* but of their mutual *relation,* is quite evident from this; that if

they begin any tune in a higher or lower note than they heard it, they will go *all through* the *same*, and thus bring out notes which it is conceivable they never heard in their lives.)

This talent is in all points of view immensely important; it constitutes almost the whole excellence of some who are universally allowed to be very superior men; and whom ordinary people would be content to call sensible, able, judicious, clever, &c., without being able to fix upon the very circumstance that constitutes them such, or to point out any one quality in which they much surpass others. This is the talent requisite above all others to form a politician, or any one who is concerned in any *architectonic* study. A person who holds any such leading office as that of a statesman, &c., and has not this talent, will be so far from turning to good account the other talents he may possess, that they will only tend to make him more mischievous; for he will be the better able to accomplish with skill the petty and partial schemes, to defend the narrow and shortsighted measures to which he will inevitably be inclined. The more *clever* a man is, if he is not *wise* ('wisdom,' I think, expresses, or at least implies, that species of totality which is concerned in practice), the more harm he will do, even though his intentions are good. But if a leading man possesses this talent he will do very well without a large portion of any others; for there will be found plenty of men capable of conducting the details of business with great skill, though

they have not a particle of totality, and are, perhaps, all the better without it.*

A good farmer may easily get labourers who can guide a plough, or sow turnips, better than himself, whereas, one who is ever so skilful in these operations may manage the farm very ill; 'Infelix operis summæ,' &c.

I think it may be affirmed, as a general rule, that women have much less totality than men (vid. ¶ 106, p. 365). Those who do not possess it will sometimes admire those who do, without well knowing why; but, generally, they underrate them, unless they also excel in other points. What is true of some other faculties (with *wit*, though, I believe it is rather the reverse), is much more so of this, viz. that no one can estimate it sufficiently but those who possess it themselves; for it is very closely and naturally connected with that candour which puts a fair and full value on each various kind of excellence — on the 'diversity of gifts of the same spirit'—and those who want it are apt to limit their admiration to excellence in their own province, or at least in *some one definite* province, as they are not qualified even to form an adequate conception of the talent I am speaking of.†

* Δόξειε δὴν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ κάλως ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ.—Ar. Eth. i. 7.

† The want of this quality which I continually feel, and the craving after it which I am continually sensible of, convinces me, for the above reason, that I am not entirely des-

It must not be forgotten (as Aristotle would say) that there is both ἁπλῶς εὐσυνοπτικὸς, καὶ κατά τι μέρος: a man may possess this faculty in some particular pursuit (as, e. g. the farmer instanced above), but not generally: it is, perhaps, most common in the mathematical sciences, from the definite invariable and demonstrable relation which in them one truth bears to another; it is most rare and precious in the affairs of life, from their being of an opposite nature. In these the faculty assumes ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον than any other whatever. When very *general* (ἁπλως), and possessed in a high degree, it is, I think, necessarily united with a very exalted tone of piety; the want of it is peculiarly apt to lead men of narrow ingenuity—of confined and partial speculations—into scepticism; in short, totality forms the very wings of the butterfly (vid. page 61); according as these

titute of it. I am also convinced of this by my high admiration for those who are distinguished for it, such as C.; for though I fall infinitely short of him, I often find that I have the capacity to enter into and admire his views; I can even so adopt them that they become as familiar to me as if they had been originally my own, and that they fit in and take root in my mind; in short, I am to him what a crab tree is to an apple tree; I cannot of myself bear the same fruit, but I can take his grafts. [I have left this note, as curiously showing the early aspirations of my father's mind. In after life most would have considered him to have been peculiarly characterised by this very *largeness* or *totality* of views, after which he at this time was so earnestly seeking.—Ed.]

are unexpanded, or are wanting, you will remain in the chrysalis state, either for the time or permanently.

October 1815.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

It is curious to observe how each pursuit becomes narrowed or enlarged according to the mind of the person. The most exalted studies seem to assume a littleness when cultivated by a little mind; and *vice versâ*. He who wants enlarged views degrades whatever he applies to. As a scholar his ultimate end is the study of minute differences of accent and metre, or perhaps of some obscure mythological trifles; his utmost ambition is the deciphering a Greek manuscript; he reads Aristotle *for the sake of the Greek!* Is he a logician (and such seem many logicians formerly to have been), his *ultimate end* is *Barbara celarent,*' and all the minute technicalities. Even divinity is debased in such hands into a study of petty verbal disputes, and of external rites, and forms, and rules. As a naturalist, he is busy and contented with enquiring whether such and such species had better be placed under one, two, or three genera, or whether a certain shade in the wings of some butterfly is a specific difference, or only a variety. Those who know any pursuit will have no need to be told that I do not at all exclude all these things from being objects of attention, but of a *con-*

fined and *exclusive* and *ultimate* attention. All these little things have their use; nay, and they are worthy of attention even beyond their *use*, since the *roundness and finish* they give to any system, while it affords a very innocent and rational amusment to the mind (such as I feel very strongly in *Barbara celarent*, and many other things) tends by this means to give a greater zest to the pursuit, whose very artificial technicalities become thus the source of associated pleasure. (See A. Smith, Mor. Sent., part iv. c. ii. p. 392, &c.) Nay, while I despise the *person* who is not able to *look beyond* all these things, I do not at all find fault with the *institution* of nature, that such persons should be common. I believe people labour better in their own little sphere from *overrating the importance* of it. The man who thought rivers were created for the purpose of supplying canals; he who, in a treatise on dyeing, reckoned it among the most important of arts, and a thousand other such grubs, are very contemptible indeed; but if you were to take from them this narrow and overweening estimate, you must supply its place by a most extraordinary diligence of disposition, or they would flag in those pursuits which are undoubtedly useful, and perhaps the *most* useful *they* could be employed in. It is lucky for us that the bee does not look upon the honeycomb in the same light we do.

Moreover, this disposition is a useful counterbalance to the opposite fault so many run into of

despising little things too much, for want of perceiving their *full and combined* effect. Both these opposite faults proceed evidently from the very same want of totality. It is the part of an able man to have a due value for *little* things; the narrow-minded man wants this as much as anybody, for *to him* they are *great* things.

Many would object, on reading the above, that every subject, if followed up through all its bearings, branches out into infinity, and that too wide a view of it is not so good as a close and accurate one. Now, if anyone ever had a *passion* for accuracy, I have. The above fault is the last that a man of real totality will fall into. To contemplate any subject in all its relations, and as a part of some great whole, is so far from leading to inaccuracy that it will often guard you against errors. There are some in Smith's 'Wealth of Nations' which would have been prevented by a more comprehensive view. To wander from a subject, and to have an *enlarged view* of it, are two very different things. Nothing can be more distinct than a *rambling* and a comprehensive mind. There does not, perhaps, exist a better proof of this than *Aristotle*, who always knows where he is, always keeps to the *part* he is about, yet never loses sight of the *whole*; he has a microscope and a telescope always at hand; in short, he has the eye of a bird.

OF LEARNING GRAMMAR

SOME great man or other said (I don't agree with him), 'Take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves;' it might be said with much greater truth of many parts of learning, 'Take care of the easy things, and the hard ones will take care of themselves;' or, treat the easy parts as if they were hard, and the hard parts will become easy. I have formerly remarked, I believe, that the way to make out a difficulty is, not to puzzle at it, but to familiarise yourself with those parts which you do understand, till they gradually throw light on the more obscure. This is particularly evident in the learning of languages. If men could but be persuaded to read easy books with very great care and attention, they would acquire such a knowledge of the language as they might apply with the greatest advantage when they came to harder ones; but, unfortunately, they generally will be satisfied with making out (or fancying they make out) the meaning; and when they can do this with ease, they are for proceeding to a harder book; and when they are stopped by its difficulties, they have to learn and apply, at once, those rules which they should have been already familiar with.

My rule will apply also very well to the right method of learning grammar. It is very common in Greek, e. g. to plague boys with learning the anomalous verbs as soon as they are *tolerably* perfect in the

regular ones; this does more harm than good, for the quantity of irregular tenses is so great (not to mention the artificial difficulty of those verbs which are not really irregular, but defective, and borrowers) that in the long time they are learning them the *chime* of the regular tenses, which ought to be as familiar as the alphabet, is driven out of their heads; whereas much the best way would be to let these alone, and begin *reading* (I would at first even give them select sentences which had no irregular verbs in them), and when they came to an irregular tense they should look for the verb it comes from, and learn it, which they would then be less likely to forget; and thus they would pick them up almost imperceptibly in practice. A vast help toward this would be a plan used in Laisne's (on the whole bad) Portuguese grammar, which is an alphabetical list of the most irregular tenses with their verbs over against: this would make the reference perfectly easy. I am convinced that the long fag I had in learning the anomalous verbs was time and labour much more than thrown away.

October 1815.

[*Note by Editor.*—It should be remembered that this was written very many years before the systems of Ollendorff, and others of the same kind, had been thought of. The coincidence between the views expressed in this paper and those brought forward in these modern systems of teaching a language is very remarkable.]

OF THREE STAGES OF INTELLECT.

Most, if not all, who attain to a certain point of intellectual excellence, have passed through two previous stages. The first is that in which a man judges from obvious external appearances, adopts implicitly established notions and practices, assents without enquiry, and sees without much observation, or at least observes without much ambition to account for phenomena, and is satisfied with the ὅτι without the διότι. In the second stage, he eagerly examines and endeavours to account for everything; instead of being contented with ignorance, he thinks his capacities equal to everything; he hastily rejects vulgar prejudices, and ridicules established customs, and is for altering and reforming and perfecting everything. The third state, which is that of mature judgment and enlarged views, though the most remote from the first, yet practically reapproaches to it; he now perceives the origin of many common notions and practices, and the utility even of many which are erroneous; he does many things and believes many things in common with the vulgar, though on *different grounds;* he has just that degree of respect for popular belief, as neither to adopt nor reject hastily; and he discriminates accurately where truth and falsehood, right and wrong, are blended. He perceives the bounds of human capacity, and attempts not to explain what is beyond it; he perceives that many things which appear at first sight (or rather, at second

sight) faulty, are best as they are; and of those alterations which are really desirable, he perceives what are and what are not attainable.

* These three states may not unaptly be compared to those of the grub, chrysalis, and butterfly. The narrow views and lazy implicit belief of the first state are closely correspondent to the condition of the crawling grub, confined to the plant on which he was hatched, devouring it leaf after leaf, and minding nothing beyond. The chrysalis, wrapped up in a fine web of its own spinning, neither increasing in bulk nor providing for the continuance of the species, and lost to all useful purposes except the gradual inward change which is preparing him for a subsequent development, is not unlike some modifications of that above-mentioned second stage of intellect, in which a

* Another comparison by which this progressive state may be illustrated, is that of the different states of strong liquors; musk, or sweet-wort, would be a good representation of the weak, mild, flat character of the first class; the turbid, unsettled, agitated, and varying state of a fermenting liquor would well represent the second class; and the third would be equally well figured by the perfect liquor, which has now thrown off its scum, &c., regained its transparency, and acquired its strength and flavour. And the various characters into which men settle when their fermentation is over, and their minds fully formed, correspond with the various kinds of winged insects. Aristotle is said to have thus described two of his pupils. There is yet another change which fermented liquor undergoes if ill kept; and we sometimes see men, from disappointments and other causes, end by being soured into vinegar. December 1815.

man who is disgusted with common notions and practices without having yet formed a better system of his own, is entangled and enclosed in fine-spun speculations which withhold him from the world in self-sufficient and torpid retirement. In some, however, this second stage assumes a more busy and bustling character, and raises them to a higher and more active condition than their first; they take a wider range than before, they attain general improvement, and approach, not only really, but visibly, to their last point of perfection. These correspond to that more active chrysalis state which some insects, e. g. the gnat, experience; the chrysalis of the gnat, instead of lying torpid, or crawling at the bottom of the water, like the grub, darts about in that element with an agility which seems an obvious approach to the brisk and airy range of the finished insect.

The third state of intellect, that of the sound and enlightened philosopher, is strikingly similar to that of the butterfly and the other various tribes of winged insects; their boundless range through the air, the brilliant wings, especially of the butterfly, its delicate diet of honey, and elegant apparatus for procuring it, its light hovering from flower to flower, with a preference however for the plant which it sprang from, and on which it lays the eggs that are to produce a future colony of creatures like itself, all correspond remarkably (as well as the curious Greek name of ψύχη) with the richly stored and cultivated mind, the refined and lofty and varied pursuits, the exten-

sive range and enlarged views, of the philosopher; as also with his partial return (though on new principles, and, as it were, hovering on wings), to his *first notions* and practices; together with his useful exertions for the transmission of knowledge and enjoyment, and for the general good of his species.

In using the above comparison (which will be found not merely entertaining, but extremely convenient, in saving long descriptions by a mere allusion to it), two modifications are to be kept in view; first, that the changes from one of these states to another are not (as in the insect), entire and complete; and, second, that they frequently never take place at all. Thus you will find, indeed most frequently, that he who is a butterfly in some points, is in others a chrysalis, and in some, perhaps, still a grub, all at the same time; and many remain all their lives in the chrysalis state, many more live and die grubs. Savages, and the lower orders, together (with vast numbers of the higher), are always grubs. They go to church, &c., as if there was a certain magical efficacy in the external forms of religion; they have a blind instinctive veneration for their governors and other superiors, adhere to the established order of things because it *is* established, and perform a certain routine of duties, because they have been accustomed to do so, and have been told that they ought. These are a very useful sort of people, as far as they go, and frequently act and believe much more wisely than they are themselves aware. The chrysalis, on the contrary, is

often a dangerous or useless animal; for under this head come all enthusiastic reformers, wanton innovators, sectaries, infidels, democrats, projectors, &c. Such also are hermits, monks, misanthropes, sentimentalists, Berkeleyans, and castle-builders. Nothing indeed can be more likely to lead to absurd or mischievous conclusions, than a want of self-distrust, and a disposition to reject with indiscriminate contempt whatever has a mixture of error and imperfection, without perceiving, selecting, and retaining, the good which is to be found in it; and this is exactly the temper of men in the chrysalis state: they want CANDOUR. A few applications of the above comparison will explain and demonstrate its convenience. A staunch Arminian is a grub; a staunch Calvinist, a chrysalis; a butterfly, neither; a violent Tory, a grub; a violent Whig, a chrysalis; a true and judicious friend of the constitution is the butterfly. The grub is liable to superstition; the chrysalis to infidelity. The slave of fashion is a grub; the affecter of singularity a chrysalis. The Spanish and Portugese nations, grubs; the French, a chrysalis; the English, a butterfly.*

September 1815.

* Among the Ancients, some appear to have been slaves to the popular superstitions (as Nicias) (grubs); others to have seen through and *openly derided* the folly of them; as the Roman general who threw the sacred chickens into the sea when they refused to eat, saying, 'bibant igitur,' and was of course defeated; he was a chrysalis. The butterflies were those who, scorning in their heart these things, professed be-

OF PEDANTRY.

IT is a reproach to a man of any profession to 'smell of the shop.' This in the learned professions is called pedantry; but however the name be applied, the *thing* is found in all professions, and chiefly in those which are *not* learned. No one has it more than a common sailor. The fault consists in two things: 1st, in forcing in subjects or expressions belonging to one's profession (to which, perhaps, the name of pedantry is most strictly applied); 2nd, in a general cast of manner which savours too much of that profession. E.g. a lawyer is guilty of the first, when he is perpetually quoting law out of place; of the second, when he speaks of other subjects as if he was pleading.

There is no profession to which this latter kind of fault adheres more inseparably than that of a tutor. In many professions there is little or no danger of this fault, because there is little or nothing of peculiar in the *manner* belonging to them; so that if he can but keep clear of the matter he is safe. A physician, e.g., is not likely to smell of the shop if he does but avoid medical topics. In a tutor, on the contrary, the *manner* of his profession is very peculiar, and very likely to peep out in conversation. He is accustomed (if he performs his office well) to *lay down*

lief, and employed them with immense success, to influence the minds of the grubs; as Numa, Agis, Cæsar, Sertorius, and, in short, almost all very great men. November 1815.

his precepts with an air of perfect certainty; and if he gives *proof* of what he affirms it is always with such an air as to show that it is merely *for the satisfaction of the pupil*, not from any *doubt* in his own mind. He bestows *authoritative commendation* or censure on what his pupil says; asks him questions avowedly for the purpose of *trying his ability* or acquirements, not for the sake of *gaining information*; and says, 'Very well,' or, 'No; you are wrong,' to his answers. He delivers his instructions as what must necessarily be good, and ought to be received for the reasons which he gives, *if the pupil can understand his reasoning*; if not, on *his authority*. All doubt and hesitation, all deference and submission to the judgment of the other, and apparent desire to learn from *him*, must utterly be excluded. His manner, in short, is didactic and authoritative, which, though perfectly compatible with the utmost mildness, must still be wholly at variance with the proper style of common conversation. *There* we should show diffidence of ourselves, deference for others, a desire to receive, rather than give, instruction, a modest distrust of our own opinions, and openness to conviction; and though we may express our approbation or disapproval of anything that is said, yet this should not be spoken *ex cathedrâ*, as if our decision *stamped the value* of whatever is spoken, and as if the speaker depended on *that* either to be duly encouraged or to stand corrected. In short, the respective excellences of tuition and of ordinary conversation are exactly opposite;

and yet it is peculiarly difficult to prevent the latter from having a cast of the former, from the circumstance of their being on the whole very much alike; alike inasmuch as they come under the same genus, though their *differentias* are opposite. There is no other profession the exercise of which is so much like ordinary conversation.

The lawyer will probably be reminded of what he is about by missing the solemn and crowded court; the schoolmaster, by perceiving that he is surrounded by grown people: but the tutor is accustomed to speak to those who are not children, and that in a private room; and moreover, if he is a good tutor, he is not wholly nor principally occupied in hearing them construe a book, &c.: his *trade*, in short, is *conversation*—not ordinary conversation indeed, but enough like it to spoil it. Much greater allowance should therefore be made for a tutor who is guilty of the above fault than for anyone else, and the more, inasmuch as his readiest way of escaping the fault is to be a bad tutor. If he converses with his pupils either not at all, or in a different style from what I have described, he may be a very agreeable man very much at the expense of those he has to teach. I don't mean that it is *impossible* to avoid the fault without sacrificing the merit of a good tutor; but it is so very *hard*, that while we bestow the highest applause on him who succeeds in this, we should make ample allowance for him who does not. We should regard him as a sacrifice to the public

good; and a sacrifice the more meritorious because he not only is in general poorly paid, but also might probably be as well paid and as popular in his tutorial capacity, and much more popular as a man, if he were to sacrifice his duty for the sake of popularity. To be a good tutor is far more important to society (though in general far less so to oneself) than to be an agreeable man. The two are not *incompatible*, but according as the former or the latter is made the *primary object*, must a man's conscientiousness be judged of.

September 1816.

ON THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE.

D. STEWART very truly observes that when the attention flies off from anything we are striving to learn, we cannot so well remedy this by a direct effort of forcing it, as by contriving to place the subject in a more interesting light. Curiosity is as much the parent of attention as that is of memory; and he who undertakes to teach a man what he has no curiosity to learn, proceeds, and succeeds, much as a farmer would who should sow his land without having ploughed it. But a mere *general* curiosity to understand any subject, though very necessary, is far from sufficient: you should also have a *particular* curiosity about *particular* points in that subject. E. g. you should not only have a general wish to understand Ethics, or

what Aristotle has said of it; but you should also have a *particular* wish to understand what virtue consists in; how far it is natural or acquired, &c. &c. To excite this curiosity, then, is the *first business* of the teacher (first not only in point of *time*, but of *importance*); and all who understand their business will find means to effect it occasionally in the course of their instruction; but I could wish to see it done systematically. I have made some rude essays towards such a plan, by proposing questions to my pupils, such as are treated in the book they are to read; when they have bestowed their thoughts on these, and especially if they have been puzzled with them, they read the solution with avidity, take it in easily, and remember it firmly.

Nothing tends more to excite curiosity than the analytical method of teaching; nothing is more dry than the synthetical; which is the best form, indeed, in which to *store up* your knowledge; but the analytical is the best for first *introducing* it. How dry is the grammar of a language before one begins (especially if it be the first foreign language learnt) to read in it! Much, indeed, of this drudgery *must* be gone through, but the less the better; and I wonder at old Lily's method being so often neglected, who advises in his preface not to make a boy go through all his rules in the first place, 'but rather let him read some poetic book,' so that the rules may be learnt as he sees the want of them. How dry the common systems of logic! and how hard to persuade a man who

is told abruptly of the three operations, without having ever thought of the subject, that the study can be interesting and useful! The analytical method, i. e. that in which the system must have been invented, is evidently the very reverse; i. e. to analyse *arguments* must have been the first thing thought of. I am not sure that mathematics might not be introduced in the same way (it certainly is of great use in this study, for a man to practise *inventing* demonstrations, which must of course be done in the analytical way); i. e. by pointing out some interesting truths respecting *natural philosophy*; and when curiosity was roused by them, to proceed backwards towards the first principles, which, when you had thus arrived at them, would be eagerly grasped, and you might then go forwards again with spirit; for I do not mean that any science should be *completely learned* in this method (that would be prolix and ill arranged), only first *introduced* by it.

May 1814.

Education, as usually conducted, is addressed to the memory alone; and that is the reason, one reason at least, why clever boys, as they are supposed to be, do not turn out clever men, and *vice versâ*.

If a boy remembers all that is told him, he does as much as is usually required of him; and no wonder; for he is *told* just everything, and is never called upon to exert his own powers except in retaining; and then it is made a wonder that a person who has been so well taught, and who perhaps was quick in learning

and remembering, should not prove an able man; which is about as reasonable as to expect that a capacious cistern, if filled, should be converted into a perennial fountain. Yet no doubt many men do succeed under this faulty system; but that is owing in great measure to the *defect of their memory.* If the learner finds that he can retain word for word just what has been told him, he is apt to give himself no further trouble about it; but if he is at a loss, then he is *compelled* to think, to reason, to investigate, to conjecture,—in short, to exercise his own faculties; and thus he improves accidentally. Hence it is usually a misfortune for a young man to have a very quick and retentive memory; he advances no more, according to the usual system, in the use of the most important intellectual powers, than he would in learning to swim by sailing in a vessel. Hence, also, the best teachers are often the worst *tutors;* and the most complete, clear, and satisfactory treatises of science are of less service to the mind than more imperfect ones. But if the mode I propose was generally adopted, a man's faculties would be cultivated systematically and not merely by accident; and a good memory would be a real and great advantage to him, instead of proving the means of spoiling him.

September 1816.

OF SHAKING THE HEAD.

MASON'S 'Self-knowledge,' though not worth considering in itself, is a curious phenomenon, if one considers the sale it has had. At first sight, it is natural, as well as pleasing, to suppose that the readers of the twenty editions of a book which has nothing but piety to recommend it, must be of a pious turn; and that, however little instruction it may afford, it must, at least, have a beneficial effect on their hearts, since they read, and read with satisfaction, what they can have. one would think, none but a good motive for reading. Yet I fear that, in reality, all this is not the case; at least, not in anything like the degree one would at first sight hope. Setting aside those who merely *have* such books because they have been given to them, or because they have been told they are good books to have, and think it looks respectable that they should be seen on the shelf, I am convinced that people often *read* such books, and *approve* them, without deriving either instruction or any other benefit whatever, but rather the reverse. They read, with perfect seriousness, Mason or some other religious book because it is *a good thing* to read *good books*; and when they have spent the allotted hour or two in this wholesome exercise, they rise with the satisfactory feeling that their time has been very well employed. Not that their understanding has been in the smallest degree improved or informed, or their feelings rightly

excited, but because everything they have read is perfectly *true* and *good*, and therefore it must needs be a very good thing to read it. They set it down among the praiseworthy actions of their life, instead of regarding such studies as *means* and *means only* towards a further end, the non-attainment of which renders them as utterly worthless as the act of sowing the land with seed which never comes up. I don't say that this is always the case with this or that book; but it is manifest that it may be, and I am certain it is very often. This, then, will fully account for the approbation bestowed on religious and moral books when they are utterly undeserving of it. Where men are really anxious for a certain end, they approve only of these books (or other means) which really conduce to that end: a history which does not inform, a treatise of science which does not instruct, a poem which does not please, are thrown aside; but it is otherwise when that which ought to be regarded as a means is considered as an end, and a merit is attached to the mere act of reading a good book, with the expectation, indeed, that it will make them wiser and better, but with no anxious enquiry whether it answers that purpose or no. If a farmer was paid for *sowing* his field merely, and had no anxiety to get a good crop, he would not distinguish very accurately between good seed and bad. Some may think that a book of this kind, if it does no good, can, at least, do no harm. Not so; for whatever furnishes a man with the pretence of per-

forming a duty when he is not, so far does harm. Nothing is really harmless which is *mistaken* for a virtue. This, indeed, is the only objection to the scourging, &c., of the Papists. In all pursuits, as might be shown by many arguments, but most of all in *the* great one, to *think* that we are advancing when we are not, is a positive evil.

Such books as I have described make people *shake their heads.* I don't mean but what religious and moral books in general have this effect frequently, but that the books I speak of tend to produce *no other.* This gesture is the natural expression (besides when it indicates dissent) of a serious and rather melancholy moral sentiment, as much as to say, 'That is but too true!' or 'Ah! if people would but think of that, they would be much better than they are,' &c. &c. Now, this shake of the head, I think, is a *social* gesture; i.e. it is not the immediate result of the inward feeling, but it is the instinctive effort to *indicate to others* that you have that feeling. Accordingly we do not, I think, use this gesture when *alone*, unless we happen to *conceive* another person present: moreover, for the same reason, this gesture does not necessarily imply that we *have* any strong inward feeling, but only that we wish to *express* such a one.

There is a particular mode of *scratching the head*, not far from the ear, which, I think, is a natural gesture of a very different kind, not *social*, but the immediate indication of a strong inward feeling, such

as we have when we not only *assent* to a truth, but are struck with it, and apply it to *ourselves*, with a strong and somewhat alarming *consciousness* of its importance. A *scratch-my-head* book, then, can hardly be read and approved without doing good, but a *shake-my-head* book very easily may.

Foster's 'Essays' is a book which to me is peculiarly contrasted to Mason. He has not only a great deal of strong and original thinking, but he has a way of bringing everything so home to one's individual feelings, he hits so hard, in short, that I cannot read him without strongly applying what he says to myself. In a word, he makes me scratch my head.

October 1816.

NIL ADMIRARI.

I PRETEND not to decide on the precise sense in which Horace used this expression, but there is a certain class of gazing and gaping philosophers whom I hold in great contempt—I mean moralists especially. To *admire*, indeed, is quite worthy a philosopher, since the more we contemplate the works of God the more of this feeling we shall have; but *surprise* (which properly signifies the feeling excited, not by the *wonderful*, but the *unexpected* [see A. Smith]) is what the philosopher should strive to get rid of, and which he will feel less and less the more wisdom he attains, on account of the uniformity of nature's laws, which is ever the most clearly perceived the further we carry

our researches; since many apparent exceptions to those laws turn out, when examined as to all their circumstances, to be so many confirmations of them.

That absence of surprise, indeed, which arises from a total want of attention to the phenomena around us, I don't commend. Surprise is natural and proper at the *commencement* of a course of speculation, but it is most absurd to make it at the *end* thereof also; and to stand marvelling and staring to the very last at those phenomena which it is the very object of the philosopher to account for (i.e. to refer to their general laws), and thus make them no longer objects of surprise.

What I have said is directed against some, not a few, moral writers, who call our attention to this or that strange phenomenon in human conduct, and then, when they have pointed out the strangeness and excited surprise, they leave you in the puzzle, and seem quite *satisfied* when they have attained the unaccountable.* They 'wonder, and no end of wondering find,' and these, too, not writers professing scepticism (for to such it would be perfectly

* Instances of this are numberless; e.g. the avarice of old men (which many have stared at without attempting to account for; but Cicero de Senectute goes further and makes the strangeness of the phenomenon an argument against the fact!); the opposition between men's principles and conduct in various points; the apparently arbitrary manner in which our various feelings are excited by various classes of objects; the readiness with which nonsense is often overlooked and received; the eagerness of parties; delight in war, &c. &c.

suitable), but professed moral instructors. Now, on what pretence they can profess this, it is hard to say, since their reasonings practically lead to scepticism. They leave us nothing to depend upon with any certainty—no grounds of calculation. Now, the *introduction* paradoxical is very good, but not for a *termination* to be a perfect *ἀπόρια*. It may so happen, indeed, that this or that phenomenon cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we should then confess our ignorance, but not *boast* of it, and rest *satisfied* with arriving at a *cul de sac*.

I am quite provoked with these writers, who thus triumphantly non-plus their readers and themselves; and am always ready to ask them, 'Well, then, this being, as you have shown, so very strange, what is the cause of it? Is it a miracle? Or if not, on what natural principle does it proceed?'

May 1817.

POETRY IMPROPER FOR LEARNERS OF A LANGUAGE.

It occurs to me that a beginner in any language ought never to meddle with verse, but wait till he is got pretty familiar with prose. This is contrary to the usual practice in the dead languages; it being common to introduce boys to Homer among the very first of Greek books, and Virgil and Horace of Latin. I think this may be one of those obstacles which render the acquisition of those languages so tedious and

difficult a task. For the more I reflect on it, the more absurd does the practice appear. The very essence of poetical diction is the *ξενικόν*, the departure from what is common, the *εἰωθυῖα διάλεκτος*; you are not, therefore, teaching the boy Greek—plain, common Greek—but a certain peculiar modification of it; and all the beauty of the poetry, as far as diction is concerned, he utterly loses, since he is thus used to the departure from ordinary expressions before he knows those ordinary expressions themselves. He gets familiar with the exception before the rule. Nor is it merely that, of two kinds of Greek, he learns first what it would be most natural to learn last, with a view to the enjoyment of its beauties (which is like being brought to the wrong end of an eye-trap in artificial landscape); for poetry is not merely a *distinct* kind of language from prose, but is also far more irregular, and consequently more difficult. There is one established set of terms and of idioms which prose writers do not *very* widely depart from; at least, whatever their differences from each other, they do not, at least, vary much each from himself. They trust to their matter to afford sufficient dignity and variety to dispense, at least, with seeking continually for some bold and novel expression merely as such; whereas for poets it is not enough to be *different* from *prose*, they must seek continually for every *variety* of novel and out-of the-way mode of speaking, both as to words and construction. Let anyone but read

Aristotle's Poetry on λέξις, and then say whether the poets ought to be the authors put into the hands of beginners. What success would a foreigner have in learning English who should begin with Milton? The Lake poets, indeed, are quiet and prosaic enough, and so perhaps would the works of Sthenelus be, had they come down to us; but the reading of *real poetry* must, I think, always be improper for tyros. I would not have a youth look at Greek verse till he could construe and parse Xenophon and Herodotus, and the same in Latin.

It should be added that the difficulty of reading verse easily is still further increased by the attention required to the metre and prosody.

Modern languages are never taught on this plan; and though, doubtless, they are in themselves much easier, I have no doubt the ease with which they are acquired is partly owing to this circumstance.

June 1817.

To learn a language from its poetry is like learning botany in a flower garden—each is full of beautiful monsters.

OF THE BEST FOUNDATION OF STYLE.

THERE are many advantages in the style of Hobbes, Hooker, Bacon, &c., over that now in use; and I do not know whether I should not use them, as a

foundation, if I had the instruction of youth in composition. I certainly would, if I had it in my power to make the plan general. It may be a good sign for young writers to be flowery, but there is no need to teach it them. If once they get a flowing, easy style, without nerve, they will rarely amend the fault; whereas solid gold may be easily polished. What our language has gained in elegance it has lost in force. One of its chief corrupters was Addison, whose singular beauties led many to copy his defects, his diffuseness and tautology. Johnson also produced a verbose style from another cause; for though the structure of his language admits of great density, yet it tempts a writer to admit empty sounds for the sake of antithesis. Many of his colours are like sham handles or keyholes, made only to answer to real ones. One of the most nervous of modern writers, and therefore the best for laying a foundation, is Paley.

Feb. 1811.

Some authors write as if they *wanted to say something*; others, as if they *had something to say.* Paley is one of the latter. This is what Butler calls writing with simplicity and in earnest.

May 1817.

OF THE RULING PASSION.

WHAT is meant by a man's ruling passion? (I mean, by those who are careful in their language.) Not *that*, necessarily, which he most usually acts on; for he may be ἀκρατής and frequently led by the temptations of passion to act against his deliberate judgment and habitual intentions; and I think the ruling passion is like the κύριον of a state, that in which the supreme authority resides in quiet and regular times. Now a state may be in constitution, e. g. monarchical or aristocratical, and yet the rules may often be opposed by turbulent mobs; this would not affect the character of the institution, nor prove the government to be democratical, but only ill-obeyed. Nor again is it that which a man's reason assents to and admits to be the most desirable object; for this may have no habitual influence on his sentiments, and he may be like one 'beholding his natural face in a glass,' &c.

The ruling passion is not a *passion* in the ordinary sense of the word, but an habitual sentiment fixing the mind, when in its calm and ordinary state, undisturbed by any immediate temptation, on some object as desirable (I mean as *practically felt* to be desirable, not necessarily as judged to be so by the sober deductions of reason). 'Now what is this,' some one

will say, 'but happiness, or at least apparent happiness, and that which is practically admitted by the feelings to be such?' So that, according to you, it comes out that every one's ruling passion is self-love, that being the desire of happiness. Now, even supposing this to be perfectly correct, it would advance us little or nothing in our enquiry; for all men, indeed, have this self-love or desire of happiness (though in different degrees), but they place their happiness (I mean their apparent happiness, as above defined) in various objects; for it should be observed (what is often overlooked) that self-love, generally speaking, implies other desires, and can hardly exist independent of them: it is only the swivel which turns the gun towards the object which each desire fixes on to be aimed at. Self-love prompts, in a certain sense, the ambitious man to seek power, the friendly man to serve his friends, the epicure his belly, &c., *because* these are the objects suitable to their respective natures, and calculated to gratify their feelings. [To call these feelings 'selfish,' therefore, would be utterly improper, even were that word strictly paronymous with self-love; since they do not *arise* from self-love, but rather, generally speaking, self-love is subservient to them.] Self-love may, indeed, lead us to seek some utterly unknown and inconceivable kind of happiness, which reason tells us will be such, but which of course cannot be the appropriate immediate object of any particular passion; but our feelings in such a case are very

faint; hence men's coldness towards future happiness, of which they can form but an indistinct conception.

After all, therefore, it is not correct to say a man's ruling passion is the *same thing* exactly with his self-love, only that it gives the principal bias to it, and determines its modifications. Self-love leads us (as I have said) to *any* (even inconceivable) kind of happiness that reason may point out; but this is faint. Self-love also leads us to the gratification of *every* passion, when such gratification does not interfere with a greater; but the ruling passion, though not (as I have said) always in practice prevailing, must always prevail over inferior ones when we are acting *deliberately* with a view to happiness, i. e. when we are led by self-love. Lastly, self-love seeks happiness *as such*; the other active principles do not; e. g. the object of curiosity is not happiness, but knowledge; but then, if we find that the attainment of that knowledge constitutes our chief happiness—in other words, if curiosity be our ruling passion, then knowledge will become the main object of self-love, and so of the rest.

It is evident that much of a man's character depends on his ruling passion; not the whole of it, since it may be variously modified and checked by other passions, and by principle; but it must ever be an important feature (I mean where it exists, for I am not sure that every one has such a decidedly predominant passion); it is therefore a great omission

to leave this out, when studying or describing any-one's character. A man might give a very full detail of the business and transactions of each separate department of our government, and yet convey but a faint idea of our constitution compared with one who should in a few lines point out the κύριον of it, and the checks upon that. So, also, it is not enough to be able to enumerate a man's good and bad qualities, without adverting to his ruling passion; no, not even if you describe his conduct also; for the same conduct is not only consistent with, but may even spring from, different passions. A, B, and C may earnestly labour in the same studies for many years. A, from thirst of knowledge; B, for the sake of credit; C, to make his fortune, &c. These will be very different characters, though their conduct is much alike.*

This, then, should be the first thing looked to in forming a judgment of any character, viz. to see if there be any perceptible ruling passion, what it is, and how far it operates.

It is a point of some nicety, since we are not to be led altogether by a man's conduct, nor by his professions, nor what his reason assents to; yet each of these will generally, though it may not be precisely conformable to his ruling passion, be in some measure tinged by it. Perhaps one of the best criterions (when we can, as in case of oneself, obtain knowledge of it) is

* See the contrast between Richard III. and Macbeth.

his *castles in the air*: a reverie is, on the one hand, not regulated by the corrections of sober reason, and yet on the other hand is not usually influenced by the sudden irruption of those casual passions which in practice so often produce *ἀκρασία* and interrupt a man's general plan of life; it is in them, therefore, I think, that the ruling passion bears the most complete sway. Some men's day-dreams *terminate* (for that is the main point) in glory, some in power, some in beneficence, some stop short at wealth, some in comfort and tranquil retirement; this last case seems to bear reference to a sort of negative ruling passion, which I think is by no means uncommon.

Practical rules:—first, if you find your ruling passion a laudable one, be not proud of it, or, if somewhat base, be not too much ashamed of it; and the like in judging of another; for it is in *obeying* or *disobeying*, *indulging* or *repressing*, good and bad impulses, that merit and demerit consist; not in originally having or wanting them. Second, it is generally easier and better to direct and modify the ruling passion than to extirpate it; and there is scarce any that may not be engaged on the side of virtue. 'Laudis amore tumes?' What is the praise of man compared with the praise of God? Is a man eager for knowledge? Heaven must be set before *him* as the place where we shall 'see face to face' and know even as we are known. Is he ambitious? Such an one may be made eager to rise to a more exalted state of existence. Is he a lover of ease and

comfort? Heaven is the place of perfect security, ease, and satisfaction. (This is said to be the favourite view of the Turks.) Even he whose ruling passion is the love of gain may be made to understand that it answers in the long run to do one's duty, and that his eternal interest requires him to 'lay up treasures in heaven,' rather than on the best landed security.

To me, whose ruling passion is philanthropy, heaven presents itself as a place where multitudes will be happy around me, and, especially, where the distressing and perplexing appearance of evil will be explained, and the divine benevolence already made manifest.

By-the-by, I think myself a striking instance of the occasional inefficiency of a ruling passion, not from being checked by other principles of action, but from want of opportunity; mine is like a telescope in a dungeon; I do not know that it has ever influenced a single action of my life, or, in short, anything but my castles in the air, which always terminate in the public good.

I have, indeed, done kind and useful actions to those who *came in my way*, but that is the office, not of philanthropy, but merely good nature, and I know people quite as good-natured, without even a spark of public spirit, who would have done everything that I have. What signifies my earnest desire for the welfare of England, and for the civilisation and conversion of the Hottentots, since I am neither a prime minister nor a missionary? It only makes

me anxious and useless and dissatisfied with the limited sphere of action to which I am confined. Mine is the best ruling passion for very great men, but troublesome, and perhaps sometimes mischievous, to others.

February 1818.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

I hesitated some time before adding this article to the list. The principles set forth in it are found more clearly put forward in later works, and there is a certain crudeness in the style, from which the subsequent articles in the Commonplace Book are mostly free. But it appeared on further consideration that such a picture of the writer's earlier mind and thoughts, before he had entered that public life in which the same principles were so strikingly exemplified, ought not to be withheld from the reader. And then we see what an ample field was one day vouchsafed to the aspirations which he then thought useless or painful. This may encourage some, especially of the young, who are tempted to think their early longings after good were given them in vain. It may not be granted to many to find a wide or conspicuous field for their virtuous desires and plans, but let them be assured that, if they really desire to work for God, He will sooner or later show them the way.

OF MORAL PRECEPTS.

It would be curious to collect (as one might to no small amount) such moral precepts as are frequently delivered, or alluded to, and are almost always assented to readily, which yet are *not true*, nor were even believed by anyone. I mean *practically believed*; for when stated generally, men not only, as I have said, assent to them, but really fancy that they believe them. When, however, a case occurs in practice, the maxim never so much as comes across them. E. g. 'You should never say anything of a friend behind his back which you would not say to his face.' 'Speak well of those who deserve it, but speak ill of no one.' 'De mortuis nil nisi bonum.' 'We must not do evil that good may come.' 'It may be allowable sometimes to suppress what you know, but never to utter what is false.' 'No one ought to be the more or less respected for having or wanting wealth, and the other goods of fortune.' 'It is very unfair to lay down any general character of a class of men, because individuals differ so much among themselves.' 'One should never believe anything on mere general report,' &c. &c. Now I will not deny that these are true *as general rules*, in the very widest sense of that word; but they require limitations, and explanations, and exceptions to a very great extent, and such as call for a very nice judgment, and without these they are certainly false;

yet they are in general roundly stated, without any qualification, and very often too are so applied in particular cases, which, when they happen to be *our own*, we find require the exception to be made. Little, therefore, is gained, except to the sophist, by bringing forward general maxims which require a peculiar, distinct explanation in every case to which they apply: it would surely be better to lay down maxims so expressed and so modified in the outset as to be true in practice. I could easily prove by bringing cases, that these maxims are false, and universally known (in practice) to be false, in that sense in which they are respectively brought forward, and in which they are generally assented to; e. g. 'we must not do evil that good may come,' is true enough, if it means doing that which we admit to be at the *time it is done* evil and wrong, for the sake of some good end—in other words, sacrificing duty to expediency; but this can hardly be in the sense in which it is urged, since it would be hardly worth while to say that what is wrong ought not to be done. You have sufficiently proved your point if you have shown that to do what is proposed would be wrong; for if a man should still insist on doing it, there is no further room for argument with him, any more than concerning an arithmetical question with one who should deny that $2 \times 2 = 4$, for he, in fact, denies that duty is duty, 'whose condemnation is just.' But the sense in which it is urged is, I think, in opposition to the Jesuitical maxim, as it is called, that on some

OF RENT.

A. SMITH, though he does not give in to the fancies of the French economists, who call husbandmen the *only* productive labourers, yet admits that they are *more* productive than artisans, because they alone produce rent; and this he seems to attribute to the bounty of the earth, whose produce will always maintain more than the labour required in raising that produce—will more than repay the expense of bringing it to market; all which seems to me to be a mass of confusion. He is misled, perhaps, partly by the preeminent utility and necessity of the principal productions of the earth; but why did he not consider the case of *mines*? Is it from the bountiful produce of gold and silver that they pay a rent? On the contrary, the quantity (the *absolute* quantity) of their produce signifies nothing to the question; if the richest gold-mine in the world produced but an ounce per day, the proprietor would still receive a rent. Or, again, suppose a country of limited extent whose people existed wholly by fishing; their land yielded nothing fit for human support, but only flowers for pleasure, and that these were cultivated for nosegays, as they are now—would not the landowners demand and receive a rent of the gardeners? Take the converse, the case of a young colony where good land may be had for nothing; no one of course would pay rent, but a man would set up a farm, as

he here set up a forge or loom; the price of food falls in consequence, and population increases; all the price of the corn, &c., divides itself into profits and wages, and in the midst of the most luxuriant produce, rent is annihilated. Does the farmer then become a less productive labourer than he is here? You say that a husbandman raises more corn than he eats; so does the weaver make more cloth than he wears. The weaver, you may say, must be fed as well as clothed. *Answer.* So must the husbandman be clothed as well as fed. Why then does the husbandman pay rent for his land, and the weaver none for his loom? For this plain reason, that the husbandman (in a fully peopled country) *cannot get land* without paying rent: he cannot make land, as looms unlimited are made; the landowners therefore enjoy a *monopoly*, and that is the whole secret of rents. It is preposterous to say that the produce of land sells so high, and that of the manufactory so low, in proportion to the labour bestowed on them respectively, that the one can afford a rent, the other not.* It is the rent (or rather the rentability) that *makes* the price high, and vice versâ. Make the manufacturer pay a rent by limiting artificially what is by nature unlimited, i. e. by establishing a monopoly,

* I do not mean that if the rent of land were lowered prices would fall; it would only take money from the landlord to the farmer. It is the limited extent of land that causes such a high price as enables the owners of it to exact a rent.

and you will see the price of that article rise so as to afford a rent, simply because the rent must be paid. This is done every day by the patentee of some manufacture, whether he *farms his own privilege* by making the article himself, or sells permission to others, i. e. makes them pay rent for the use of his privilege. It is done every day by government, who call such a rent a tax; e. g. saltmakers and distillers in reality *pay rent* to government for the license to make their respective commodities, which rent is of course paid ultimately by the consumers. The distiller is thus, according to the economists (if they would be consistent) converted into a productive labourer: while the accession of a boundless extent of good waste land would in like manner convert the farmer into an unproductive one!

It is manifest that the English pay (call it by what name you will, but it is virtually) a rent for the light in their houses both by day and night; and in sooth, our ministers do usually make the people *productive* with a vengeance!

It is then, I think, evident that the payment or non-payment of rent has nothing to do with productiveness, but depends on the power of *exacting* payment, which the landowners have by the monopoly they enjoy. It is plain I do not mean this in any reproachful sense, for that applies to such monopolies only as are (strictly called monopolies, and) artificial restrictions of what is by nature unlimited (even this may be justified when it is necessary so to raise

money for public use); whereas the quantity of land is *by nature* limited, and those in whose hands it is, whoever they be, *must necessarily enjoy* the advantage of monopolists. There is indeed this singular advantage in this particular kind of monopoly, that, the produce of land making so large a portion, ultimately, of everyone's expenses, the monopoly never enables its holders to raise the price extravagantly. He who has a monopoly of salt or of wine may raise the price so as to make an immense revenue from them; but if one man owned all the land in the country he probably would not be enabled to raise the price of corn, &c., above what it now is, for though he might require such a rent as would cause corn to sell for a guinea a peck, this would be only nominal, as the price of labour would rise in exact proportion, since the labourer must earn his bread;* whereas salt makes but a small part, and wine no part, of the common labourer's expenses, so that the increased price of them would not so fully return on the landlord's head.

February 1818.

OF CHARITY AND FORGIVENESS.

In general, if I were to deny any extenuation that might be offered of some offence or misconduct, and

* In a later note he adds, 'Partly true, partly not . . . . the price of labour would rise, or the *people would rise.*'

insist upon the character or the conduct being highly blameable, I should be understood as arguing *against forgiveness* and charity. Now, doubtless, this would be just, if I were striving to find faults, and to put the worst construction on everything, and unfairly to exaggerate faults; but that is not what I mean: for if I merely insisted on calling what is wrong by its true name, and would not suffer it to be explained away, or converted into a virtue, I should be understood as recommending implacable rancour against the offending party. For the way in which most persons practise the duty of charity is by *extenuating the wrong* in question, till they have made it out to be little or nothing; and if you refuse to call evil good, they take for granted that you have no charity at all, but are filled with hatred or bent on revenge. The case of the Dissenters is a very strong one; if you insist on it that schism is a sin, and that they are guilty of it, forth steps your man of liberality of sentiment and rails against uncharitable bigotry, &c. &c., taking for granted all along that you must (since you condemn schism) bitterly hate all Dissenters, and think them necessarily excluded altogether from the benefits of the Christian covenant, and doomed to eternal perdition. Now, surely, it is most preposterous for him to preach charity to you, when he is *taking away all place and occasion* for it; for charity must consist in making allowance for what *is wrong*—in feeling kindly towards those who *are in fault*; but if there is nothing wrong in differing from

us, there can be no *charity* in allowing that difference; nor is there any room for liberality when there is nothing to concede.

Again, B. uses A. very shamefully, who communicates his sentiments on the matter to C., after having in vain sought for some favourable construction to be put on B.'s conduct or palliation of it. C. does not even attempt to remove or lighten the charge; he suggests not even the shadow of a plea for the injurious party; and yet he strongly condemns A.'s censure of that conduct, and pronounces it undeserved—I presume, out of sheer charity, proceeding on the supposition that to believe in the existence of an injury, is to cherish implacable resentment, and that it is impossible to forgive, except where there is nothing to be forgiven.

It is scarce necessary to say how these notions render nugatory the Gospel precepts. Why should we be called on to render good for evil, if we are bound always to explain away that evil and call it good? &c. &c.

Doubtless it is a violation of charity to imagine and invent faults where they do not exist, or to exaggerate them, or to dwell upon them unnecessarily, but charity does not call upon me to sap the foundations of morality by *vindicating* what is wrong, but to *forgive* the offender as I hope to be forgiven myself; and if neither had done wrong, neither of us would need forgiveness. The error I am speaking of is a dangerous one, because what we vindicate in

another, we shall not be very likely to condemn in ourselves. To *dwell* upon the fault of a parent, e. g. or friend, or even a stranger, is wrong; but it is absolutely necessary to *perceive and acknowledge* them, for if we think ourselves bound in piety, or friendship, or charity, to defend and justify them, self-love will most likely demand fair play, and urge that what is right in another is not wrong in us, and thus we shall have been perverting our own principles of morality.

February 1818.

OF HONOUR.

It is a fact obvious as soon as stated, though often overlooked in practice, that the honour of men and women differs: the one is in courage, veracity, and fair dealing, the other in chastity; and this difference has a great influence on their respective characters. It is a folly to trust in the fair dealing of a woman merely because she is on the whole well disposed and well principled, in the same degree that you would in that of a man in whom you observed the same; as great a folly as it would be to be as confident of the chastity of a man as of a woman, *cet. par.*

Not that shabbiness and double-dealing are regarded as *no* fault in women, in like manner a dissolute man is worse thought of, but in neither case is there a forfeiture of *honour*. A person's honour is

lost when he or she is regarded as degraded from their rank in society, and unfit to be associated with by the great body of those who hold that rank. When honour is used to express a moral quality, it implies that a person disdains to do that, whether it be known or concealed, which, if known, would incur this forfeiture. This feeling is not the noblest motive to good conduct, but it is very powerful and of wide extent. Its influence may be estimated by observing the defects of the two sexes respectively, in points wherein they are respectively influenced by it; both chastity, and also sincerity and uprightness, are *per se* duties of both sexes, but are very unequally practised by them respectively. Would you know whether this woman's chastity, or that man's probity, veracity, and courage, proceed or not merely from a sense of honour, without any higher motive? observe whether they practise also the other virtues respectively; if not, it is merely a regard to honour.

Here we have an instance of two moral qualities, in themselves perfectly distinct, called by the same name, by *analogy*; the honour of a man is not the *same* as the honour of a woman, nor at all *like* it, but male honour : man : : female honour : to woman. This alone, I think, might serve as an answer to those who contend that though the attributing of passions to a being who *has none* must be understood analogically, yet if he *has* moral attributes, these must needs be the same in kind with those which in us are known by the same names. In an article in

the 'Quarterly' on China, the writer describes the Chinese as a NATION WITHOUT HONOUR, and he is so proud of his wisdom in this remark that he prints it in capitals. But what he really means is that their honour is placed in *quite different* things *from ours*. A nation really without honour could not exist. If we were to enact within our Chinese territory, both for English and Chinese, that cheating should be punished by the bastinado, and neglect of a parent's grave by cutting off the hair, the Chinese and the English would each suffer what each would account an appropriate penalty.

June 1818.

OF EXPENSE.

EVERYONE knows that many expenses, and those indeed the heaviest, are only for the sake of appearance, show, splendour, state, or call it what you will. I mean such things as are meant to be *observed*, and for that purpose principally, and to be observed *as costly*. A lady's beads and ribbons I do not include, because they are known to be cheap, nor false hair, it being meant to be taken for natural. These are used *merely* because they look pretty; but not so a diamond or pearl; neither are six horses, or a gold watch, or a mahogany table desired merely for their use, or their beauty, or both, but for their known costliness. Everyone also is ready to blame anyone

for unsuitable expense, not only if he really pinches his fortune, but also if he displays an appearance of wealth beyond his real circumstances. If, e.g., a man of moderate fortune should set up a service of plate, even though he should do it without impoverishment, yet if his general style of living does not correspond he will be laughed at.

The question, however, is often a nice one in each particular case, what expenses *are* unbecoming in things of this kind? I should draw the line much closer than most people, and should say that a man can then only afford this or that article of *ornamental* expense when he can not only afford to *buy* it, but to *replace* it. The splendour of wealth surely consists not merely in *having* costly articles, but in having them without uneasiness, in short, in being careless about them: 'exilis domus est ubi non et multa supersunt.'

If a man has fine china, and is in constant dread of its being broken, he had better, according to my notion of respectability as well as comfort, use plain Worcester: if a lady is in a fever lest her beautiful lace veil should be torn or lost, that shows that she has no business with such costly articles. I agree with Sandford, who preferred a horn to a silver cup, because it never made him uneasy. Of course, no man could afford to buy another estate if his was destroyed by inundation or the like; but I mean that one should be prepared to meet such kind of accident that each kind of property respectively

is usually liable to—e. g. porcelain to be broken, brooches and such small things to be lost, horses to be lamed, &c. If a man cannot be prepared to face the *average* amount of these accidents, in respect of any such article, or if it makes him exercise a peculiar and anxious care to prevent such an accident, he had better be without it. The creditable display of wealth, which is the very object of the expense, is destroyed by the very circumstance of such extra watchfulness. It, then, is evident that the expense is a *great* one to *you*. One may indeed *conceal* this, and exercise all his anxious care, while he appears to make light of the costly things he is surrounded with; but then he is pretending to be richer than he is. If any one likes to live in that sort of tricking and feigning way, I have nothing more to say to it. I am speaking of one who wishes to appear nothing more than just what he is; and of that the proper measure is, the expenses which he can afford habitually to incur without feeling them.

I have said nothing of (what weighs most with me) the comfort of being exempt from needless care, and of keeping one's purse *full*, by not living up to the utmost one can afford, because all that is matter of taste.

June 1818.

OF MENTAL LABOUR.

It is curious to consider what it is that makes the public tuition such a poison to me as it seems to be. Many a one, from observing its effects, would be disposed to recommend the complete absence of all the higher exertions of intellect, which would make me ready to hang myself, after a time. In fact, the most intense application of mind seems little or no fatigue when it is perfectly agreeable and the object of choice; and in that case it seems to do more good than harm.

I suppose the mind is as intensely employed in attending to an interesting play or novel, as at any time. Yet in that we can energise without much fatigue. 'As busy as a child at play' is a proverb, and a just one, which implies what I am now saying. But it is to be remarked, that what is play to one is hard work to another. I believe the mind of many would be more fatigued than even the body by field sports; and yet perhaps those very men would feel endless amusement in mathematics or other such pursuits, which to the generality are very fagging. The thing that most fatigues the mind, in short, seems to be that which is felt as a task; I mean that the latter circumstance is the cause of the former, not vice versâ. So at least it is with me, who often do the same thing with pleasure when voluntary, which fags me when I am compelled to it. This,

however, is the case both with private and public tuition; but the latter seems to derive its greatly superior effect from the additional *anxiety*. Every man requires to be separately watched, and requires in some degree a different treatment, and hardly ever will the whole of a class be going on well; so that compared with private tuition it is like balancing ten things at once. Besides this, there is a personal interest in each private pupil, which, if he goes on well, is a vast lightening of labour, and which is felt but in a very weak and watery manner towards each of so many public pupils. I work from a sense of *duty*, but my affections cannot be engaged by a body corporate. Compare the feelings of a gardener employed in nursing and rearing five or six separate plants, and of one of three farmers jointly occupied in tilling a large farm! Yet this sort of bustle and anxiety and importance and power seem to delight some men.

June 1818.

OF OUR REGARD FOR THE OPINIONS OF OTHERS.

THERE are three kinds of things which men are proud of (I mean not in the faulty sense). 1st. Those qualities which are admired. 2nd. Those possessions which are valued, and good fortune. 3rd. Those actions or habits which are commended. Between qualities and possessions I understand this difference,

that the one is considered as a *part of the man*, the other not. Thus, if a man possess a genius, or a person that is admirable, he is *himself admired*; but not if he has an admirable horse or house; the sentiment we feel towards *him* is of a different nature, and we have no English word to express it; so much are we at a loss as to resort to the word 'envy.' I should like to introduce the word 'macarise.'* The 3rd implies the notion of *merit*. We praise, commend, applaud, ἐπαινοῦμεν, a man who has improved his talents, used his fortune well, &c., and assign him merit for so doing; but we do not think there is any *merit* in possessing great talents any more than wealth.

The desire of attention, approbation, or whatever else you will call it (λόγον), on each of these grounds is perfectly natural, and, in due moderation, not culpable, a circumstance often overlooked; e. g. the trite moralist tells you you ought not to be proud of beauty, birth, talents, &c., because these imply no merit.

The distinction I have drawn is perfectly clear, though the three are of course continually blended together in every variety of form; e. g. a fine estate which a man has acquired by a diligent and laudable exercise of superior talents, combines all three. Different dispositions incline men to pride themselves

* The words 'felicitate' and 'congratulate' are used only in application to *events*, which are one branch only of 'macarism.'

on different points (with reference to the above division); some delight most in being admired; others, macarised; others, commended. In each point also there are infinite subdivisions; one likes to be admired for beauty, another for talents; one to be macarised for what is great and splendid, as equipage, rank, &c., others for what conduces to comfort, as good friends, wife, or children; some seek credit, most for temperance and regularity, others for courage or for generosity, &c.

Excess, of course, is to be avoided in all; but there are many practical maxims applicable specifically to particular points; e. g. most would say that it is base to seek credit which we know to be undeserved, as when a man gets another to write for a prize for him; now this is most especially applicable to the case of *admiration*; for if I wish to gain praise for good conduct, my shortest and easiest way (as Socrates said), as well as fairest, is to become what I would seem: whereas in the case of beauty or talents this is not so easy. The love of admiration therefore leads to fraud much more than the love of commendation. But then, on the other hand, the other is much more likely to spoil our good actions by the substitution of an inferior motive for a nobler: it is however more useful to society, as on the whole its tendency is to make men *exert* themselves, the other to *puff* themselves. Again, the censure in question seems to lie much more strongly in the case of those things which are *excellent and*

valuable in themselves, than of those which have no value whatever, except their exciting the regard of others; e. g. for the first, take virtue or ability; for the latter, beauty or a diamond ring; the latter, if concealed, are as good as annihilated, and would never excite a wish on a desert island, whereas the former would. Now if a man is content with the *opinion* of virtue or ability, he seems manifestly prizing a mere shadow, and we exclaim against such pure vanity; but if a person can be universally and constantly *believed* to possess beauty or a fine ring, he has *all* that the actual possession of them could confer. You cannot, therefore, so well blame a person for pursuing a shadow in a case where the substance is valued only for the sake of the shadow; nevertheless we regard all fraud as dishonourable; but surely all is not equally dishonourable.

On the whole, however, it appears to me that the desire of admiration or of macarism is much more contemptible in the case of those things which have no value in themselves. And universally, the less valuable the thing, the meaner is the desire of regard on account of it; e.g. to be admired as a tandem-driver or a punster, or macarised for a curious tulip. I think it is from distinctions of *this* kind, rather than in *degree*, that some are called vainer than others.

Lastly, it is to be observed that there is necessarily a great degree of looseness and uncertainty in men's language in what regards the distinction

between admiration, macarism, and praise; it is very hard to say what is and what is not to be regarded as part of himself; what is or is not to be regarded as depending on himself, and thence meritorious; e. g. a good bodily constitution seems, if you consider the matter closely, as much a part of oneself as strong intellects; yet for *that* a man is rather macarised than admired; and, again, good temper is pretty much on a level with the others, and yet for *that* he is rather praised as meritorious. All this, however, does not disturb my original distinctions, since I am speaking not of what things *are* in themselves, but in what light they are regarded by *men*; e. g. a healthy constitution may be as much a part of oneself as talent, *strictly speaking*, but it is much more easily abstracted in thought; and thence is regarded more as a possession. So also in proportion as we consider good temper as a part of one's original constitution, so far do we lower our judgment of its merit. In reality all goods are the proper objects of *macarism alone*, for 'what hast thou that thou didst not receive?' Yet that there is a distinction in *men's feelings*, is undeniable; everyone would admire a man most for being *clever*; praise him most for being *studious*; and congratulate and give him joy most for getting into a *good college*, and having a very good tutor.

June 1818.

To admiration, contempt seems to be the direct contrary; censure to commendation; pity to macar-

ism; with this limitation, however, respecting the last, that pity implies something of good will, being only felt for *undeserved* evils; whereas undeserved goods excite rather indignation than macarism.

OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

As one of the earliest dawning and most important differences between individuals is the degree and manner in which they desire approbation, so is it one of the most striking in their respective behaviour.

I have said it is one of the earliest. You may see one child continually anxious to attract notice, and wanting you to observe him when playing; another even of the same family quite independent, and satisfied in solitude. Not that the latter is necessarily unsocial, for he may possess the kindly affections in any degree. So also in grown persons; some are considering at every step what people think of them; others comparatively concern themselves but little about it.

The manner generated by the former habit has been aptly enough called *conscious*, which perfectly accords with A. Smith's account of conscience, viz. the judgment we pronounce on our own conduct by putting ourselves in the place of a bystander. One man never speaks a sentence nor makes a gesture but he thinks of the appearance it will have, and the opinion that will be formed of him, like an actor or

singer; another, who perhaps is quite as social, and to whom perhaps society is necessary for his happiness, talks for his own amusement, and in a natural and unconscious way, just as his inclinations prompt him. The one speaks as if he wanted to say *something*, the other as if he had something to say. And the same with writers; in some you can see by their manner that they are writing like a man for a prize (only with the difference that they set themselves the subject), and anxious to make the best possible composition, in short, trying *to say something*; the other, having some facts, remarks, or theories which they think will prove useful or amusing, are anxious only to give vent to what they know, think, or feel; in short, they write as if they had *something to say.*

This is what Bishop Butler (who is an eminent instance of it) means by 'writing with simplicity and in earnest,' the consequence of which is, as he remarks, a certain uniformity and congruity of style and sentiment throughout. Hume is a remarkable instance of the opposite class, to which indeed very many, if not the majority, of our best writers belong. The others, however, are to me at least much the most pleasing, and though they do not always excite so much admiration, they much more carry the reader along with them. So it is also in the *natural* style of delivery; a fine pompous spout may more establish one's character of a *very fine man*; but the other style makes them (to use the King of France's ex-

pression) less pleased with the preacher than displeased with themselves; like the Athenians who, instead of shouting forth the praises of Demosthenes, cried, 'Let us go and fight Philip.'

There are several mistakes which one might fall into from what has been said, and several others current in the world.

Since sympathy gives us, according to A. Smith, our first notions of right and wrong, and reflex sympathy, i. e. conscience, is our great guide in life (whether he is right or wrong in thus referring *all* to sympathy, there can be no doubt it is of consequence in our morals), it might seem from what I have said that he who had the most of this consciousness would be ever the best man; but A. Smith himself remarks, that our regard for the opinions of others, though necessary to give us the first notions of virtue, will, if carried too far, interfere with it: he will be the best man who looks to the judgment of the wise and good, and considers what THEY *would* think, and what others *ought* to think of him, *οἱ πολλοὶ, φαῦλοι*: wherefore consciousness of manner can never be generated by a regard merely for the opinions of those who are good judges. However, this whole question does not much concern the present, because the desire of approbation in great things—in what may be called *the conduct of life*—does not always go along with the desire of petty approbation which gives rise to the conscious manner; a man may be covetous of glory, yet care little what

impression he makes in ordinary chat with ordinary acquaintance.

Still, it may be thought that, setting morals out of the question, a man's manners would be improved by his being always thinking of appearance; which is far from the truth, the two cases being of a widely different nature: for whereas in morals it must be granted that he is the best (not, indeed, who is always *aiming* at the applause of others, but always trying to *deserve* it), and who *takes pains* about his morals; in the case of manners, on the contrary, those are the best which both appear unstudied and really are so, the latter being, indeed, a necessary condition of the former. The fact is, while we are taking pains with our morals,* we are taking pains with that which is the most important; when about manners, we are attending to the surface instead of the substance. He will please most who is aiming, not to *please*, but to *give pleasure*; the former is pretty sure to be detected, the latter is what all feel to be true politeness, which thus implies by its very definition that it must not be made a distinct study, but must be acquired, as it were, obliquely. There cannot, therefore, be a more injudicious way of improving a person's manners than that which was adopted in my own case, viz. directing his attention to that point, and above all, setting him to copy the manners of others. If he is

* Take care of the digestion and circulation if you would keep them sound; if you would keep the skin clear, take care, not of the skin, but of the digestion and circulation.

bent, and solely bent, on giving pleasure, he will easily *catch* in good society those forms and expressions which are, as it were, the language (in many cases the arbitrary language) for giving utterance to that wish. He will then be thinking of others, not of himself, which is the very essence of politeness: by the opposite plan you drive him to think of himself, and of others, only in reference to the figure he makes in their eyes, the result of which must be either shyness or affectation, and generally both together, the former springing from fear of exposure, the other from ambition for display. I, accordingly, in whom the former much predominated, suffered all the agonies of extreme shyness for many years, and if the efforts to which I was continually stimulated had been in any degree successful, or had been applauded as such, I should probably have gone on to affectation, and have remained conscious all my life; but finding no encouragement, I was fortunately driven to utter despair. I then said to myself, 'Why should I endure this torture all my life to no purpose? I would bear it still if there was any progress made, any success to be hoped for; but since there is not, I will die quietly without taking any more doses. I have tried my very utmost, and find that I must be as awkward as a bear all my life in spite of it. I will endeavour to think as little about it as a bear, and make up my mind to endure what can't be cured.' From this time I struggled as vigorously to harden myself against censure as ever I had to avoid it, like

a stag at bay (who faces about to fight when he finds that flight is vain), and with as much effort as the said stag, for it is not without a hard and persevering struggle that consciousness can be shaken off. I was acting more wisely than I thought for at the time, for I had not then that clear view of the subject that I now have, and consequently I succeeded beyond my expectations, for I not only got rid of the personal suffering of shyness, but also of most of those faults of manner which consciousness produces, and acquired at once an easy and natural manner, careless, indeed, in the extreme, from its originating in a stern defiance of opinion which I had convinced myself must ever be against me; rough and awkward, for smoothness and grace are quite out of my way, and of course (vide 123, p. 467*) tutorially pedantic; but unconscious, and therefore giving expression to that good will towards men which I really feel; and these I believe are the main points.

Though many conscious people are very agreeable, there is a charm in unconscious manners which endears a person even when there is nothing else very remarkable in him. Social intercourse is in itself a pleasure, independent of the instruction or entertainment we may derive from the matter and language, else books would be, which they are not, a complete substitute for society. Hence it appears that the essence of social intercourse is the inter-

* The reference is to an article which was not, apparently, preserved.

change of ideas as they arise naturally in the minds of the speakers. The excellence of it, therefore, —social intercourse—must consist in complete unconsciousness. The further you recede from that (and there are infinite degrees), however clever your conversation, the less have you of the nature of a companion, and the more of a book; consequently, consciousness is, as it were, the specific poison of that which is the *οἰκεία ἡδονή* * of conversation. All disregard of self also is so amiable, that unconsciousness seems to be almost a virtue. In the pulpit, it is quite; an ambassador from heaven has no right to be thinking of himself and trying to be a fine man (if this virtue were practised by our clergy with singleness of heart, how much increased would be the effect produced!). When a friend therefore asked me whether I did not feel nervous about preaching, I replied that I *dared* not; for nervousness implies thoughts about your own appearance, when you ought to be thinking only of your hearers.

It is rather curious that affectation should so often be reckoned to imply *conceit*: as far as it goes, it implies the reverse; for what woman would paint if she thought her natural complexion good?

It does not follow from what I have said of myself that all conscious people are uneasy. They are like actors, and if they think they act well, and gain applause, they are as happy as a good actor.

It is remarkable that great affectation and great

* The appropriate or special enjoyment.

absence of it (unconsciousness) are at first sight very similar. They are both apt to produce *singularity*.

July 1818.

OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.

We are apt to regard a cause *as prior in time* to its effect; whereas, strictly speaking (whether we mean the real agent or the physical cause), it must be exactly simultaneous, because if there were ever so minute an interval between them, during that interval the supposed cause would have been existing in full force without the effects being produced; wherefore no reason can be given why the same state of things should not last for ever, as far as that cause (supposed) is concerned. E.g. volition, and the contraction of the muscle. What are commonly called causes, are either remote, as poison is said to cause death, or gradual, as removal of support, or, more strictly, gravitation, causes a stone to reach the earth, and sunshine causes fruit to ripen, i.e. causes that chemical action to *begin* which is continued *till* the fruit is ripe.

Yet there does seem to be a *priority of order* in cause which is inseparably attached to those correlates. Hence, to suppose the material universe, &c., eternal, does not contradict the notion that God created all things (I think this is a notion of Tucker's).

If there never was a time when He did not will that there should be creatures, there never was a time when there were not creatures. This is more agreeable, and I think not more inconceivable, than to suppose the Deity existing for infinite ages without calling any creatures into life and enjoyment.*

August 1818.

SELFISHNESS.

ARISTOTLE, though he has not accounted for the use of the word φιλαυτία, has well explained the difference between self-love and selfishness. It is clear that the latter exists only in reference to others, and could have no place in one who lived alone on a desert island, though he might have, of course, any degree of self-love; for selfishness is not an excess of self-love, and consists not in an over-desire of happiness, but in placing your happiness in something which *interferes* with or leaves you regardless of that of others.

One of the many mistakes respecting selfishness is to confound it with stinginess. Now if either the love of saving, or any other propensity whatever, interfere unduly with benevolence, the man is selfish, but not otherwise;† and it is certain that as many people

* This subject, here only touched on, is followed out in several of his works.

† *Vide* Stewart's 'Outlines.' It is from the effect and

are selfish who are profuse and given to sensuality, so there are others who are decidedly stingy but not selfish, who have a morbid love of saving,* but are almost as careful in saving for others as themselves,† and who will deny themselves some gratification for fear of the expense, which they will freely afford to a friend. Hence, let not a man of an opposite constitution flatter himself that he is not selfish, because he is not so in that particular way. An Irishman will squander his money freely to serve you, but if it is care and trouble that is wanted, will not go a step out of his way. A Scotchman will run to and fro to serve a friend, but will not part with the siller.

Another mistake is to suppose that selfishness and want of feeling are either the same or inseparable.

tendency things are called selfish, not their cause; and stinginess commonly terminates in self, but not always. Every one has a *self* of his own; the idle child will be selfish in respect of labour; the greedy child will be selfish in respect of plum-cake, &c.

* In such as have this (and there are, perhaps, few entirely free from it), it is curious to observe how *ill-calculated* their savings will often be: a man will often grudge you an extra cup or two of coffee, just as much and just as little as an extra glass or two of wine; in short, will only grudge an *unusual expense in kind*, however moderate in *degree*; as if he were trying to preserve a sort of regular analogy. How some are stingy in paper alone, some in postage, &c., is notorious.

† He often quoted Mrs. Alison Wilson, the miser's housekeeper in 'Old Mortality,' as an example of this.

Now, on the one hand, I have known such as have had very little feeling, but felt for others as much nearly as for themselves, and were therefore far from selfish; and, on the other hand, some of very acute feelings feel for no one but themselves, and, indeed, are sometimes among the most cruel.

Again, some are capable of making grand and generous sacrifices on great occasions, who yet indulge an habitually selfish temper in trifles. To conquer selfishness should be one of the first steps in education, and it is not very difficult if begun early; but a child who is a great treasure, and the object of great attention, is apt to fall into it even though he is strictly *controlled*; the very pains taken with him heighten his idea of his own vast importance.

It is remarkable that freedom from selfishness is not a virtue that is particularly well learned from example, but rather the contrary; e. g. a parent who is never thinking of her own convenience,* but always of her children's advantage, will be likely to let that too plainly appear, so as to fill the child with an idea that everything is to give way to him, and that his concerns are an ultimate end; whereas a parent who is selfish will be sure to accustom the child to sacrifice his own convenience, and to understand that he is of much less importance than the parent; and so in some other cases.

September 1818.

* 'A light-heeled mother makes a heavy-heeled daughter.' *Ray's Proverbs.*

OF FLATTERY—DOMESTIC.

THERE is no flattery like domestic (I use the word flattery in the sense of undue praise merely, not implying insincerity). 'Laudari a laudato viro,' is what every one would prize most, but other praises may more than make up in tale what they want in weight; and, in effect, I think the flattery of those who are living with one, however humbly one may think of their judgment, has more influence in spoiling a man than any other. When we come to deliberate upon it calmly, one knows that this is a very partial, and, perhaps, not a very acute judge; but we are not always deliberating, and our feelings very strongly take his part; these are always in full force, and *his* praises, either expressed or implied, are reiterated every hour; we gradually make less and less allowance for his incapacity, and take what he says at a lower discount; it is hard to continue long thinking very meanly of the judgment of one who approves of everything we say and do.

Moreover the world, however great may be our credit in its sight, applauds (because it sees) merely some *part* of us; we are sensible how imperfectly it knows us, and are perhaps conscious how much its praise would be lowered if it knew some more private parts of our conduct; but the domestic friend sees us, as it were, naked. One becomes 'a hero to one's valet,' and feels that there is a certain peculiar excel-

lence in everything one does, great or small. The other kind of glory may be more delightful, but this is the most likely to breed conceit, and make one feel confident of being always in the right.

I believe, however, that the circumstances of constant *repetition* has alone more influence than all the rest put together; in other things also the same thing takes place. Many notions are propagated without much force of argument by mere earnest asseveration and constant repetition; people learn to think in a certain way by having the idea presented to them continually, just as they learn to swear by hearing it or as parrots to talk. The 'Courier' persuades many that the ministers have many merits by insisting upon it 306 times a-year that they have all. How much more must a man's mind be influenced by the daily droppings of domestic flattery! The worst of it is that a man will often himself dictate this flattery, and listen with delight to the echo of his own sentiments, and thus it is that a bad man may often become much worse through the flattery of an innocent wife; he frames, of course, the best account he can of his conduct, which she learns by heart, and then, when a qualm comes over him, he appeals to her, and she quiets him: by so slight an artifice may conscience be lulled when one is so disposed!

In smaller matters, this kind of flattery makes people expose themselves most absurdly, especially when their flatterer is in company. Mrs. H. M. and

her sisters put me in mind of a showman and his well-trained elephant.

September 1818.

OF BODILY AND MENTAL DISEASE.

I REMEMBER Dr. L. being very indignant at my saying, half in jest, that all vices are bodily diseases. I say 'half in jest,' because, of course, I did not mean literally that any vice actually *is*, but only originates in, bodily disease; which, by-the-by, might be admitted (taking the expression in its usual sense) even by one who should hold that bodily affections are themselves completely out of our own control. We may say that such and such a destructive fire *originated* in a flash of lightning, without meaning to imply that the fire might not by proper exertion have been quenched sooner. He alleged that I destroyed all responsibility; but he assumed a premiss which I not only had never stated, but never will admit, viz. that all bodily affections are completely out of the control of the will. I instanced coughing, which every one knows is checked by a good sermon, and he must, in the course of his practice, have remarked and acted upon the reverse of what he took for granted a thousand times. He must perpetually have urged patients to struggle against languor and low spirits, to shake off their lethargy, to check their inordinate hunger or thirst, &c. &c., while with the

very same breath he was telling them that these feelings were the symptoms of the disorder. If, indeed, it were necessary, in order to believe in free agency, to prove that a man's character and conduct are quite independent of the constitution and state of his body, and if (which would be the necessary consequence) free agency were to be limited accordingly, not only would the task be difficult, but very pernicious consequences would follow; for whether Gall is right or not in making this and that part of the brain the organs of certain passions, it is certain that the body does in very many instances affect the mind, and he who removes all these cases beyond the verge of responsibility, will find that it is he who is lessening man's responsibility. But in fact (as I have said elsewhere), free agency is not to be established by an appeal to reasoning, but to consciousness; if we *feel* we act with our will, we act voluntarily; how we *come by* the will is another question, but it may be a very interesting and useful one, since it may be more effectual and easier to alter our inclinations than to withstand them. It appears to me then, 1st, that at least all vices connected with *temper*, which fill a prodigious catalogue, are in a very considerable degree bodily Nothing, indeed, is more common than to hear the effects of palsy and other diseases in this way remarked; and that there is much in original constitution also, is indicated by the very words 'temper' and 'humour.' Some who have no very strong principle seem in this point to have no

want of it, from being so constitutionally good-tempered, and vice versâ. As M. says, their reason is quite a sinecure. Now from faults of this class arise ultimately discontent, envy, hatred, slander, &c.

2nd. The same is, if possible, still more evident in everything connected with the appetites, they being, by the very definition, seated originally in the body, and varying according to constitutions, diseases, and medicines. Indolence and activity depend also very much on the occasional or the original state of the body. The effect of hot climates in this respect is notorious; a soft bed and an improper diet will also have a great influence this way, 'corpus onustum,' &c. With regard to pride, avarice, and some other vices, the cause is not so clear, but I have very little doubt that in these also there is a considerable connection with the body. I have heard a curious case in which a fever left behind it for a considerable time, besides other mental symptoms, an extraordinary portion of conceit. Many more such connections might probably be discovered by systematic observation.

But it may be asked, supposing this doctrine not to encroach on free agency, what good can arise from it? Will not men at least palliate if not vindicate their faults by it? I think it will, on the contrary, be of great advantage towards eradicating them. For, 1st, they may often be able, not only to trace the malady, but to administer remedies to the body, which (as M—— well observes in the case of insanity) we

can act upon much more easily and more effectually than the mind. A man may be for a long time exerting himself most laudably but most painfully to command his temper, to rouse himself from indolence or gloomy despondency, or perhaps to refrain from suicide, when perhaps a few doses of calomel would have saved him nine-tenths of the trial. It is on a similar principle, in some measure, that fasting has been adopted by the best and wisest men. Withstand temptation as firmly as you can, but do not lead yourself into it, or stand exposed to more than you need; exert the powers of the mind as much as you will, but give the mind as little to do as possible. If one had taken an overdose of opium, I should certainly exhort him to try and keep awake, but I should trust more to the exhibition of lemon-juice and coffee, or at least I should be sure to call in the aid of those drugs. Why then should not a similar course be pursued, as far as possible, if the indolence and dulness were habitual? And so of other faults.

But, 2ndly, even where no advantage of this kind could be obtained, as well as where it could, I think the tracing up of mental to bodily disease would aid instead of impeding men's exertions against it. A person would be, I grant, less ashamed of feeling the *propensity*, but he would for that very reason be less likely to indulge in the vice; for it seems to me that the great difficulty is to get a man to acknowledge, either to others or to himself, that he is strongly inclined to do ill (I mean not *generally*, for

general confessions stand for nothing, but in some particular point), or if he can be brought to *believe* it himself, and to confess it in plain terms to another, still he will not keep it fully, and strongly, and steadily before him, but he is so much ashamed and mortified at the thought that he strives earnestly to keep it out of sight, the consequence of which is obvious, 'stultorum incurata,' &c. The most striking case of this kind is that of the faults of temper; for there, a man not only will not strive and guard against a fault which he will not allow to exist, but irrritates himself ten times more by labouring to prove that he is not irritable, but that things go so wrong, and people are so provoking, that it is enough to overcome even *his* patient mildness. Now, on the other plan, this would not so much take place, for though I will not undertake to prove that a man *ought* to feel more shame and receive more blame for the natural defects of his mind than his body, the *fact* is undeniable; when, therefore, the fault is laid to bodily disease, one is, as I have said, less loth to acknowledge the propensity; while, at the same time, the indulgence or restraint of that propensity being distinctly placed under the control of the will, a man is not the less ashamed of actually doing wrong.

There are instances apparently opposed to what I say, which in fact confirm it. You find a man excusing and indulging his ill-temper under the pretence of his irritable nerves, his debauchery, by

an amorous constitution, &c. Now the meaning of this is, that allowance is to be made for *this* and that *particular* fault in *him*; he aims to *distinguish* his case from that of vicious men in general, whereas, if you lay it down as a *general* rule that vicious propensities arise from bodily constitution, his vindication is nullified; argumenti gratiâ, he may contend for the non-responsibility of man as a consequence; but no man really wishes to be classed with the worst of the species.

Many instances might be brought to prove the expediency of representing mortal defects in this light to those who are labouring under them, even when we do not believe the fact to be such. When S. H. was a child, his mother as often as she seemed fretful and humoursome, instead of scolding him, told him he was unwell and must go and drink a glass of cold water; it always cured him. Add to this the case of little H., who goes to the window to throw out a *pain in his temper*, and returns perfectly good-humoured; and of M.'s child who, taught by experience, asked for some physic to make him good.

How much better a man will conduct himself when tipsy if he is himself aware of it!

In all these cases the principle is the same. A man is not only more fully aware of the existence of the propensity (and therefore more on his guard against it), from the very circumstance of being less ashamed of it; but also he feels a peculiar shame in

letting the body palpably subdue the mind, more than in letting one part of the mind, as it were, subdue the other.

October 1818.

OF SCEPTICISM.

It is very evident that the opposite to credulity is scepticism, and that to disbelieve is to believe; so that the reproach of credulity lies not more against him who admits than him who rejects a given story, till it is ascertained which of them has formed his decision on the slighter grounds. Whence is it then that not only infidels themselves reproach Christians with credulity (which charge, if it implies that there is weaker evidence for Christianity than against it, is palpably begging the question, and if it does not mean that, means nothing at all), but also that their opponents reproach them with *incredulity in excess*? It is in great measure from this, that both 'believer' and 'unbeliever,' being *relative* terms, and each man believing his own opinion and disbelieving the opposite, then he who believes contrary to the *generality*, and therefore stands in the relation of 'unbelievers' to *their* opinion, gets by this means the name of *un*believer and *in*credulous, though in fact *they* are just as much unbelievers with respect to *his* opinions, and *he* as much a believer in his own. It is also that they generally call themselves, and

perhaps set out with being *sceptics*, though ultimately and in reality they are disbelievers of Christianity, which, as I have said, has nothing to do with incredulity or credulity till it is decided which side has the strongest evidence. I say they set out with being, and profess themselves, *sceptics*, but do not continue so; the proof of which is that no rational creature, who really was in *doubt* on the subject, could consistently act otherwise than as if it were all true, even supposing he thought the chances five to one against it, for it is evident which is the safe side; much less could any honest real sceptic of the smallest humanity write and reason against Christianity. I am therefore authorised to infer that all who do this, or in any other respect form their system of conduct on the supposition that Christianity is false, are fully convinced that it is so; this, at least, is the most charitable inference.

But then how come they (I do not say to *doubt*, or to be *inclined* rather to the negative than affirmative side, but) to be thus fully *convinced*, and that in a case where there are many at least plausible arguments against them, and the authority of many eminent men who have appeared to be believers in Christianity? The answer is, that it seems to be a sort of general principle of our nature, when we are once brought to *doubt* of what is very *generally* believed, or of what we have been accustomed to consider as indubitable, to proceed immediately from doubting to absolute disbelief; whereas a thing that

men have been used to debate, or hear debated to and fro, they will perhaps go on doubting to the end of the chapter; or, if they do decide, will probably decide according to the evidence. 'Conculcatur enim cupide nimis ante metutum.' It seems, indeed, universal to fly from one extreme into the other, as here from implicit belief to sweeping rejection; and, moreover, everyone likes to *have an opinion*, though he dislikes to be thought credulous. 'I don't know,' and 'I doubt,' and 'perhaps,' take off all the soundness of sentiment, and the air of wisdom. Hence it is that even those who hoist the neutral flag of scepticism to gain a readier admittance, are either not sincere or not steady in that profession, but take a decided part very soon, and endeavour to make others do the same.

If it were not for this, it would be hardly worth while to reason against scepticism; there are so few who do really continue in that state of mind, and it does so little harm if a man is consistent and considerate; but since it leads to, and is made a screen for, decided opposition, it becomes necessary to fire upon this neutral flag.

I think the best way, then, of doing this, is by the *reductio ad absurdum*. It is hard to explain to ordinary minds, especially in opposition to skilful sophistry, *where* the lines should be drawn between what is to be received, to be doubted, and to be rejected, especially as the common fault of the vulgar is want of *discretion*, that is, power of *distinguishing*.

They generalise hastily, and either believe or disbelieve in the lump. Some of them swallow all the follies of superstition because they see the truth of religion; others, from the very same turn of mind, reject all religion because many fables have been thrust in. Now I say that for such people it is hard or impossible to draw the line clearly in *abstract terms*, but they can comprehend it in the way of illustration, just as a man who cannot comprehend what you say about elocution, will understand and amend when you mock and caricature his faults.

Thus the folly of boundless scepticism may best be shown by bringing forward plausible arguments against something which no one ever did or can doubt (e.g. 'Historic Doubts respecting Napoleon Buonaparte').*

December 1818.

OF SMATTERING.

THE word 'smattering' is used to signify two things which are not only different but in great measure opposite. A smattering, or slight and imperfect knowledge of any subject, may be, 1st, a *superficial*, or, 2nd, a merely *elementary* knowledge; e.g. A.

* What follows is almost word for word the same as the 'Historic Doubts.' We therefore omit the rest of this article, referring readers to that well-known pamphlet.

knows many words and the general drift of many phrases in a language, but nothing of the grammar (as I do in Italian); B. knows the grammar well, but has a very limited reading: each may be called a smattering, but the first more properly. Endless is the abuse of this ambiguous term. Nothing else can account for the Scotch writers either believing or pretending (whichever it was) that chemistry is here taught superficially. Not that that charge is ambiguous; it is a plain and palpable falsehood; but it could never have had a chance of gaining credit for a moment, had it not been true that the terms 'smattering' and 'imperfect,' are, in different senses, applicable both to 'superficial' instruction and to that which is here given. How far is each of these desirable?

It is evident that a man cannot learn all things perfectly. Some may say it befits a gentleman to have a slight and general knowledge, as much, however, as he can gain, of every dignified and curious pursuit; others say, 'Let him make one study (whether mathematics or any other) his main object, lest the mind be distracted by the multiplicity of pursuits, as yours are at Oxford, and so he learns nothing thoroughly; and then let him pick up what he can of other things.'

Now it is impossible to discuss any question of this kind with clearness, unless you carefully keep in view the distinction above. I should say it is best for a man to make *some* pursuit his main object,

according to his, 1st, calling; 2nd, *natural* bent; or, 3rd, opportunities (by the way, it does not follow that it is best to *fix what* one this shall be, as at Cambridge, instead of leaving it to a man's choice; much less that they are right in the one fixed on); then let him get a slight knowledge of what else is worth it, regulated in his choice by the same three circumstances, which should also determine in great measure, where an elementary, and where a superficial, knowledge is desirable.

Generally speaking, however, the elementary is the more philosophical, the superficial the more showy, and also the more practically useful, with a view to the particular object of the art in question: e. g. he who has an elementary knowledge of anatomy and chemistry will not be able to apply his knowledge so well as one who merely knows a few empirical remedies (vid. 'Aris. Eth.' 6). Hence it follows that of those things which are to be imperfectly learned, such as are of the most dignified and philosophical nature are the most proper for elementary study, and such as we are the most likely to be called upon to practise for ourselves, the most proper for superficial: e.g. it would be to most men of no practical use, and consequently not worth while to learn by heart, the meaning of some of the Chinese characters, but it might be very well worth while to study the principles on which that most singular language is constructed; contra, there is nothing very curious or interesting in the structure of the Portuguese

language, but if one was going to travel in Portugal, it would be worth while to pick up some words and phrases. If both circumstances conspire, then both kinds of information are to be sought, viz. something at the beginning and something at the end; and this is very commonly the case; as when a man knows the elements of geometry, and has also picked up, without going over the intermediate steps, some of the most important results. To have a good deal of such imperfect knowledge as this last is peculiarly becoming a gentleman and a philosopher. Total confinement to one or two studies is mechanic-like, and breeds narrow-mindedness. (See A. Smith, 'On the Effects of Division of Labour, and Totality,' § 118, p. 406; and 'Defence of Oxford.'*) My own learning is of a very singular kind, being more purely elementary than anyone's I know. I am acquainted with the elements of most things, and that more accurately than many who are much versed in them, but I know nothing thoroughly, except such studies as are intrinsically of an elementary character, viz. grammar, logic, metaphysics, ethics, rhetoric—I mean that I know these the *most* thoroughly, comparatively with myself. Grammar, logic, rhetoric, and metaphysics (or the philosophy of the mind) are manifestly of an elementary nature, being concerned about the *instruments* which we employ in effecting our purposes; and ethics, which is in fact a branch

* By the late Bishop Coplestone, then of Oriel College, Oxford.

of metaphysics, may be called the elements of conduct.

I can explain the nature of mathematical reasoning better than some practised mathematicians, and describe the peculiar nature of theology, and give advice as to the study of it, better than many learned divines. I know pretty accurately the peculiar character of each branch of study, the misconceptions of it which men are liable to form, and the errors in pursuing it, the faculties which it calls for, and the habits it tends to cultivate, and there I stop. I am fitted, in short, for entering upon and pursuing any, but have not done so, and probably shall not, as elementary studies are most to my taste, and are as inexhaustible as any; so that practically, and with a view to general utility, I resemble one whose trade is to make instruments for others to work with, being occupied in training others to do more than I can do myself: 'fungor vice cotis,' &c.

Such knowledge is far from showy. Elements do not much come into sight; they are like that part of a bridge which is under water, and is therefore less admired, though it is not the work of least art and difficulty. On this ground I have suggested it as suitable to females, as least leading to that pedantry which learned ladies must ever be peculiarly liable to, as well as least exciting that jealousy to which they must ever be exposed, while learning in them continues to be a distinction; a woman might in this way be very learned without anyone's finding it out.

As far as learning of this kind gains one any sort of credit, it is credit rather for natural abilities beyond what one possesses, than for the learning one has in fact acquired.

March 1819.

OF THE NATURE OF POETRY.

Does not all that Aristotle (and indeed most others) say of poetry labour under this defect, that he places under that head everything belonging to *fiction*? Some, indeed, have been led from this to suppose that he did not regard *verse* as essential to poetry, but would have regarded 'Telemachus,' e.g. or any other prose fiction, as a poem. What he would have done had any such work existed it is hard to say, but it is quite clear that the idea of such a work never crossed his mind, and that as he considered a *fiction* as necessarily a *poem*, so he considered a *poem* as no less necessarily *verse*. It is indeed remarkable that he does not (as he might) take for granted, but expressly mentions verse in his 'Definition of Tragedy.'

We have plenty of prose fictions: whether they are to be called poems may be considered as a verbal question, but it is a real and curious question whether there is an essential or only a trifling and accidental difference (such as that of different kinds of metre) between prose and verse fictions. I think the former, and should even be inclined to maintain, though sorely against most critics, that the essential character

of a poem is that it should be in verse: thus have I come round to the vulgar notions! If the diction be prosaic indeed, why then it is very *bad* verse; if the thoughts and subjects and descriptions are mean, then it is *bad* poetry. It may be more or less imperfect poetry; and just so if I cultivate ugly flowers I have a *bad* garden, and if I let weeds spring up it is an *imperfect* garden; but still so far as I cultivate flowers, it is a *garden*, while the most perfect and beautiful casual assemblage of wild flowers, and the most nicely cultivated and brilliant fields of saintfoin and beans, would never approach to the character of a flower garden. So here, no poetical diction (like the prose run mad of the 'Death of Abel') which is not verse, will constitute a poem, *much less* the highest excellence of fable, character, description, &c., as in Scott's novels. This is no mere verbal distinction; call them all poems if you will, still they belong essentially to different classes of composition, the pleasure they afford is different in *kind*, they are incommensurable, they proceed on different rules, and are no more to be compared together than speaking and singing, or walking and dancing, which indeed have similar ratios. Proofs: many an admired poem and novel if translated respectively into prose and verse *fairly* (I mean making no *alteration* but in diction and addition or removal of metre, and expressing in good or indifferent verse or prose each passage according as well or ill-expressed in the original), would suffer exceedingly. The detail of

the novel would be insufferably tame and prolix in verse, and the transposed poem would be meagre; no possible prose-eloquence would give the same force to its *fine passages*. The fact is, the fable, characters, &c., are only the vehicle (though I grant the indispensable vehicle) of the said *fine passages*; in the novel, on the contrary, the fine passages, if any, in short the whole of the language, is the vehicle for the fable, characters, &c.

Hence it is that we have hardly any pleasure, or much less, at least, in reading over again even the most perfect productions of prose. Whereas a poem which gave less delight at first may be read again and again with even increased pleasure, even when one knows it by heart.

Prose is (*cet. par.*) more entertaining, or, if you will, more *lounging*. Poetry requires more exertion of mind; but affords, when excellent, gleams of more rapturous pleasure, and also a more permanent pleasure.

A strong additional proof of the distinct nature of the two, is, that poetry is confessedly not translatable in the same sense that prose is. A translation of a prose work (supposing it not to be of that character which approaches more to the nature of poetry, by depending much on diction) may be a perfect fac-simile of the original, each merely employing language for the purpose of conveying the meaning to the reader's mind, and each, in its respective language, accomplishing that object in the same

degree. Whereas a translation of a poem can at best be but an imitation: it is a *distinct poem*, only on the same subject, plan, &c.; the proof of which is, if any be wanting, that none but a poet can write it; whereas a man who wants the talent of a novelist may make a very fair translation of a novel. And while to one who knows the original of a prose work of any kind, no translation would afford gratification, because the only object that translation proposes, the clear conveyance of the matter, is already accomplished,—a good translation of a poem, on the contrary, may afford even equal or superior pleasure to one who knows the original.

One does, it is true, read again and again, and get by heart some fine prose passages, but this confirms my theory; for they are all such as are particularly admirable for language and rhythm, and so far partaking of the nature of verse. Certainly to my mind, and I think I am not therein singular, nothing can be more clearly distinct than the kinds of pleasure I feel from a good poem, or a good novel or other prose work. Now, Aristotle and most others seem to think that the essence of poetry is in the matter, and that the diction and metre are merely superadded luxuries. Whereas I contend that they totally change the whole nature of the performance and of the pleasure it gives. Plant a park with parterres of flowers, and you may perhaps increase its beauty; but you do not make it a *prettier park*; you make it a garden—a different kind of thing.

The essential character of poetry and the nature of the pleasure it gives, may be gathered from A. Smith on the 'Imitative Arts' (q.v.), and from one short passage in Aristotle's 'Rhet.,' 3, where he says that the poet comes forward in the character of a person *inspired.* Hence you make up your mind, as it were, for a peculiar diction and an exact rhythm, and are gratified by the pleasure of *imitation* as such (*vide* A. Smith), viz. by seeing one thing brought to resemble another widely different. And, accordingly, in all cases, so far as the means of imitation are more remote from the object, so far is the imitation itself more essential, and the *object* subordinate to it. Thus, as in singing, the essential part is the modulation of voice, though the pleasure is infinitely heightened by the words and sentiments of the song being fine; though no conceivable excellence in these, however well *spoken*, would constitute singing; whereas in speaking *these* are the essentials; and a good delivery (though immensely important) is but the vehicle of these,—so in poetry, the verse first and then the diction, are the essentials; because, though these lose most of their force unless the substratum of the matter (i. e. the object imitated) be good, yet no degree of excellence in this department will alone produce the *appropriate effect* of poetry. Whereas in prose works the matter is the essential. The language, however fine, is but the vehicle; and if in a prose fiction the representation of striking natural scenes, &c., be perfect, it will produce its appropriate effect, even though the diction be ever so bad.

Poetical prose is like the reading of which Cæsar asked whether it was meant for singing. It was called ψυχρόν, because it reminds us of, and thence makes us miss, poetry, to which the words *warmth*, *glow*, *fire*, &c., are naturally applied; just as a fire-place without a fire excites peculiarly the idea of cold, the bed of a torrent, of aridity, &c.

There are, however, innumerable gradations between poetry and prose, e. g. a very interesting and well-told tale in slovenly verse and humble diction will deservedly be much admired; and thence arises much of the prevailing confusion of thought on this subject; for because it is a *poem*, and *admirable*, men think it is an *admirable poem*. Whereas as a poem it is not admirable, and, though it gives much pleasure, gives but a moderate degree of that particular kind which is the appropriate pleasure of poetry. It is like a very excellent song tolerably sung.

July 1820.

OF MIRTH.

I FIND no fault with any one for differing in taste or opinion, but I do for professing what they do not verily hold, though perhaps they themselves fancy they do, from want of attentive reflection (such is the case with numerous moral precepts); such also with respect to mirth and liveliness of spirits,

which almost everyone considers, or at least professes to consider as an indication (except where there is studied dissimulation) of inward cheerfulness and peace of mind; and yet there is scarcely anyone who does not know to the contrary. Many, perhaps the generality, are, if anything, more disposed to gaiety, and more ready to perceive the ludicrous, when the furthest from being happy and from a comfortable state of spirits.* And in a very few, I think, is this relish altogether destroyed by uncomfortable circumstances and feelings, though in many cases it happens that fashion reckons it indecorous (e. g. when a friend is lately dead) to manifest any such relish; but if, on the contrary, it were reckoned indecent to express sorrow of any kind by a serious demeanour, I believe few would find themselves very hard taxed to keep up a cheerful demeanour. To me anything which produces much annoyance seems to have a direct tendency to produce gaiety of spirits, and real deep-felt happiness I am inclined to think (from conjecture) must be a calm and serious thing.† The agitation of spirits produced by bodily or mental

* There is a story told of a man in Paris consulting a physician for a terrible depression of spirits. He advised him to seek diversion. 'Go and see that celebrated actor of comedy, M——, who keeps all the audience in roars of laughter.' 'Alas, sir, I AM that wretched man!'

† This article appears to have been written during a time of much deep trial, in the earlier life of the writer, before his marriage. He adds, in a subsequent note on the words 'deep-felt happiness,' 'Probatum est, Dei Gratia, July 1821.'

annoyance, if you keep it from breaking out into raving and complaining, seems naturally to vent itself in talking and joking (like the troubled sea's *ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα*). It is much more difficult to produce a demeanour of calm fortitude than of gaiety. And again, when there is no agitation of mind, but you are filled with mortification, disgust, and disrelish for every object, you retain, I think, just enough and not too much interest in all things around you to laugh at them: disgust, contempt, and laughter are nearly akin. I sympathise fully with the careless, comfortless, hopeless gaiety of

Πάντα γέλως, καὶ πάντα κόνις, καὶ πάντα τὸ μηδέν·
*Πάντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀλόγων ἐστὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα.**

I mean that the '*γάρ*' seems to me very just. Lord Byron is also, as he represents himself, a most just representation of the union of wretchedness and gaiety; one who enjoys nothing, values nothing, and *therefore* laughs at everything.

There are few who do not perfectly well know all this from what they have either felt or seen, and yet everyone says, 'such a one is very well and happy, and in excellent spirits; no one can believe he is anywise "distressed in mind, body, or estate," for he chatted and joked with the utmost spirit.' Would they conclude the same from a cockchafer's spinning when he has a pin through his tail?

September 1820.

* *Trans.*—'A joke are all things. All is dust, all nought;
For from a senseless world are all things wrought.'

OF WHIGS AND TORIES.

I HAVE come to the discovery that I am a divine-right Tory. That name, at least, is often applied, and I can't say unjustly, to those who hold that a king has a right to the obedience of his subjects for conscience sake; and consequently, if they are Christians, on the principle of obedience to the Divine will, in opposition to the notion that because a king is bound to govern for his people's, not his own good, therefore we are to obey him or not, according as we conceive his commands in each case to be expedient or not.

Now I hold that though the king is bound to govern with a view to public utility, and though that truth cannot be too strongly impressed on *him*, yet he has the same *right* to his subjects' obedience, independent of his goodness and wisdom as a governor, that a creditor has to his debt, independent of the use he is likely to make of the money received, though undoubtedly he is bound to make a good use of the money.

The whigs are right in maintaining (what I suppose no one ever disputed) that there is a reciprocal duty, viz. of good government on the one side, and obedience on the other; but their error is in teaching that a failure on one side authorises a failure on the other; in other words, that the parties are respectively *accountable to each other*. There are many cases in

which the parties are thus mutually accountable, but many others also in which they are not, and the mischief lies in confounding the two classes together. If I make a bargain with a man, e.g. to transact some affairs for him, for which he is to pay me a certain sum, we are mutually accountable to each other; and on my failing to transact his business in the manner I had engaged, he is released from all obligation of paying me. No less are husband and wife bound by their vow to love and be faithful to each other; but they are not responsible to each other, only to God; so that the infidelity of one party does not release the other from the engagement. The same with parents and children, the same with governor and subject; the governor is bound in duty to govern well, but he is responsible, not to his subjects, but to his God, and therefore misconduct does not absolve his subjects from their allegiance.

The three cases above, indeed, are all of a similar nature. But are we then to submit to a tyranny which destroys all the ends of government? Surely not: extreme cases (which everyone must judge of for himself) authorise an exception to every general rule; the right of a man to his property must yield in such cases, e. g. if when shipwrecked and perishing with hunger and cold, I help myself to the first food and shelter I can find, though it is clear my act is unlawful (for no laws can or should pretend to provide for such cases), I am not only justified, but bound by the law of self-preservation.

So are subjects both authorised and compelled by duty (they cannot be the one without the other), in extreme cases of tyranny which subvert or threaten to subvert (not the happiness of an *individual*, but) the ends of government to the public, to resist.

It is much better to say that in such cases, where the evil of the particular instance clearly overbalances the advantage of adhering to the general rule (vide Paley), it is right to dispense with law, than to try to make out, like Blackstone, that resistance is in any case *lawful*; which is in fact a contradiction in terms.

The revolution in 1688 I will ever maintain was unlawful; nevertheless I would have joined in it. There is no great danger then in my doctrine of non-resistance: now look to the opposite. If the matter be not as I have stated it, then it must be that the parties *are* responsible to *each other*; that is the only alternative. It follows therefore inevitably that every subject who believes his governor to have erred in the slightest degree, is at once absolved from his allegiance, for such is the nature of all such compacts; if I stipulate to buy a horse warranted sound, at a certain price, should he prove to have a blemish contrary to agreement, be it ever so small, the bargain is null. So there is an end of all government till we can find infallible governors, and (on the same principle) of all conjugal fidelity, filial duty, and security of property.

So much for my Toryism, now for my Whiggery.

I abhor the ultra-tories, or rather pseudo-tories, whose errors are the following: 1st, considering the divine right of *kings* as something peculiar, which is palpably absurd. Parliaments and constables have as good a right to obedience in the regular exercise of their functions as the king. 2nd, Extending their obedience to the king beyond his *lawful* authority. I obey the king only so far forth as he *is* king, according to the constitution; if he demand my money without consent of Parliament, or issue any other illegal order, he has no more claim to my obedience than the Great Mogul. 3rd, Resting their loyalty on the personal merits of the reigning sovereign. If he is a good one, I thank God for it, but that is not the ground of my obedience; my loyalty is to the king *as* such, not to this or that individual. 4th, Making it a point of loyalty to support the *government*, i. e. the ministry for the time being. This transfer of loyalty from the king to the ministers is highly unconstitutional; if I think the ministry a good one, I support it; but if I think they ought all to be hanged, and do my best in a lawful way to accomplish that object, I am not a whit the less loyal.*

With respect to the grand question between the Whigs and Tories about the balance of power between the Crown and the Parliament, I profess myself a trimmer. As a general rule, I am equally jealous

* *Loyal* is from 'Loi.'

of the encroachments of each side; in each particular, I am ready to oppose that side which seems most inclined to preponderate (vide Burke).

September 1820.

OF LORD BYRON.

To a person of tolerable good sense, Lord Byron in his late productions may prove, so far from dangerous, a very serviceable writer by furnishing a sort of 'reductio ad absurdum' of the whole system of scoffing. A Socinian, we will say, who fancies ridicule the test of truth, thinks he has made the doctrine of the Incarnation appear perfectly absurd, by having held it up to ridicule and scorn; professing all along, and perhaps feeling, the most serious veneration for Christianity. But the Deist finds it very easy to employ the same plan for *his* purposes, for in fact 'everything,' says the proverb, 'has two handles,' and it is not difficult to place Christianity in such a point of view that it shall seem extravagant and ridiculous, and so to interweave with every part of it absurd ideas, and suggest low and ludicrous associations, that it shall seem unworthy of serious notice. Meantime, he is perhaps not at all aware of what he is about, and believes that there is *something ἄξιον σπουδῆς*, as he does not dream that what he calls natural religion may be laughed down just on the

same plan. The atheist does this for him, making the whole constitution and course of nature appear a joke, the universe a whimsical and random jumble of atoms. Yet *he* will still have some ground to stand on, as he will talk very big of conforming to the excellence of human nature, of the perfectibility of the species, and of virtue being its own reward, &c. Next comes the philosopher, or philosophico-sentimentalist of some of the German schools, who in like manner holds up to scorn all rules of ethics, all pretence of acting on fixed principles, and is all for 'listening to the dictates of the heart,' 'following the impulse of unsophisticated nature,' &c. If, therefore, you ask *him* whether there is anything at all that is worthy of serious regard, he will refer you to these feelings, as what ought to be so considered. Then forth steps Lord Byron and shows you that it is not a whit more difficult to turn into ridicule all the most natural feelings of the human heart, thus overthrowing the last stronghold to which reason, or anything partaking of reason, can retire; extinguishing this last faint glimmer of twilight on the same principle by which the utmost brilliancy that human wisdom can attain had been quenched; and leaving us to *πάντα γέλως, πάντα κόνις*, &c.

A man of any considerate common sense will be apt to pause at this, and reflect that since there surely is *something* which is not a mere joke, and since it now appears plain that there is nothing which may not be so represented, by one who has the knack of

setting things in an absurd point of view, it may be as well to try over again with serious candour everything which has been hastily given up as fit only for ridicule, and to abandon the system of scoffing altogether, looking at everything on the right side as well as the wrong, and trying how any system will look standing upright as well as topsy-turvy.

There seems to me a considerable resemblance between Lord Byron, Voltaire in his 'Candide,' and Swift in his Houyhnhnms; viz. that each seems to satirise not merely any class of mankind, nor mankind in general, as they are, but human nature in the abstract. One might suppose each to be a being (as I think Madame de Staël says of Voltaire) of a different species. Swift, however, does not so fully answer the purpose of a 'reductio ad absurdum,' because though he laughs at and abuses everything that *is*, he seems to have a real value for something that is *conceivable*. The ridicule, however, which, in his account of Laputa, he throws indiscriminately on all projects of improvement (I say indiscriminately, because he represents his man of sense, not as steering in a middle course, but as being against *all* alterations, and wishing to let everything remain just as it was), when compared with the improvements which have since his time taken place in agricultural implements, machinery of various sorts, gas lamps, railroads, steamboats, and numberless things connected with chemistry, abundantly prove how possible and how easy it is to make what is perfectly

rational and highly dignified assume an air of the wildest and most ludicrous absurdity.* Astronomy and electricity have been most copiously ridiculed in their time; vide a satire of Hudibras Butler on the Royal Society soon after its establishment.

I think it a good plan with a young person, at least if he seems of a character to be much affected by ludicrous and absurd representations, to show him plainly by examples that there is *nothing* which may not be so represented; he will hardly need to be told that everything is not a mere joke, and he may thus be secured from falling into a contempt of those particular things which he may at any time happen to find so treated.

Certainly it cannot be said that Lord Byron has put vice in the most seductive forms, for he always places it in company with acute suffering or dismal gloom. And though in many instances he has conferred a dignity on his vicious characters, nearly (not quite) as seductive as that of Milton's 'Satan,' yet in 'Don Juan' he has robbed it even of dignity. I do not say, however, that his writings can dc no harm to the very thoughtless.

November 1820.

* See *A Lost Leaf of Gulliver's Travels*, p. 239.

OF PUBLIC SPEAKING.

THERE are several curious phenomena relating to public speaking of which I have never seen a satisfactory solution.

1st. Why does a man feel embarrassed in the attempt to say the same things before two or three hundred which he could say with perfect ease before two or three, and that even though the two or three should be persons for whose opinion he has far more respect?

2nd. Why is an orator who is master of his business able to influence so much more strongly the larger assembly? for that is true of all men which some ancient said of the Athenians, that they were like sheep, it was easier to drive a flock than a single one.

3rd. Why is so different a style of speaking adopted? Aristotle notices the difference of the agonistic and graphic styles, but does not account for it.

It is commonly said, I believe, that a man is of course more afraid of the censure of many than of a few, but this solution is manifestly inadequate; for a man will often feel such a just confidence in himself as to have *no* embarrassment at all in speaking to three or four. Now any multiple of 0 is 0. Why therefore should he feel any embarrassment before a greater assembly? Moreover, he may have a far greater

anxiety about the good opinion of three or four wise men than of a thousand blockheads; yet will he feel more embarrassment before these last.

The cause of the phenomena in question is a curious and most complicated play of sympathies. I lay down, then, these Lemmas: 1st, we are disposed to sympathise with any emotion which we believe to be in the mind of any one present; and hence, if we are at the same time otherwise disposed towards that emotion, such disposition is thereby heightened. 2nd, we sympathise with that sympathy of others towards us, and any emotion in ourselves is then still further heightened by our knowing that there are others present who not only feel the same, but feel it the more strongly from their sympathy with us. 3rd, we sympathise with the sympathy of others towards each other.

The case of the ludicrous affords the best illustration, from its effects being so open and palpable; if anything laughable occurs, I am disposed to laugh; but much more if anyone else is present whom I think likely to be tickled with it, even though he should not know of my being present, but much more still if he does know it, because I know that his emotion is increased by his sympathy with me; and most of all, if many such are present, because I am aware that they all sympathise with each other as well as with me. Hence the *catching* nature of all feelings in a large assembly, which may be compared to the increase of sound from a number of echoes, or

of light from a number of mirrors, or to the blaze of a number of firebrands which would each have gone out if kindled singly, but which when thrown together kindle each other.

Now to apply this: the speaker who, in addressing a large assembly, knows that each of them sympathises with his own anxiety to acquit himself well, and also sympathises with each of the rest in this feeling, and who knows also that every slip he may make, which may excite ridicule, pity, &c., makes the stronger impression on each of them from the mental sympathy and consciousness of it. This augments his anxiety. Next, he knows that each hearer, putting himself in the speaker's place, sympathises with this augmented anxiety; this increases it still further (hence, by-the-bye, it is found that shy people are the most so when in company with the shy); and if he becomes at all embarrassed, the knowledge that there are so many to sympathise with his embarrassment, and with each other's sympathy with it, heightens it to the utmost.

The same causes will account for a good speaker being able so much more easily to rouse the passions of a multitude. They kindle each other by mental consciousness of sympathy; and hence the bolder style which suits such an occasion, or perhaps which in the closet would at the first glance excite pity, &c., but on a moment's reflection would appear extravagant, may be very suitable to the agonistic style, because before that moment's reflection should take

place, you would be aware that everyone around you sympathised in that first emotion, which would thereby become so much heightened as to preclude the ingress of any counteracting feeling.

If you could suppose it possible for anyone to address a multitude, each one of whom believes himself to be the *sole* hearer, I believe he would feel no embarrassment.

December 1822.

OF DUELS.

I HATE to hear women and clergymen declaim against duelling when not called on for their opinion. It is a mighty proof of fortitude to defy temptations to which we never can be exposed. If you want to show how well you *would* undergo trials from which you are exempt, show it by the way of sustaining your own.

I have never seen among the numberless sermons, essays, &c., on the subject, any one which is not absolutely frivolous, except Mandeville's, which I think is, as far as it goes, correct. Almost all set themselves to prove that a duel is a bad thing, and therefore the law of honour must be bad which *sanctions* it. They might as well conclude that the law of the land is bad, because it *sanctions* hanging. And though few could clearly set forth the absurdity of this reasoning, yet in practice it is so clearly *felt*,

that none of their arguments, I believe, ever have any effect in practice.

That a duel is a bad thing, is not only never doubted, but is the very datum assumed by the law of honour, since the necessity of fighting a duel (or else of being excluded from a certain class of society) is the very penalty employed by the law of honour. In every duel, one party at least must be (I mean on the principles of that code) in the wrong; since to offer an affront, which is the only ground, according to that code, of a duel, is a violation of its law. To estimate therefore the effects of that law by the number of duels fought, is as absurd as to estimate those of the law of the land by the number of men hanged or transported. In every case each instance of the *infliction* of the penalty annexed to any law is an instance, not of its efficiency, but, as far as that instance goes, of its failure. The object of the laws is, not that man should be punished, but that they should be deterred by the fear of punishment. If they could completely answer their purpose, no one would be punished. If a duel should come to be universally regarded as no evil, the law of honour would have lost one of its chief sanctions.

That society has a right to impose such a sanction I do not take upon me to maintain; but since women and clergymen enjoy the benefit of that courteousness with which they as well as all others are treated, even by such as could not be restrained by Christian principles, it seems rather unfair in them

gratuitously to rail against the butcher and eat the meat; and, more especially it is indecorous in them to resort to the protection of their gowns when they act in a way that would lead to a duel among laymen. Mr. G., who lately wrote a pamphlet about duels, in his controversy with D. used such language as he would not have dared to use had they been both laymen, for fear of having his nose pulled.

A clergyman and a woman should always keep in mind 'I cannot be challenged,' as a reason, not for doing, but for abstaining from what would otherwise lead to a challenge. Clergymen sometimes seem to think it a mark of spirit to use insolent language; which is in fact as cowardly as to beat a woman.

Let them not write against duelling, but prove by *their conduct*, as far as *they* are concerned, the falsity of the opinion that good manners *cannot be maintained without it.*

February 1827.

OF HOPE AND FEAR.

ARE men disposed to overrate or underrate their own good luck? A. Smith says the former, and he adduces lotteries, mining schemes, fisheries, and many such things, in which men are aware that the *total* losses exceed the gains. N. W. S. says the contrary, and adduces insurances, in which a person knowingly pays more than the amount of the risk,

for the sake of being secured from loss: for the insurers receive as much as compensates the risk, besides a profit, and the tax to government is as much more. It may be doubted, however, whether in many cases a man does pay more than the risk is practically worth to him. A risk may by fair computation be 50*l.* per annum, and to be insured from it I may pay 100*l.* per annum, not from overrating my own risk, but because the 100*l.* may be but a very trifling deduction from my enjoyments, while the loss might involve total ruin. 100*l.* is no doubt the $\frac{1}{200}$ of 20,000*l.*, but it does not follow that the evil of my losing 100*l.* is $\frac{1}{200}$ of that of losing 20,000*l.*, or anything near it.

To explain the whole matter I should adopt the language of the craniologists, though not so as to imply the least shadow of truth in their speculations concerning the brain.

They say there is an organ of Hope, and another of Cautiousness or Apprehensiveness; the former excited by and dwelling on bright prospects of futurity, the other on dangers and anticipated evils. This language does not exactly correspond with the ordinary, but I think it is more precise. In common discourse, Hope and Fear are always understood to imply each other; i. e. any diminution of the confident anticipation of good is called Fear. As the lover fears he may lose his mistress, and when he is free from this fear it is called not Hope, but Confidence; so also apprehension of evil is called Despair when there is no limita-

tion of it, i. e. no hope of escape. But it is plain that Hope and Fear cannot, both of them at least, be *mere* negations or limitations of each other, else they would be like the two cats who ate each other all but the tails, or Duncan's horses, who are not even recorded to have left the tails (vide 'Macbeth'). There must be such a thing as a cheering anticipation of positive good, and I think it is a very different sensation from the mere abatement of a dread of positive evil. So also vice versâ.

Then some persons have more to say of the one organ, others of the other. But how is it with the generality? Those in whom Hope predominates will overrate their own good luck, and those who stake the best part of their property in mining and such speculations are plainly of the number.

Hope says, You will make your fortune; Cautiousness, You will lose your fortune. Now, if the latter be in itself the more likely, it is plain that such as do take their chance are dazzled by the bright pictures drawn by a predominant Hope. On the other hand, the case of insurances does not prove that the insurer must have a predominant Cautiousness, because in this case Cautiousness is left to *act alone*, without having the antagonist muscle of Hope to counteract it. Suppose I have a richly-freighted ship at sea: Cautiousness says, It may be lost, you had better insure. Hope does not forbid this; for though she may be drawing splendid pictures of the wealth coming in this ship, insuring does not destroy

this wealth, only a small portion of it. Whereas, in the other case, Hope not only draws a splendid picture of the wealth to be drawn from the mine, but requires that we should shut our ears against Cautiousness, if we would realise the picture. The gain cannot be had but by running the risk.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that some lottery speculations, &c., do not imply a predominance of Hope; for when the outlay is very inconsiderable (to him who makes it) and the profitable gain great, we have the converse of the case of insuring. *Hope* is here acting without an antagonist muscle. She says, Venture, and Cautiousness has in such a case little to say against it. All this is quite independent of any speculations about the brain.

August 1827.

OF PAST SUFFERINGS.

It seems at first sight pretty obvious that to grieve for past sufferings (*really* past) is to torment oneself most absurdly. And, indeed, I don't think men are very apt to do so in respect of their *own*, but it is very often done in the case of the sufferings of one's friends.

Past evils, indeed, do very often afford a reasonable ground of affliction, but then it is from their liability to recur, or to lead to some other evils.

A past fit of the gout may be regarded as a pre-

sent evil, since it indicates a gouty constitution; but it is remarkable that there are no past evils whatever that people are so apt to grieve about as those which are the most utterly past, viz., the sufferings of the *deceased.* One of the most anxious enquiries respecting a departed friend is whether he died easily. Nothing is so consolatory to the survivors as to learn that he suffered little; and if he died in great agony, it excites their sympathy more than the case of one who is living in agony. And yet all this is pure imagination, and all our affliction in such a case is the result of confusion of thoughts. To be sure I wish to die easily, because I wish to *live* easily, of which that is a part; but if there be any amount of suffering from disease reserved for me, I care not whether it takes place in the disease of which I die, or in any other. Of the two, indeed, perhaps the former would be rather preferable; because in the other case I might be annoyed by the memory of that particular suffering, whose *recurrence* I might fear. And I feel just the same towards my friends as towards myself. I wish them an easy life, and of course an easy death, as a part of it; but it is idle to grieve in their case or in my own for any past sufferings which cannot recur or have left any ill-effects behind it, and of this number must be the sufferings of such of them as are dead. It is a folly to shiver for last year's snow.

But when we reflect on the excruciating tortures of a dying man which we have witnessed or heard of,

our sympathy is excited by the operation of conception (for it is *conception* not *perception* that we have of anything not in actual present existence), and our recollection of the distinction of past, present, and future becomes confused, so that we thus feel real pain for an unreal suffering, just as we sometimes do on reading or seeing a tragedy. But then people reply, 'Oh, the sufferings detailed in a tragedy are fictitious, but these are real.' No they are not; they *were* real (and so, perhaps, if you come to that, were Lear's, for that tale *may* be a true one), but they *are* not. That which is past *has* existed, but *does* not *now* exist. At the *present time* it is as unreal as a pure fiction.

There is a great difference, indeed, between the two cases. One really *was*, the other never was; but they are so far alike that neither of them *is*. If my house were burnt down, it would be true indeed that there *was* a house there, but I can no more live in it than in Aladdin's palace, which never was. The bread which I ate a year ago and the ambrosia of Homer's gods are both equally non-existent at this moment. I may make either of them an object of my thoughts, and I may think, very truly, that the one did exist and the other not, and that *other* bread is produced for me to-day, and ambrosia never will exist; but still I could not subsist on the bread which was consumed a year ago any more than on ambrosia. Why, then, should I grieve now at anything which has now no existence? There *was* good

reason for my grieving at my friend's sufferings at the time, because they *were* not past, but actually existing; but that is no reason why I should grieve now. Present and past makes all the difference. And this I think most people perceive clearly enough in their own case. A man who has had a leg cut off does not, I think, in general, grieve over the pain of the operation, unless he has any suspicion that he may again suffer amputation, and even in that case it is the thoughts of the future, of which the past presents so lively a picture, that gives him the pain.

But in the case of others there are two circumstances that make the difference: 1st, in our own case we have a distinct view of the difference between the past and the present, because we have a *perception* of the latter, and only a *conception* of the former; whereas in the case of another's suffering we have only a *conception* of each, so that we do not so readily draw the line. It may be said that of the future also we have only a conception; and in truth it often happens that the unthinking are occupied almost exclusively with the present, but those who use their understanding are taught by it, that their conceptions of the future, if correct, will be succeeded by perceptions; that though the things which are to befall them are not real now, they *will* be so, and therefore are just objects of pursuit or avoidance; while the same understanding teaches that past evils, so far as they have left no result, are to us the same as if they had never been; except, indeed, that many even

derive pleasure from thinking of them in contrast with present ease.

2nd, Though reason would teach us the same in respect of the past sufferings of a friend, we are less apt to listen to the lesson from our attaching a kind of *merit* to tender-heartedness toward a friend, while it is regarded as no merit, but rather a reproach, to feel very keenly for ourselves; all which is very right, only it should not blind us to the real state of the case, and lead us to sympathise with those who are, at the very moment we are grieving for them, perfectly free from the affliction.

To all this I have been answered, 'Oh, you are for altering the nature of man; nothing can be more *natural* than this kind of sympathy, and you might as well pretend that one ought not to feel pain.' Certainly the weaknesses of our nature are a part of our nature, and imagination is a part of the human mind as well as reason; but if everything that is natural is to be vindicated on that ground, what folly may not? To go no further, it is undeniably natural to feel real and acute pain at a tragedy or mournful tale; but I do not admire the wisdom of him who gives way to this, and does not, when the pain predominates, recall his feelings and rouse himself by the recollection that it is all unreal. As for the latter part of the objection, it is quite futile; for to pretend that pain is no evil is not to follow the dictates of the understanding, which does not at all teach us to deny that we feel; but in the present case, the understand-

ing does teach us that what we grieve for has no real existence at the present moment. Reason does not teach us that a man who was burned alive *suffered* no pain, but it tells us that it *suffers* none now; and that if we grieve for him, it is through a confused conception which gives no distinct view of the past and the present.

I believe the reason why the sufferings of the deathbed affect people so much more than any other, is because in any other case there is at least the hope of a kind of compensation resulting from the enjoyment of subsequent health and comfort in this life, which in a man's last illness of course cannot be.

This is a fanciful ground of affliction, however, even in a heathen, and it is utterly unchristian. On the whole, I think we have enough real pains and troubles in life without tormenting ourselves with imaginary ones.

September 1827.

OF FATALISM.

It is commonly and plausibly urged against fatalism and predestination that the natural tendency of such a belief is to paralyze man's exertions, or render him careless in his conduct; and when it is answered that multitudes of those who maintain such doctrines are as active and vigilant in their conduct as any others, it is replied that the belief of these men is only

speculative—that their tenets never occur to them in practice, but are entirely out of their thoughts whenever they are engaged in the concerns of life; and that this is proved by the very fact that they do act thus inconsistently with their own professed principles.

This last argument, however, is a little like 'petitio principii.' It is *assuming* that if men had these principles in mind in the emergencies of life, they *would* be thereby rendered inactive or careless, which is the very point to be proved. It may perhaps be proved that this *ought*, in consistency, to be the result; but I do not think that in fact it is so. A gipsy persuades a silly girl that she is fated to marry such a man, or to go to London and gain a great fortune, &c.; the result is that she does marry the man, go to London, &c.: can it be said that her belief in Fate is dormant and inoperative? It is the very ground of her actions. The like may be said of many men of whom more wisdom might have been expected. A belief in Fate appears to have prevailed in many great conquerors, and by no means to have lain dormant, but to have influenced (however inconsistently) their conduct in the exertions they have used. He who is convinced that the stars have decreed him victory will generally, instead of leaving the stars to fight for him, fight like a lion himself. No historical instance is perhaps so conclusive as that of Macbeth, because any one of them may be an exception to a general rule; whereas a poet who understands human

nature as Shakespeare did, presents us with a picture, not of an individual, but of human nature in general; and thence it is that Aristotle calls poetry (i. e. fiction) more philosophical than history. Now Macbeth is evidently urged by his belief in the witches' prediction that he should be king to commit the murder from which both his scruples and his fears deterred him. One might think it more reasonable that his firm conviction of such being the decree of Fate should have even deterred him from the crime, had he meditated it before; that he would have acted on the principle 'if Fate will have me king, why Fate may crown me;' but the result was just the reverse. Once only does this reflection escape him, in a soliloquy; he never even urges it to Lady Macbeth; and, so far from acting upon it, each recurrence to his mind of the prophecy seems to harden him in his resolution.

I will not undertake to say that the doctrine of decrees never led anyone into sin or indolence; but I cannot admit the arguments commonly and plausibly urged for the affirmative; viz., the plea of sinners that it was their fate, and they could not act otherwise. It is natural for everyone to excuse himself by the best plea that his religious or philosophical system will furnish; but it does not follow that that system was the *cause* of his sin, and that he would not have been as bad under any other. He who holds the truths of fatalism, urges them in self-vindication; another pleads the all-sufficient sacrifice of Christ,

another, that God is merciful, &c.: does it follow that these truths have *led* them into their sins? *

December 1826.

WHAT THINGS MEN MOST READILY GIVE.

JOHNSON said that every man is least willing to give away what he is accustomed to deal in: 'Thrale would rather give me money than beer.' S— says it is just the reverse, and I think he is right. When subscriptions are raised you see brewers subscribing beer; and clothiers, blankets; a physician, advice, &c.

How is this to be explained? It may be said with truth that a man may in this way subscribe *more* than he otherwise could. I may furnish goods which would cost them 20*l.*, but which cost me 15*l.* I then do more than 15*l.* worth of *good*; but I do not get, I think, even the same degree of credit for it. People are given to think less of what a man gives of articles in which he deals, even than in proportion to what they really cost him. The desire then of doing the more good is the most *reasonable motive* that can be given; and that is what people usually look for to account for anything. And if men acted from reason alone, this would be very right; as it is, this procedure often leads to mistake.

In the present case I should say that a man gives

* Fatalism is like the pressure of the atmosphere.—*See* King's *Discourses*, appendix.

the most readily what he has an *associated pleasure in parting with*: a farmer likes to clear out his barns; a wine merchant is accustomed to feel glad at sending out wine, &c. When they send out money, they are more accustomed to feel a sensation of loss, which their charity has to get over.

If this be so, those would the most readily give money who are accustomed to have much money pass through their hands, and to make money payments by which they are no losers: e. g. bankers; and such is said to be the fact.

August 1827.

NOTIONS OF HEATHEN PHILOSOPHERS ON A FUTURE STATE.

I HAVE been surprised to find that an interpretation of some of Aristotle's expressions ('Ethics,' b. i.), which makes him acknowledge a future state of enjoyment or suffering, has gained more currency than I could have conceived possible. And this though it is universally admitted that in the 3rd Book of the same treatise, he speaks of death as the complete and final extinction of existence, 'beyond which there is neither good nor evil to be looked for;' and though in the 1st Book itself he observes that it would be absurd to speak of a man's being happy after his death, since happiness has been defined as consisting in an active exercise of the faculties

(ἐνέργεια). These different passages, I suppose, are regarded as set off against each other, so as to neutralise Aristotle's judgment in the question.

I cannot but think it, however, a better plan, when an eminent author appears to contradict himself within a few pages, to examine whether he may not have been misinterpreted; or whether he may not have been speaking, in one place, of what *appears* at first sight, or is *thought* by the generality, and in the other, of what, in his own opinion, is the *real* state of the case; or, in short, whether in some way or other he may not be fairly reconciled with himself.

Aristotle is represented as saying in one of the passages in question (human happiness being the subject of which he is treating), that men are conscious after death of the transactions going on in the present world; that they are affected by the prosperous or adverse fortune of their surviving friends and relatives; but that they are affected by them in so *faint* and *slight* a degree that *nothing which happens after death* can make the difference of a man's being happy or miserable!

Now, if I had met with a passage that plainly conveyed this meaning in a writer of such acknowledged powers of mind, I should have been very strongly inclined to suspect it of being spurious, by whatever external evidence it might have been supported. For, not to mention its being at variance with a plain passage in the 3rd Book—a passage, too,

in which Aristotle does not attempt to *prove*, nor even *states*, that death is the termination of existence, as if it were at all questionable, but *alludes* to it as a truth universally admitted—and even to say nothing of his remarking in the outset of the passage in question, that it *would be ridiculous to suppose a man to be happy after he is dead*, to waive all this, and confine myself to the intrinsic absurdity of the supposed doctrine:—he is represented as saying that the deceased are sensible of what is going on in this world, and are affected by it in a very slight degree. Could he be so absurd as not only to pronounce positively that the dead *are* in a percipient state, and likewise that they are aware of what is passing among the survivors, but also that they are, nevertheless, affected only in a very small degree by the good or ill-fortune of their friends? If they know anything at all of it, how can he tell how much or how little they are affected? The more reasonable conjecture would be the contrary: e. g. one would suppose that, after such a person as O. Cromwell had spent what one might regard as a most prosperous life in establishing his own sovereignty and transmitting it to his son, he would be very miserable at knowing that shortly after his death his son was deposed, his own bones disinterred, the royal family restored, and all the work undone and reversed at which he had been labouring. The only supposition on which one could imagine the dead to be, though conscious of the condition of

their surviving friends, yet very slightly affected by it, would be the supposition that they are too intently occupied with the affairs of the state they are in—with the happiness or suffering belonging to the condition of the departed. Is this, then, Aristotle's account of the matter? On the contrary, he makes not the slightest allusion to anything of the kind. The scenes and occupations, whatever they may be, peculiarly belonging to that other life, which is to last either to all eternity or at least for an indefinite length of time, and all the pains and pleasures thence resulting, are totally passed by as not worth notice by a writer who is treating on human happiness; and we are left to conclude, it seems, that though the departed care but a very little about what befalls their surviving friends, they care not at all about anything else. The good or ill-fortune of their friends has a small and insignificant influence on their enjoyment or discomfort, but yet is the source of all they have!

No doubt eminent philosophers have been guilty of great absurdities; but there is a limit to all conceivable extravagance: and if any one can believe that Aristotle could be the author of such a tissue of unsupported and self-contradicting absurdities, we can hardly regard him as a philosopher worth studying. But, in fact, there is no such passage in existence; the whole of this notion has originated in a misinterpretation of the author's words—the result of that oscitancy to which all are more or less subject.

Those who have an opportunity of consulting the original, I am content to refer to that; and if an attentive perusal does not convince them that whatever his meaning was, at least it cannot be that which I have been speaking of as attributed to him, they are beyond the reach of any argument I can devise.

For the benefit of the mere English reader, or of such as have not the treatise at hand, I will attempt a brief explanation of the author's meaning. He is speaking of the notion of Solon, who would not allow that a man should be pronounced happy during his lifetime, because there is no saying what reverses of fortune he may undergo. 'Are we, then,' says Aristotle, 'to suppose that a man is happy when he is dead? No, this would be too absurd; especially since we have decided that happiness consists in an energy or exercise of his mental powers.' (Why should a man's being happy after death be inconsistent with that doctrine, except on the supposition of the dead having no perception?) 'But this,' he continues, 'is not even Solon's meaning; but that one may then safely *decide* as to a man's happiness (i. e. that he *has been* happy), when he is out of the reach of fortune.'

'But then, is he,' continues Aristotle, 'completely out of the reach of fortune? Since it *appears* that good or evil may befall the dead, as *well as the living, who have no perception of it*; such as credit or disgrace, and good or ill-success of friends.'

Now it is from this sentence chiefly, this very sentence in which Aristotle draws a parallel between the dead and those of the living who have *no* perception of the credit or discredit accruing to them, that it is inferred that the deceased *have* a perception of what passes after their death!

For, it is said, if they know nothing of it, how can it contribute to or impair their happiness? How it *really* can, it would be hard to say; but Aristotle only says that it appears so; and nothing can be more notorious than that many things *are* regarded as good or evil, as things to be desired or deprecated, both prospectively by men while alive, and afterwards by their survivors, without any notion that the party can at the time know, or at least care, anything about it. Is the desire of posthumous fame, which is so common, and the dread of posthumous infamy, which is nearly universal, to be traced to a supposed perception by the deceased of what is said of him? Does the dread so many entertain of being dissected, or torn by dogs, arise from a supposition that their dead carcases feel, that their souls at least will at the time be annoyed at the indignity? Did Buonaparte, Oliver Cromwell, and a multitude of others, who have been anxious to make their high station hereditary, suppose that they themselves should, at the time, be viewing and enjoying the greatness of their posterity?

The desire of posthumous fame, and of the greatness and prosperity of one's descendants, seems always to have been even the stronger in those who

have believed least, or thought least, of a future life. It is difficult for one who has been habituated from infancy to this belief, to imagine himself a person to whom it had never occurred; but is there anyone who will say that if he disbelieved either a future state altogether, or the consciousness of the deceased of what happens on earth, he should be perfectly indifferent as to what should befall his dearest friends, his kindred, and his country, subsequently to his own death, and should exclaim, 'When I am dead, let earth and fire be mingled'?

And lastly, would not anyone, if Solon's happiness had been spoken of, in having finally succeeded in his great and glorious work of giving Athens a good constitution and laws—would not anyone, I say, have been apt to reply, 'Ah, but a few years after his death, Pericles made destructive inroads on the constitution,—the whole state fell soon under the control of a lawless democracy, and by their mismanagement the city was captured and subjected to the thirty tyrants'?

This would not impair Solon's happiness, supposing him insensible; but it would impair the *speaker's idea* of his happiness.* These delusions of the

* The imperfect and confined sympathy we have with others, in respect of their feelings towards us, and, indeed, universally, can be likened to nothing so well as to the mixture of transparency and reflection in plate-glass. We sympathise, as A. Smith observes, with an idiot or madman, forming an indistinct idea of being in his situation, and at

imagination are productive of real effects on human thoughts and conduct. Aristotle seems to think it would be too *shocking* to *popular* feelings (λίαν ἄφιλον, ἢ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίων) to say that it is *nothing* to a man's happiness what becomes of his surviving friends; but (proceeding all along on the supposition that he knows nothing of it) decides that it cannot have any weight worth noticing.

OF MEASURING THINGS BY THEMSELVES; AND ON THE AMBIGUITY OF 'EXPECT.'

'THEY judging of themselves by themselves, and comparing themselves among themselves, are not wise.' Does this relate to their making their own notions and conduct the standard by which they measure the same? The Mahometans appeal to the beauty of style of the Koran as a standing miracle; no attempts to equal it having ever succeeded. And well it may be so, for all their canons of criticism are drawn from the Koran itself. So also is the world apt to judge of itself. Speak of the various

the same time retaining (which is a contradictory supposition) our present view of his actions. Just as one looks through the window at a tree, e. g. and sees by an imperfect reflection his own face, as if placed in the midst of the tree, which, if it were, he could not have that view of the tree; and even so we cannot imagine people talking of us after our death without the idea presenting itself of our hearing what they say.

errors of education, and the false principles that are afloat in the world, and you are answered that, after all, experience shows that the generality of men turn out very well under the system. Do they? I reply, compare the lives of Christians with the Gospel standard, and what a contrast is exhibited! 'Oh, but all this is true in theory, but it is quite wild to expect it in practice. Perfection is not to be looked for; we must make allowance for human infirmity,' &c. Then what *are* we to expect? Why, we must observe what men in general attain to; that is, what is reasonably to be expected. A very comfortable decision. No doubt you will find that the *generality of mankind are as good as the generality*. A man's clothes may well fit him when they are made to his measure. The Irishman could make it what hour he pleased when he held his candle to the sundial to see how the night went.

By-the-bye, there is a great deal in the ambiguity of the word 'expect,' which sometimes signifies ἀξιῶ, and sometimes ἐλπίζω. Thus I may fairly expect (ἀξιῶ) that one who has received great kindness from me should protect me in distress. At the same time, I may have such suspicion of his character as to expect (ἐλπίζω) that he will desert me. Men in exalted stations, including bishops, are expected to live in the splendour and sensuality of Sardanapalus; i. e. people anticipate this. But are

they, therefore, bound to live so, as if people required it of them as a right? On the contrary, it exposes them to obloquy.

August 2nd, 1828.

CONSISTENCY.

We have heard a vast deal (of late especially) about consistency and inconsistency, as the chief subjects of praise and censure, without any apparent thought of the very different things understood by each of those terms.

1st. A person is often reckoned wanting in consistency whenever he alters his course of proceeding; his language, his opinion, &c., in *conformity with a change of circumstances*; or at least, such a censure is often pronounced decidedly and at once, without ascertaining or even enquiring whether there is, or is not, such a change of circumstances as may call for the alteration.

Such is the inconsistency of passing a law and afterwards repealing it, when no longer needed; of making war, and afterwards peace; of wearing a great-coat in wet weather, and not in dry, &c.; of thinking well or ill of a man according to his conduct, &c.

2nd. A man is reckoned inconsistent for changing his conduct, opinions, &c., when circumstances remain the *same*—in short, for *altering his mind*; as

when, having been vicious, he reforms: or, on the other hand, when, having thought well or ill of a man, he finds or thinks himself *mistaken*; when, having advocated any measure (as, the sinking fund), he comes to the conclusion that he was erroneous in so doing, &c.

In this case some fault or error is implied, either first or last; an all-wise and perfect being cannot therefore undergo any such change; and the Church of Rome consequently, or any church or individual that is resolved never to acknowledge being in error, will never confess a change of this kind.

3rd. A man is strictly and properly called inconsistent whose opinions or practices are *at any one time* at variance with each other; in short, who holds, *at once*, a proposition and its contradictory: e. g. who incurs a great expense in feasting or equipage, with a view to the display of carelessness about money, yet exposes himself to ridicule through stinginess in the conduct of those very things; who censures and abhors intolerance, yet practises it towards others; who preaches and believes the truth and the importance of revealed religion, yet acts as if it were a string of nursery fables, &c. &c.

It is plain that this kind of inconsistency (if, in conformity with popular usage, we are to apply the word to all three) is to be carefully avoided by a rational person; though from the frailty of our common nature we must expect to be occupied all our life long in plucking up every root of the weed: for in

fact every deviation from duty, in one whose *plan of life* is to do his duty, must be, so far as it goes, an instance of this inconsistency. 'For the same who said Thou shalt not commit adultery, said also, Thou shalt not steal.'

[But an inconsistency of this kind is often attributed to one not guilty of it, by those who cannot enter into his views: e. g. to hate the sin and love the sinner—to disapprove a religion yet to oppose its suppression by forcible means—to think an object desirable, yet deprecate the purchase of it at an exorbitant price, &c.—are often regarded as instances of inconsistency.]

As for the second kind of inconsistency, if anyone changes from truth to error, or from good to evil, it would be more rational to condemn him on *that* ground than on the ground of his having *changed*, because this seems to exempt from the censure those who do *not* change, and to involve in it all who do. If a man turn Papist and you censure him for *changing*, that seems to imply that a *Papist* bred is not to be censured if he remain in that faith, but is, if he turn Protestant. If you censure the erroneousness of his faith, you are proceeding on right ground.

And if any person is very much addicted to changing his plans and opinions on slight grounds, it would be more precise to characterise him as *fickle* and *unsteady* than as inconsistent, because this latter term tends to confound one fault with another, viz.

with that of holding two inconsistent opinions *at once.*

This last, which (as has been said) it is the business of a wise man to guard against, exists in a wonderful degree in those who are most in dread of inconsistency. They hold a variety of opinions, of which they make it a merit never to give up *one*, though utterly at variance with each other, and adopted and allowed to have a place together, in the same mind, from a misty and indistinct apprehension which allowed their discrepancy to pass unnoticed. It is the very discipline of the mind by which we advance towards clearness of conceptions, to be perpetually comparing our opinions together, in order to detect inconsistency, and rejecting those which appear ill-founded, or modifying so as to reconcile with each other such notions as appear agreeable to truth.

A feeble or ill-cultivated mind, may be compared to a room nearly darkened, in which the most inveterate enemies may lodge together without recognising each other, and consequently without quarrelling. The improvement of such a mind is like bringing a *light* into such a room, which immediately shows who are friends and who are foes, sets them upon fighting, and the stronger turn out the weaker. And as he who is resolved that none of his guests should be expelled, must take care to leave them all in the dusk, so one who is so in love with consistency, as to resolve, at all events, to part with none of his

opinions, carefully excludes light from his mind, lest he should be compelled to perceive their incompatibility with each other.

As for the first kind of (so-called) inconsistency, a man may or may not be mistaken as to the grounds of his judgment, but if he believes his opinions or measures to be agreeable to the change of circumstances, he is at any rate not to be taxed with inconsistency. If I wear my great-coat when I expect rain, and leave it off when I expect fair weather, the rain may come and convict me of a *mistake* in my calculations, but not of *inconsistency*, in any *rational* use of the word.

This first kind of change, then, is what *must* be continually practised by everyone who is not *insane*. The second *ought* to be practised by everyone who is not *infallible*. The third kind of inconsistency (though no one probably is wholly exempt from it) ought to be sedulously avoided. But even here it would be better to censure a man not for the *inconsistency* of his notions with each other, but for the *erroneousness* of those which *are* erroneous; for herein lies the *fault*, since it is conceivable that a person's opinions might be all perfectly consistent with each other and all wrong, which would be far enough from improving the case.

And as I would have no one censured for inconsistency (because when there is ground for censure some better reason for it may always be assigned), so I would have no one praised for consistency. If a

man does not pay his debts this year, he is to be blamed, not because he paid them last year, but because he has not done now what he ought; and an honest man pays his debts this year, not because he paid them last year, but because it is right.

So great is the popular admiration for consistency that I do not wonder some act with a view to it, but I do wonder that any should be unwise enough to confess as much. It must be always a bad reason to give. If a principle or measure is right, *that* surely is reason enough for supporting it. If wrong, surely your being in the wrong yesterday, is a bad reason for being in the wrong to-day.

There would be no hardship in restricting from all exercise of power, all share in deliberations of any kind, everyone who should avow, or who should not solemnly renounce the principle of acting with a view to consistency. It at once stultifies his own decisions, for one who is not *exempt* from *error*, which no fallible mortal can be, can only preserve perfect consistency in one of two ways. First, by being too stupid ever to detect his errors; or, secondly, by being too obstinate, even when he does perceive them, to acknowledge his mistake and retreat.

Now it can be no hardship that a man who, by his own showing, is incurably stupid, or incurably obstinate, or both, should have no voice in any deliberation.

April 1829.

HASTY MARRIAGE.

I BELIEVE it is not uncommon for a man to marry in haste, for fear of marrying in haste. When my father left his estate to my mother for her life, and to be burdened with money legacies, payable at her death, she thought, reasonably enough, that if not sold till her death, it would be sold in haste, and perhaps unfavourably; and that it would be better to sell it in her lifetime, when she could get a good offer. This resolution once taken, she was impatient to be rid of it, and instead of waiting for good offers, sold it in as great a hurry and as disadvantageously as if there had been the apprehended necessity of immediate sale.

So also, when a man finds himself in a situation to make it possible and suitable for him to marry, he looks about for a wife; and finding one objection to one, and another to another, and so on, through several, he begins to get alarmed at the thought that he shall (as some have done) get more and more fastidious, till he shall have either reached the age (perhaps now far distant) at which it is too late to marry, or one at which, for fear of such an event, he will marry in haste, for fear of not marrying at all. This fear grows on him with each successive rejection of each lady, that occurs to him; and at length, when there are yet many years before him, in which he might get acquainted with many more, he fixes on some one who has perhaps but

slender recommendations, and marries in haste for fear of marrying in haste.

This is especially apt to befall those who have been once or more crossed in love; for superadded to the feelings I have described, there is a sort of feeling of spite: 'I will not let her think I wear the willow for her; she shall know that I can find somebody to have me if she won't:' *εὑρήσεις Γαλάτειαν ἴσως καὶ καλλίον' ἄλλαν.*

I shall give my children a maxim which has this great advantage over most that are given, that they may *make use of it*, (for most precepts are so *general* that they cannot be *applied* except by an exercise of just as much discretion as would be sufficient to frame them): viz. If you are crossed in love, whether by being jilted or otherwise, resolve not to marry, or engage yourself, for a year and a day.

July 1829.

OF PERSECUTION.

WHENCE is it that religious persecution seems so much harder to be got rid of, *after being formally renounced*, than most errors?

We complain of the Romish Church for it, while many of our divines preach persecution without knowing it; and the Romanists speak with as much horror of persecution, as we can do, and so on. I wish we always added to the prayers to be 'hurt by

no persecution,' another—to be preserved from *being persecutors*, which is rather the more important of the two.

It might seem to be enough to say that men are apt to include in their definition of persecution, 'being on the wrong side;' by which means of course they will always disapprove it, and can never be conscious of it. But some would allow that it is possible to persecute on the right side, yet, while they reprobate persecution, will be ready in practice to advocate it. But this also is to be considered.

I. No one ever wishes to persecute. The object is to *put down* and keep down a false religion, or whatever it may be; and if the means used for this purpose are completely successful, there will be no need of persecution. For a long time there has been no persecution of Protestants in Spain, because there were none to persecute. No plants are withered by the sun in Arabian deserts, nor killed by frost in Polar regions.

II. Till some failure takes place in the efficacy of the coercion used to produce conformity—some resistance or evasion of the system—we never hear of persecution; and in fact, strictly speaking, there is none, though the spirit of *persecution* is in full force. Properly, therefore, what we ought to condemn is not *persecution*, but coercion in religious matters.

III. Some hold that it is not persecution to prevent men from spreading erroneous doctrines, provided everyone is allowed to *think* as he pleases; this gets

rid of all persecution at once; for no one was ever persecuted for his private opinions, which would be impossible.

IV. Many will maintain that it is, indeed, persecution to inflict any punishment with a view to vengeance, but not, if it be for the public good, to save others from being corrupted. This is putting religious errors on the same footing with every kind of crime; for nothing ought to be punished with a view to vengeance. We do not hang a man for stealing, but that others may not steal. And the inquisition has always been ready with these excuses, often no doubt urged in full sincerity: they never, forsooth, punish any man for the errors he *holds*, nor from a spirit of vengeance; but for teaching heresy, and with a view to prevent mischief.

V. Again, many associate with the idea of persecution, that of barbarous severity, and reckon it to consist in torturing and burning. But if we have no right to use coercion at all, in matters of religion, we have no right to fine, imprison, or inflict any penalty whatever; if we have the right, we ought indeed to abstain from *unnecessary* severity, but to use such as shall be successful, which, however severe, is the kindest in the end. Persecution is not wrong because cruel, but cruel because wrong. All coercion must be either a duty or a sin. We have *power* to punish or release, but we cannot have a *right* to do both. The plea of conscience it is unsafe to admit, since quakers plead conscience against

paying tithes, Cameronians and Galileans against tribute, &c. If it be that the civil magistrate has a right to make regulations for the government of the Church, &c., then he must have a right to enforce them by penalties; for it is nugatory to make an enactment which a man may either obey or not, as he pleases; and if an exception is made in favour of the plea of *conscience, that* is easily set up. But if this position means only that he may exclude from certain *endowments* those who do not conform to his regulation, this is no act of a magistrate as such, since I might do the same. I might pay a chaplain or schoolmaster, on condition of his being subject to such regulations as I might enact. A rector of a parish may be also a magistrate, and may do several things in each capacity which he is not competent to do in the other.

Not only may a man be a persecutor who is not cruel, but some may even be too mild to become persecutors, who yet hold and propagate intolerant tenets, like the trumpeter in the fable.* And these need more especially to be warned, because, being justly conscious of their own charity, they do not distrust themselves. On the whole, though the *abstract* reasons against all use of coercion in religious matters are such as can be made intelligible to a

* 'His name,' said Lady Margaret, 'is Cuthbert Headrigg. I wish the lad no severe bodily injury, but incarceration, or even a few stripes, would be a good example in this neighbourhood.'—*Old Mortality.*

cultivated as well as candid mind, I think they are beyond the grasp of the great mass of mankind; and that men were therefore not left to make this out for themselves, but were furnished with a reason within the reach of the humblest capacity, and which it requires only candid simplicity and devout obedience to comprehend and act upon, viz. an express *prohibition*. This, indeed, is what many fail to find in the New Testament. But what *is* or what *can* be so stated as to force itself on those who are deaf because they *will* not hear?

August 1829.

ON FURNISHING EMPLOYMENT.

I DO not know that there is any error in Political Economy more widely spread, or productive of more evil, than the forgetting of the obvious truth, that what men live on is, not labour, but bread. The difficulty arises from the truth's being so very simple that no one can bring himself to suspect that anyone can overlook it. Yet it manifestly *is* overlooked, whenever men talk of this or that being beneficial by 'furnishing employment,' i. e. giving trouble. And beneficial no doubt it is, inasmuch as it is a wise dispensation of Providence that labour should be necessary; 'curis acuens mortalia corda.' But the benefit is exactly opposite to that which is meant, for men speak of the advantageousness of that which

furnishes employment, in the sense of its increasing the wealth of the community. Now, a *reductio ad absurdum* may reach some who have no head for abstraction; would it enrich the community, to lay aside ploughs and spades, and turn up the earth with sharpened stakes? Certainly it *would* 'furnish employment.'

The origin of the error seems to be this: that to an individual, that is advantageous, which increases *his* wealth, whether it adds or not, to the sum total, or even if it diminish it. A great hail-storm is as much a godsend to the glazier, as a fertilising shower to the farmer; but in the one case, the gain is subtracted from one part of the community, and added to another; in the other case, it is simple addition. So a heavy fall of snow which chokes the roads, or the discovery of a coal mine, are alike to the labourer a source of employment; to the community they are the opposite.

The most important practical result of this error is, the overlooking the *expensiveness* of war, which, if well understood, would check it even more than, I fear, mere humanity ever will. It is a source of gain to the soldier, and therefore is not regarded as so destructive of wealth as it is.

March 1830.

OF SALT AS AN ARTICLE OF FOOD.

Dean Swift, in the character of Gulliver among the Houyhnhnms, describes himself as having gradually become weaned from the use of salt, and as convinced that it is an artificial taste, originating in man's studying to provoke thirst in order to enjoy the greater pleasure in drinking. Whether he was serious in this hypothesis, I know not; it is not a greater absurdity than others he has fallen into, as he was often hasty in his reasoning, and careless of informing himself of facts.

He was very likely ignorant of the fact that herbivorous animals in a wild state are so well known to resort to salt-licks, as they are called, in America, that these are constantly frequented by sportsmen. Herbert Mayo, in his 'Physiology,' speaks of beasts in general resorting to salt springs, seeming to suppose that the carnivora also delight in salt; but the resort of these may be accounted for by their following their prey, as the biped sportsmen do. As far as I have been able to observe, no carnivorous animals show any craving for salt, or any liking for it: dogs indeed will eat salt meat, but not by preference; and it is reckoned unwholesome for them. To herbivorous quadrupeds, on the contrary, a salt mash often proves a valuable restorative, and they usually show a great liking for salt. It is said that in Spain, the shepherds regularly allow their sheep a certain quantity, and conceive that the fineness of their wool would suffer if this were not done. It is well known that musty ill-

got hay, if *brined*, as the farmers call it, is very much improved, and is readily eaten by the cattle. The fondness of pigeons for salt is well known. I never heard of any bird of prey showing any taste for it. When we come to our own species, we find those who live chiefly on vegetable food to have a strong craving for salt.

Mungo Park describes the desire for it in many parts of Africa, where it is very scarce, as extremely distressing. He remarks that this painful longing takes place when one has long subsisted on vegetable food; and adds that he has seen a child sucking a lump of rock salt with delight, as our children would sugar. This can be no acquired taste, where the luxury is so scarce that a 'man who eats salt with his food' is a common periphrasis for one in easy circumstances.

The South Sea Islanders, who live chiefly on vegetable food, are inordinate lovers of salt, though most of them have no art of preparing it, but are content with a cocoa-nut shell of sea water, in which they profusely dip every mouthful of food.

On the other hand, I cannot find that those who live exclusively on animal food make any use of salt. An Abyssinian tribe mentioned by Bruce, and whom he supposes to be the long-lived Ethiopians of Herodotus, are described as subsisting entirely on the flesh of elephant and rhinoceros dried in the sun, without salt. Our voyagers to the Polar regions do not mention any use of salt among the Esquimaux. The

Russian sailors who were left for several years in Spitzbergen, during which they subsisted on reindeer and other flesh, seem never to have used or wished for salt.

On the whole, I am inclined to conclude that the appetite for salt is natural, both to men and all other animals, when subsisting on vegetable food, and not when on animal. Our liking for the use of salt with flesh, I conceive to be acquired in consequence of our being accustomed to salt with the vegetable portion of our food, and partly of our using salt for the purpose of preserving meat. If such be the instinctive appetites, it is to be expected they should correspond with something in the animal economy; and such seems to be the fact. Vegetables and salt seem to be mutually qualifiers of each other. It is generally allowed that salt is a great corrective of the tendency to worms in those whose diet is vegetables. Persons living entirely on bread made without salt are said to die of worms. Though salt is not indispensable to herbivorous quadrupeds, it is well known to be salutary to them. This seems what we should expect *à priori*: all animal juices contain muriate of soda; which, therefore, will need to be supplied when the food of the animal contains none; but when the food is itself an animal substance, it is present in due quantity. It is, however, a curious question for chemical physiologists to determine in what manner the requisite amount of muriate of soda is supplied to herbivorous animals, which have no access to the

sea or to salt springs. It is, however, confidently asserted that cattle will thrive on inferior pasture by the use of salt.

Excess of salt is now generally admitted to be the sole, or at least chief, cause of sea-scurvy. It does not appear that animal food, however exclusively used, will ever generate it, provided no salt be used; but *animal* food, though fresh, is not an antidote to it; whereas all vegetables (though in different degrees) are known to be a specific. The craving for every kind of vegetable (even such as ordinarily are quite unfit for human food) which is felt by sufferers from sea-scurvy, is well known.

Nature seems here to find out the antidote—viz. vegetables—against sea-scurvy (which may be called the salt disease), as in the other case, that of salt, against the ill effects of a vegetable diet.

August 1831.

OF FROGS AND TOADS.

THERE is a curious circumstance, which I should be glad to find any one able to explain, relative to the habits of frogs and toads in feeding. Most persons are aware that they live on insects, and that frogs in particular are great devourers of earthworms. Now if you go out on a dewy evening, or still more, after dark, with a candle, into a grass plot (in the heat of summer, especially after a shower), you will be likely to see many frogs and toads, sitting still (if undis-

turbed), and taking no notice of the numerous worms lying out, as their manner is, many of them quite close to their enemies; if you then *catch* a worm and throw it gently before a frog or toad, taking care not to frighten him, you will most likely see him *make* a *set* at it, like a dog at game, and come forward and devour it, though perhaps other worms lying around, were even nearer to him. Within ten minutes, I have fed a frog in this manner, with no less than three and even four of the largest-sized earthworms, though all the time it took no notice of those uncaught, lying before its eyes. The toad is slower in his motions, and (after earthworms, at least) much less voracious than the frog. Each of them makes a most curious figure pinioning the worm with his fore feet, to keep it straight and prevent its curling round the devourer's head. But how comes it that they do not—at least never, that I saw—make any attempt to seize the uncaught worms? Have they some instinct or reason which teaches them that the worms which are lying out have always, as is well known, their tails in their holes, into which they start back at the slightest alarm? The phenomenon is certainly curious, and the experiment is easily tried.

A friend of mine showed me a property in toads which I had never heard of, and which he had discovered by accident. They delight excessively in being scratched with the end of a stick. One of them which shall be crawling away in alarm, will, as soon as you begin to scratch him, stop short, and

spread out his body in an attitude expressive of the greatest pleasure; according as you scratch the head, the side, or the back, he will accommodate his posture to your action and remain motionless, and, as it were, entranced for any length of time; at least, whenever I have seen the experiment tried, the operator was always tired before the toad.

The popular belief of the raining of frogs is usually treated with utter scorn, as the hypothesis devised by the credulous vulgar to account for the multitudes of little frogs often suddenly appearing after a spring shower, and which had, in fact, probably just crawled from a neighbouring ditch where they had been bred as tadpoles. But anyone who may think it worth while to enquire further will find that there are on record several well-authenticated accounts (I mean as far as external evidence goes) of little frogs found after a shower on the leads of houses, and other such situations, which they could not of themselves have reached. Such statements there are as would have commanded general and ready assent but for the supposed intrinsic improbability of the fact attested. And to these, I have no doubt, the belief may be traced. I am strongly inclined to credit the fact, and to attribute it to the agency of the whirlwind or waterspout. It is well known that in Barbadoes (and probably in other West India islands) it has more than once happened that after a violent tornado the ground far inland has been found strewed with minute fish, which had

been, of course, sucked up by a waterspout, borne aloft, and then let fall.

It is manifest, *à priori*, that any such small bodies within the action of the tornado, *must* be carried aloft, and probably most waterspouts at sea, are succeeded by a shower of little fishes, though not noticed, from their falling into the water. Let anyone who has seen or heard described the phenomenon, not very rare in this country, of a whirlwind carrying up cocks of hay or stubble to a vast height, and then strewing it far and wide—let him, I say, conceive such a whirlwind acting on a pond swarming with tadpoles just assuming the frog form, and he will see that the result could not but be, that phenomenon which is so generally regarded as the wildest of absurdities.

August 1831.

ON ARITHMETICAL ERRORS AFFECTING REASONINGS.

'MEN mark when they hit, and not when they miss,' or 'What is hit is history, what is missed is mystery;' or '*De non apparentibus et non existentibus, eadem est ratio*,' is one way in which Bacon accounts for the wonder of the fulfilment of many prophecies, omens, dreams, &c. No doubt if all the pocket-books now existing could be inspected, some hundreds of memoranda would be found of dreams, visions, presentiments, &c., with dates, kept to observe whether they

are fulfilled. When one is, out of a million, it is recorded; the rest are never heard of. So Bion, when shown the votive offerings of those who had been preserved from shipwreck, asked where are the records of those who were drowned in spite of their vows?

Senior has observed in his lectures that the sacrifice of vast wealth on the part of a whole people for a comparatively trifling gain by a handful of monopolists is submitted to patiently, because ignorantly, from the loss being *diffused* and the gain concentrated, the loss being also diffused among those who for the most part do not clearly trace it to its source, and the gain concentrated among those who do. If a million of persons are each virtually taxed 2*s.* 6*d.* per annum in the increased price of some commodity, which they pay through the prohibition of some importation or machinery, perhaps not above 1*s.* of this goes to those who profit by the monopoly; but this amount of shillings, making 50,000*l.* per annum, may perhaps go to a hundred persons, each of whom, when 500*l.* per annum is at stake, will combine with the rest, and strive, with tooth and nail, to keep up the monopoly, the pressure of which is but slight on each of the million; but slight as it is, if they had a clear knowledge of the state of facts, they would hardly submit to pay 2*s.* 6*d.*, or even 1*s.* each, as a direct pension to a hundred individuals who had no claim on them.

Again, an English gentleman who lives on his

estate is considered as a public benefactor, because his income is spent in furnishing employment to his neighbours, as servants, bakers, carpenters, &c. If he resides in France, his income is, in fact, spent on Englishmen as cutlers and clothiers, whose product he exchanges for the services of French servants, bakers, carpenters, &c. But the Sheffield cutlers are not aware even of his existence; the neighbours of the resident proprietor trace distinctly to him the benefit they derive from him.

Again, he who unprofitably consumes in feasts and fireworks and fancy gardens the labour of many men, is regarded as a public benefactor, for furnishing employment to so many, though it is plain that all unproductive consumption, diminishes, *pro tanti*, the wealth of the country. He, on the contrary, who hoards up his income in a miserly style is abused, though, in fact (small thanks to him), he is contributing to the public wealth, by lending at interest all his savings, which find their way generally to canals, commerce, and other *productive* courses of expenditure. But this benefit no one can *trace*: the advantage to the individuals to whom the other is a customer, they trace to *him*. Again, the superior diffusion of knowledge, such as newspapers convey in a civilised country, leads some to fancy that crimes *increase*, because they *hear* of more than in times of 'primitive simplicity;' but, as I observe in the 'Political Economy Lectures,' 'there are not *more particles of dust in the sunbeam* than in any other part of the

room, though we are apt to fancy it, because we *see* them better.' And this formula will apply, I think, to all the cases, dissimilar as they appear, that have been just mentioned, and to an indefinite number besides. It is a most important principle to keep in mind for the correction of a whole class of errors in popular judgment, viz. the tendency to overrate the amount of whatever is *known*, *seen*, and definite, as compared with what is, either from the nature of the case or accidentally, unknown—or less known—unseen—indefinite. Under this head comes my remark (suggested by Senior), in the 'Secondary Punishments,' that 'the *preventive* effects of any system, whether for good or for evil, are hardly ever duly appreciated.' We see the crimes that are actually committed, and we see the men who are hanged for them; we do not see the crimes that *would* be committed if there were no hanging.

Under the same head I think comes the supposed superiority of wisdom attributed to cautious, reserved, non-confiding, do-nothing characters, as compared with the more open, unreserved, energetic, and parrhesiastic. Of course everyone will admit that there may be an extreme either way. He who trusts to everybody and everything, and always says and does the first thing that comes into his head, is at least as great a fool as anyone can be in the opposite way. But take the average—the *moderate* description—of each class: such as are not men of very great, but of respectable talents, and you

will find, I think, that those of the reserved and cautious character have usually much greater credit for wisdom than those of a more open and daring, supposing an equality in other points in respect of ability. And certainly the latter do commit a greater number of actual tangible *errors*; meet with a greater number of distinct failures; but yet, at the life's end, you will generally find that a dozen of the latter will have had altogether full as much success —have *got on* as well, if not better, than a dozen of the other.

Whence, then, the overestimate of those who are called the 'prudent'? Because their failures are in general *indefinite*, and are neither known nor distinctly existing. One man thinks it 'always best not to mention things;' it seldom happens that any distinct evil can be traced to his holding his tongue. It is only that some, and perhaps more benefits, do not happen to him. Another goes on the maxim, perhaps to excess, of 'spare to speak and spare to speed.' If not gifted with consummate ability, he every now and then gets into a scrape, while the other exultingly derides him; but he gains, perhaps, many advantages which the other would never have put himself in the way of. The one trusts no one, and is never betrayed, but he loses all the advantages of friendship; the other is occasionally exposed to scorn, mortification, and injury; but at the end of life, when he comes to cast up accounts, he will perhaps find that not only the pleasure *but* the advantage

overbalance. If I never go on horseback, I never incur the definite evil of being stopped in a journey by a fall from a horse, or by a restive and runaway horse. I may exult over the rider's accidents of this kind, but in the long run he will have accomplished, in spite of all, more journeys than I could on foot. If I let my land lie waste, I shall not have to reckon this year, and that year, a failure of crop; but my neighbour, with all his losses, will perhaps make more of his farm. 'There are other motes besides those in *the sunbeam*.'

April 1835.

ON CONJECTURES.

I HAVE often had occasion, like all other teachers, to tell beginners in a language, not to *guess* what the author is likely to have meant, and then twist the words into that sense, against the idiom of the language; but be led by the words, and then, afterwards, if a difficulty remains, to guess which of the possible meanings of the words may be right.

The same rule holds good in theology and philosophy. No one cause has, perhaps, contributed more to impede sound views in both than the *indulgence* of such conjectures. I say the *indulgence*, because they *will* intrude themselves.

Educational habits of thought, analogies, antecedent reasonings, &c. &c., will dispose us to form an hypothesis, which is not necessarily hurtful, as it will

sometimes furnish a very useful hint; but the most unceasing care is requisite not to allow yourself to be so biassed by your hypothesis as to let it lead you to strain into a conformity with it the words or the phenomena before you. A man conjectures what Paul or some other sacred writer is likely to have said, or ought to have said; or what God may be expected to have done or designed; or what is, or is not, agreeable to the analogy of faith (see Campbell on the Gospels), i. e. of a piece with the system, viz. that which he has been taught by *men* to regard as the system, and then he proceeds to examine Scripture as he would question—often with leading questions—a witness whom he had summoned in his cause. 'As the fool thinketh so the bell clinketh.' Perhaps he prays through all the Bible; but is, in fact, without knowing it, praying that he may find himself in the right, and he will seldom fail. It is just the same in philosophy. If you have a strong wish to find phenomena such as to confirm your conjectures, you are ill-fitted for questioning nature. *That* and the *other* volume of the records of what God does, Revelation, are to be interrogated, not as *witnesses*, but as *instructors*. You must let your conjecture hang loose upon you, and be prepared to learn from what is written in each volume, *with the aid* of the conjectures of reason, not *from reason* (nor again, by-the-bye, from feelings, and fancies, and wishes, and human authority), with *Scripture for your aid*. Now, going on a different plan (to confine

myself to theology): how many do we see making an *anagram* of Scripture, taking to pieces what the inspired writers have said, and reconstructing it on the model of some human system or creed? They mistake for the true Temple a building composed of the *stones* of the Temple, pulled down and rebuilt in a new fashion. Yet such divines we often find reckoned peculiarly scriptural, from their citing numerous texts, and conveying everything in scriptural language, i. e. instead of using a human *commentary on Scripture*, they use Scripture as a *commentary on some human system*; they make the *warp* human, and interweave abundance of Scripture as a woof. They ought to reverse the plan. This may be called, truly, in a certain sense, preaching such and 'such a doctrine *out of Scripture*;' '*taking a text from* Scripture;' 'preaching *from* Scripture.'

Sabbatarianism is a curious instance of this; not as the most practically hurtful, but as a specimen of how far a man *can* go, in distorting to his own satisfaction the obvious sense of the Scripture so as to force it into a conformity with his own prejudiced conjectures. Accordingly, every one of their arguments begs more than half the question. The problem which they, in fact, propose, is to determine, not whether the fourth commandment is *binding*; but, *assuming* that, how it can be made out that the observance of the Lord's-day is a compliance with it, or can be so regarded.

Is it not (*cæteris paribus*) a greater effort of faith to

expect a miracle beforehand than to believe in the narrative of a past one? For in this latter case there is, on the opposite side, the difficulty, whatever it may be, of accounting for a *false* narrative of a matter of *fact*; whereas in regard to what is future, how much soever some may *expect* it, their *expectation* is a matter of *opinion*. And a groundless expectation or other opinion is, as a general rule, less strange than a groundless narrative. And yet many there have been who have professed to disbelieve or to reject all miraculous narratives, and many more who find in these their chief difficulty, yet profess a prior expectation—unencumbered by any sense of difficulty—of the *greatest of all miracles*, a future life.

April 1836.

PRESUMPTIONS.

1. A PRESUMPTION, of course, admits of various degrees of strength, from the very faintest up to complete and confident acquiescence.

2. The person, body, or book, in favour of whose decisions there is a certain presumption, is said to have, so far, authority, in the strict sense of the word.

3. A recognition of this kind of authority, an *habitual presumption* in favour of the decisions or opinions of such and such a person, &c., is usually called deference.

It will often happen, however, that this deference

is not *recognised* by either party. A man will deny, with scorn, his having any deference for some person —a child perhaps, a humble companion, or some one else whom he treats, *in manner*, with familiar superiority; and the other party may as readily renounce all pretension to authority, and yet there will be that *habitual presumption* in the one party in favour of the opinion, suggestions, &c. of the other, which I have called deference. But then I do not think these parties use the *words* in a different sense, but that they are unaware of the *fact*. There *is* a deference, but *unconscious*.

4. Those who are habitually wanting in deference towards such as we think entitled to it, are called, I think, *arrogant*: using this word as distinguished from *self-conceited*, *proud*, *vain*, and other kindred words. They may be perhaps described as having an habitual *self-deference*.

We do not call a man *arrogant* for his want of deference towards those who are high authorities with *somebody*; for then all men would be arrogant. In each age, and country, and class of men, some persons are regarded as high authorities, who are thought little of or are despised elsewhere; but we usually measure a man's habits of thought by our own judgment; and consequently deem *him* arrogant who disregards what *we* deem the highest authorities.

5. That man may most strictly be called arrogant who has no deference for those whom he *himself*

thinks the most highly of. One may find such instances. One may find a man holding in high estimation the ability and knowledge of certain persons, and even with perfect sincerity rating them much above himself, and yet if in any particular case the idea that first strikes his mind be at variance with their most deliberate judgments, on the points on which they are likely to be the best judges, he will regard them no more than the chirping of so many sparrows.

6. *Admiration, esteem, concurrence in opinion*, are quite distinct from deference, and not necessarily accompanied by it. If a person makes some remark which seems to you very just—if you acquiesce in his proposal on account of the reasons he gives—this is not deference; and if the same happens many times over, and you thence form a high opinion of his ability, this also is not deference; and what is more, it does not always (though it ought) produce deference. It is not uncommon to find a person conversant with two others, A and B, and estimating A, without hesitation, as the superior man; and yet in any case whatever that may arise, where A and B differ in opinion, taking for granted at once that B is in the right.

Admiration, esteem, &c. are more the result of *judgment* (though often of an erroneous judgment). Deference is apt to depend on *feelings*; often very whimsical and unaccountable feelings. Deference is often yielded to a vigorous *claim*; to an authoritative and overbearing demeanour. With others, again, an

insinuating, flattering, soothing manner will have the most weight, especially with those who have, what phrenologists call, a large organ of combativeness. They will yield to those who seem to yield to them; the others, to those who seem resolved never to yield to any one. The Tractites have baited their trap well, for the arrogant. Many a one will yield the most blind deference to antiquity, because a book or tradition of a thousand years old is rather a *thing* than a *person*; and though they may be disposed to treat their contemporaries with the most contemptuous insolence, they 'will not go to compare with an old man;' they will submit at once to the authority of men who lived fifteen or sixteen centuries ago, and whom, if now living, they would not treat with decent respect.

Habitual affection, again, in some minds, leads to deference. They form a habit of—1st, *wishing*; 2ndly, *hoping*; 3rdly, *believing*, a person to be in the right, whom they would be sorry to think in the wrong. (This a branch of the fallacy which, in talking to Keble, I used to designate as the fallacy of, '*sorry to think.*')

It is almost superfluous to add, that in a state of morbid depression of spirits, the same case leads to the opposite effect. Whatever we should be 'sorry to think,' appears to us, under this depression, the most probable, and consequently there is a presumption present to our minds *against* the opinions, measures, &c., of those we are most attached to.

It is very obvious, and not very useful, to say that the deference we feel for any person's authority should be entirely independent of our feelings, and should depend wholly on our judgment as to the probabilities of his coming to right conclusions. But it may be of some use to point out that there is a danger on each *side*: if having an unreasonable presumption, either on *the side* of our wishes, or against them.

7. It is evident that reference may be, and of course usually is, in respect of *particular points*. Most people have deference for their physician in questions of medicine; and for their bailiff in respect of farming, but not vice versâ. And so in other matters.

And deference may be misplaced, therefore, in respect of the thing as well as the *person*. It is conceivable that you may have a *due* deference, a *want* of due deference, and an *excessive* deference, all for the same person; but in respect of different points.

8. It is a curious fact—for a fact it is—that we should be liable to deceive ourselves as to the degree of deference we feel towards different persons; but I believe there are few who would give quite a correct account of themselves in this matter. A man would probably describe himself as *feeling* great deference towards some one, on the ground of his *believing* him to be entitled to it: and perhaps being sincerely indignant against *anyone else* who does not show it (which is what takes place in respect of many other feelings also, as has been observed in the

'Rhetoric,' chap. 1, § ii., with respect to pity, love, joy, &c.).

To be convinced that an event is one to be rejoiced or grieved at—that a man is deserving of pity, contempt, &c.—is very different from feeling those emotions; and sometimes again on the ground that he *concurs* in most of his views, and admires them. But if we do so in each case just on the same grounds as we should have done had we found those views stated and maintained in some anonymous paper, this implies no deference. The converse mistake is equally natural: a man may fancy that in each case he acquiesces in such a one's views (what she does seems 'wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best'), for the reasons given, and not from any feeling of deference; when yet, perhaps, the same opinion and the same reasons, *coming from another*, would have been rejected; and it is curious to observe also that there are few persons who pay any regard to statements of *facts* coming from a person for whose *judgment* they have no deference. A man *may* indeed wilfully falsify, or be unconsciously biassed by his opinion, in what he collects from others, or observers: but a man again *may* be trustworthy in his report of facts, whose judgment may be entitled to little or no weight: and again, a man may refer you to documents or other proofs to establish his facts. Yet on ordinary minds facts make little impression, except when coming from those for whom deference is felt.

June 1843.

FACT AND OPINION.

THE expressions 'matter (or question) of fact' and 'matter of opinion' are not employed by all persons with precision and uniformity. But the notion most nearly conformable to ordinary usage seems to be this: that by a 'matter of fact' is meant something which might conceivably be submitted to the *senses*, and about which it is supposed there could not be any disagreement among persons who should be *present* and to whose senses it should be presented: and by a 'matter (or question) of opinion,' on the other hand, is understood anything respecting which an exercise of *judgment* would be called for on the part of those who should have the same objects presented to their senses, and who might conceivably disagree concerning it while the objects were before them.

This, I think, is nearly the description of what people in general *intend* to denote (though frequently without having themselves any very clear notion of it) by those phrases.

Certainly it is not meant, by those at least who use language with any degree of precision, that there is greater certainty, or more ready and general agreement, in the one case than in the other; for, that one of Alexander's friends, e. g., did or did not administer poison to him, everyone would allow to be a question of *fact*, though it may be involved in inextricable doubt; while the question as to *what sort of an act* that was, supposing it to have taken

place, all would allow to be a question of opinion, though it is probable most men would agree in their opinion thereupon.

Again, it is not necessary, apparently, that a matter should ever have been, or be likely ever to be, actually submitted to the senses of any human being in order to constitute it a matter of fact, only that it should be one which *conceivably might* be so: e. g. whether there is a lake in the centre of New Holland, whether there is land at the South Pole, whether the moon is inhabited, are questions which would generally be admitted to be of fact, although no one has been able to bear testimony concerning any of them; and in the last case we are morally certain that no one ever will. The circumstance that chiefly tends to produce uncertainty and occasional inconsistency in the use of these phrases, is, that there is often much room for the exercise of judgment and for difference of *opinion* in respect of things which are *themselves* matter of *fact*. E. g. the degree of *credibility* of the witnesses who attest any fact is itself a matter of opinion; and so in respect of the degree of weight due to any other kind of probabilities. That there *is* or *is not* land at the South Pole is a matter of fact: that the existence of land there is *likely* or unlikely is a matter of opinion.

And in this and many other cases different questions, very closely connected together, are very apt to be confounded together, and the proof belonging to one of them to be brought forward as pertaining

to the other. A case of alleged prophecy, e. g., shall be in question, the event said to have been foretold shall be established as a fact, and the utterance of the supposed prediction before the event, which is also a matter of fact, shall also, suppose, have been proved; and this perhaps will be assumed as a proof of that which is in reality another question, and a question of *opinion*, whether the supposed prophecy related to the event in question, and whether it were merely a conjecture of human sagacity, or were such as to imply superhuman prescience.

Again, whether a certain passage occurs in a certain MS. of the Greek Testament is plainly a question of fact; but whether the words *imply so and so*, however indubitable it may justly appear to us, we must admit to be a question of opinion.

It is to be observed, also, that as there may be questions of *opinion* relative to *facts*, so there may be questions of fact relative to opinions, i. e. that such and such opinions were or were not *maintained* at such a time and place by such and such persons are questions of *fact*.

June 1843.

PHENAKISM.

ONE person in one case, and another in another, will be among the first to perceive certain classes of

things, according to his own *idiosyncrasy*, each in general being the most sensitive to that which from nature or education he most abhors. Those who have an especial aversion to some particular scent will detect the smallest particle of it much more readily than the average. And those who have a morbid terror of 'a harmless necessary cat' are said often to perceive its presence when others do not. Now, the detestation I have long and earnestly cultivated of all double-dealing, equivocation, trickery, disingenuousness, and, in short, in the modern phrase, phenakism, may have caused me sometimes to smell it out before others of generally superior acuteness.

Many men are surprised at the recent *retractations* of the censures of Romanism, while I was only surprised at the boldness with which they were put forward.

But as for the insincerity itself, that was avowed. My only wonder was that anyone should wonder at it, so plainly had I perceived the cloven foot long before. Besides my knowledge of the *sudden* changes which had taken place in the doctrines taught by the leaders from what they had formerly held, and besides that the very tone of many of the Tracts is to me that of a man not in earnest—besides this, they avowed, both in the Tracts and other works, and in conversation, and in action, the double-doctrine, even more plainly than one could have supposed anyone would have done; in addition to all this, 'The Elucidation of Hampden's Bampton Lectures' was such a

deliberate misrepresentation that I should have felt I deserve to be deceived if I trusted to anything afterwards from that quarter. Others, however, there seems to have been who are not deficient generally in sagacity, and who do not think pious frauds justifiable, but who really did not perceive the disingenuousness and double-dealing—to me so palpable—till 'tother day. Better late than never! But they should come forward and declare their abhorrence of it. If they do not, or if they profess great veneration, and on the whole approbation and gratitude, towards those who have cast aside all regard for truth, do they not lie open to the suspicion that at least they regard phenakism as a peccadillo, or a fault excusable in very eminent men when for a pious purpose?

A truly pious and at the same time truly upright man will regard a pious fraud as superadding to the general atrocity of falsehood the additional guilt of profane and impious presumption in making free with God's name, and crying (virtually), 'Thus saith the Lord, when the Lord hath not spoken.' And as for the ability with which any one has put forth religious and moral truths, this shows his moral and intellectual capabilities (for men differ from each other in both) to be of a high order, and therefore aggravate his departures in practice from truth and piety; unless at least we are to reverse the Scripture rule, and suppose that the *more* is given, the *less* will be required of each man.

But for the moral faculty there could be no sin.

TALENTS REQUISITE FOR TRAINERS OF SUPERIOR YOUTHS.

ONE of the wisest things I ever heard from Arnold (or indeed from anyone) was his remark that he felt bound to look out for under-masters who should be not only respectable and steady, sensible and *well-informed*, but if possible men of superior *ability*, largely endowed *with mother-wit*. 'The other description,' said he, 'would do nearly or quite as well for nineteen out of twenty boys; but the twentieth, the boy of superior talents, who is a more important person than the others, is liable even to suffer detriment from not being early placed under the training of one whom he can, on close inspection, look up to as his superior in something besides mere *knowledge*.'

The dangers are of various kinds. One lad may acquire a contempt for the knowledge itself which he sees prepared in a superior degree by a man whom he feels to be, nevertheless, far below himself. Another will fancy himself as much above nearly all the world as he feels he is above his own tutor, and will become self-sufficient and scornful (he used to instance L. of B. who was under J., a very diligent tutor, and very good for *average* men). Another will deem it his duty as a point of Christian humility to bring himself down, intellectually, to a level with one whom he feels bound to reverence (e. g. K., whose veneration for his father, a man of very small powers,

was, as A. said, a mill-stone round the neck of an eagle).

And other dangers beset other dispositions, from various causes.

A. himself laboured under the disadvantage, and it is impossible to do full justice to the pains he took in the disciplining of his own mind without taking this into account. But nothing that a man can do for himself in after-life will completely supply the want of that very early training under a guide possessed of superior abilities.

Jan. 1844.

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*APOPHTHEGMS.**

1. Most vices spring from bodily disease.

2. An evil propensity confessed is half-cured: people irritate themselves by trying to prove that they are not irritable.

3. If a man once comes to doubt of what he had been accustomed to take for granted, he will reject it.

4. Smattering is applied to two opposites: elementary knowledge and superficial knowledge.

5. Some things should be learned a little at each end.

* These Apophthegms contain the substance of many of the foregoing and subsequent reflections, concentrated into the form of proverbs.—*Editor.*

6. In prose, the language is the vehicle for the matter; in poetry, the matter is the vehicle for the language.

7. Gay spirits are always spoken of as a sign of happiness, though everyone knows to the contrary.

8. A cockchafer is never so lively as when a pin is stuck through his tail; and a hot floor makes Bruin dance.

9. Happiness is no laughing matter.

10. Governors are accountable for their conduct; but not to their subjects.

11. When a large assembly is addressed, they kindle each other like lighted sticks.

12. Perhaps fatalism ought to produce inactivity, but it does not; if you want to make a man fight, persuade him that he is destined to conquer.

13. Men condemn the law of honour, on the ground that duelling is a bad thing; if it were not, the law of honour would lose the sanction of one of its chief penalties.

14. Every instance of a man's suffering the penalty of a law is an instance of the failure of that penalty in *effecting its purpose, which is to deter.*

15. Men are readiest to give what they deal in, because they are accustomed to feel pleasure in parting with it.

16. When *positive* hope and positive fear contend, the former predominates in the mind of the generality.

17. It is a folly to grieve, though not to *have*

grieved, at past sufferings; for what is past *was*, but *is* not.

18. It is a folly to shiver for last year's snow.

19. The generality of mankind are as good and as wise as . . . the generality.

20. A man's coat may well fit him when it is made to his measure.

21. It is a folly to expect men to do all that they may reasonably be expected to do.

22. Learning a language from its poets is studying botany in a garden full of double flowers.

23. Honesty is the best policy; but he who is governed by that maxim is not an honest man.

24. All men desire earnestly to have truth on their side: few to be on the side of truth.

25. There are two things each of which he will seldom fail to discover who seeks for it in earnest: the knowledge of what he ought to do, and a plausible pretext for doing what he likes.

DOUBT.

It is very curious to observe how many persons there are of a disposition (I have known some few even acknowledge it) as to be nearly incapable of remaining in *doubt* on any subject that is not wholly uninteresting to them; but speedily make up their mind on each question and come to *some* conclusion, whether there are any good grounds for it or not. And they usually judge (as all men are apt to do in all matters)

of others from themselves, apparently discrediting the most solemn assurances of anyone who professes to be in doubt in any matter; and taking for granted that if you have not adopted *their* opinion you must be of the opposite. Others there are who can understand remaining in doubt as long as the reasons on both sides are exactly *balanced*; but not otherwise. Such a person can no more refrain, as soon as he perceives any preponderance of probability on one side of a question, from deciding immediately on that side, than he could continue to stand after having lost his equilibrium in a slanting position, like the famous leaning tower at Pisa. And he will accordingly be disposed to consider an acknowledgment that there are somewhat stronger reasons on one side as equivalent to a confident decision.

These are the prevailing infirmities of ordinary minds. A much smaller number, among whom, however, are to be found a larger proportion of the highly-gifted, are prone to the opposite extreme; that of not deciding when there are reasons on both sides, even though there may be a clear preponderance on the one, and though the case may be such as practically to call for a decision. As the one description of men eagerly rush to a conclusion, and trouble themselves little about premises, the other carefully examine premises, and care little for conclusions. The one decide without enquiring, and the other enquire without deciding.

June 1843.

MUSHROOM-CELEBRITY RESULTING FROM PUZZLE-HEADEDNESS.

VERY curious, and in some respects instructive, is the history of Michael Thomas Sadleir. For a time, all England resounded with his fame, and his book was in almost everybody's hands. Senior, I remember, told me of his meeting him at a dinner party, where, among others, was Lord ——, on whom he 'bestowed all his tediousness.' 'I could not have believed,' said S., 'that anyone's power of *boring* could be so great. He called himself an enthusiast, and professed much honesty of purpose and public spirit (in all which I believe he spoke true), "and now, Lord ——, apply your powerful mind to this subject,"' &c. &c.

'I went away into the drawing-room,' said S., 'but I *heard the noise* going on while I was taking tea.' About the time when he was in his perihelion (which must have been, I think, about 1828), I was dining with a pretty large party at —— and was asked by one of them whether I had read M. T. S.'s book. I answered that I had looked into it enough to see that he was a *puzzle-headed* writer, and had therefore not taken the trouble to go through it.

Mr. ——, an M.P. (but I don't know whether the same who afterwards made such a figure as a parliamentary speaker), took me up sharply, saying it was very strange to speak of a man as puzzle-headed, who, without wealth, birth, or high connexions, had

so *very rapidly* risen into high celebrity. And so, indeed, he had; for the 'Edinburgh Review' not only reviewed his book, but even replied to his answer, and spoke so vehemently of their feeling no anger, and very great contempt, that everyone perceived they felt just the reverse. Well, having flown one paradox, I went on to support it by another. I said that a man hardly *could* rise to *very sudden* popularity without being (along with some cleverness) somewhat puzzle-headed. For he who refutes prevailing errors, and sees his way through prevalent fallacies, and brings to light new or forgotten truths, will at first, and for a good while, be thought unfavourably of. Men do not give up their prejudices and adopt new views very *readily*. Such a man, therefore (e. g. Malthus), will have to wait many years—perhaps to his life's end—before he is appreciated. His credit will be lasting, but slow of growth. But the way to rise to rapid celebrity is to be a plausible advocate of *prevailing* doctrines, and especially to defend with some appearance of novelty something which men like to believe, but have no good reason for believing. And this, I said, a skilful *dissembler* will never do so well as one who is himself the dupe of his own fallacies, and brings them forward therefore with an air of simple earnestness, which implies his being, with whatever ingenuity and eloquence, puzzle-headed.

There seemed something in this; but they were as loth to admit it as I had just been observing men

are in such a matter. 'What do you say to Mr. Pitt? He was an admired statesman at the age of twenty-three! was *he* puzzle-headed?' 'Why, I would not call him a puzzle-headed man generally; but he was so in reference to the *very point* which chiefly *contributed to obtain him* his very early and speedy celebrity. Look at the portraits of him at that time; and you will see a paper in his hand, or on his table, inscribed "Sinking Fund." It was his eloquent advocacy of that delusion (as all now admit it to have been) of Dr. Price, which brought him such sudden renown. And he could not have so ably recommended, nor indeed would he have probably adopted such a juggle, if he had not been *himself* the dupe of the fallacy.' [Lord Grenville, before his own death, published an exposure of it, pointing out frankly how he had himself been duped by it. But most people had perceived before that that it was a delusion.] They could not deny that the instance thus adduced went to confirm my position.

And now, I said, I will adduce an instance of another kind, where the *whole British nation* were puzzle-headed on one particular point, with the exception of *one* man, who was accordingly derided as a fool or a madman from one end of the empire to the other. In the quarrel with our American colonies, though there were great differences of opinion—some being for and some against taxing them—some for force and some for conciliation, *all agreed*

that the *loss* of them—the dismemberment of the empire—would be a heavy calamity; and how to *keep* them was the problem to be solved.

But Dean Tucker, standing quite alone, wrote a pamphlet to show that the separation would be *no loss at all*, and that we had best give them the independence they coveted at once and in a friendly way. Some thought he was jesting, and trying how absurd a paradox could be maintained, and the rest despised him as too great a fool to be worth answering.

But now, and for above half a century, everyone perceives that he was quite right, and regrets that his view was not adopted.

[By-the-bye, it is remarkable that Professor Smythe, who gives him due praise for this view, remarks at the same time on the extraordinary absurdity of his saying that it would be very *easy* (though not at all worth while) to subdue the American insurgents; and that a disorderly, hastily-raised militia could have no chance against a well-disciplined and well-commanded regular army. This, he thinks, is refuted by the event. But, from the documents brought forth in an article (by Senior) in the 'Edinburgh Review,' it appears that Tucker was right *there* also: that the game was in our hands, and Washington reduced to the very brink of despair, and that nothing could have saved his cause but such a series of blundering follies—such gross incapacity—on the part of the British commanders as never

occurred before or since, and such as no one could have calculated on.]

Tucker then was the only man in the empire who was *not*—then, and on that point—puzzle-headed; and he earned some small degree of late credit, but present contempt.

> He that is truly wise and great,
> Lives both too early and too late.

A very clear-headed man must always perceive some of the truths which are generally overlooked, and must have detected some of the popular fallacies; in short, he must be somewhat *in advance* of the 'hoi polloi' of his contemporaries, and if he has the courage to speak his mind fairly, he must wait till the next generation at least for his popularity. The fame of clever but puzzle-headed advocates of vulgar errors will spring up like a mushroom in a night, which rots in a day. His will be a tree, 'seris factura nepotibus umbram.' They were at a loss to answer me; but Sadleir himself afterwards furnished the best confirmation of my paradox. In two or three years after, he and his book were totally forgotten. He outlived his own mushroom-reputation, I believe, for above ten years; and few people knew for a good while before (or cared) whether he was living or dead.

He went off like a comet into its aphelion, and became invisible. It would be difficult to find a copy of his book in Ireland, except at the trunk-

maker's. My prophecy about him in that conversation is probably forgotten also, except by myself. 'Ipsæ periere ruinæ.' But it is worth recording for the sake of the general moral. When I find the doctrines I maintain or the measures I propose generally censured or contemned, this is indeed no proof that I am right; but it is no proof to the contrary. And it is a sign that at least I am not so puzzle-headed as to earn *sudden* reputation. And making up my mind to obtain rather censure than approbation, just at *first*, in proportion as I may be combating prevalent errors and drawing attention to neglected truths, I will take my chance for the result. If I am wrong, at least it is not for the sake of immediate popular favour. If I am right, it will be found out in time, though perhaps not in *my* time.

It is on these principles the 'Cautions' were drawn up. In them, as in everything else, the more disapprobation I met with, and the more intelligent and the more worthy the objectors, the more earnestly have I always urged my own views, *when no disproof* was produced. For the more wide-spread and deep-rooted any error, and the more it prevails in the minds of the wise and good, the more important to refute it. If I am right, they will find this out, perhaps after I am gone.

The preparers of the *mummies* were (Herodotus says) *driven out of the house* by the family who had engaged their services, with execrations and stones;

but their *work* remains sound after three thousand years.

July 1835.

WHAT IS HARDEST TO FORGIVE.

WHEN I consider what magnanimous candour it requires to think kindly of those who adhere to the principles, party, &c., which were once *ours*, and which we have abandoned (far more than to be charitable towards those who had *always* differed from us), even when we are fully convinced that we were right in the change, I do suppose the bitterness of feeling towards me in those who had formerly acted with me on the Education question, especially that large portion of them who are well aware that I am quite in the right, must at least equal that of any of the numerous phials of wrath that have before now been poured out on me.

How easy it is to forgive *injuries*, compared with many things that are no injuries! But people may object to this use of the word forgive, and I will not insist on using it; though Miss E. Smith says, 'A woman has need of extraordinary gentleness and modesty, to be *forgiven* for possessing superior ability and learning.' And she, I believe, *was* forgiven accordingly.

But not to insist on a word, instead of 'forgive,' say, 'judge fairly, and feel kindly' towards—

1. One who adheres to the views which were yours, and which you have changed. (This was one of Paul's trials.)

2. One who has proved right in the warning and advice he gave you, and which you rejected.

3. One who is preferred to you by the woman you are in love with; or has carried off some other prize from you: especially if he has attained with little or no exertion what you have been striving hard for without success (vide Aristotle's 'Rhetoric:' *φθόνος*).

4. One who has succeeded in *some* enterprise when you predicted failure (as in the railroad over Chat Moss).

In all these, and some other cases, there is evidently no injury; and therefore 'I hate,' some will say, 'to hear *forgiveness* spoken of, when in fact there is nothing to forgive.' Be it so; but do not go on to imagine that you have therefore no need to keep down with *strong effort* just the same kind of feelings that you *would* have, if there *had* been an injury.

If you take for granted that *because* there is no injury, inasmuch as they are so manifestly unjust, the result will be that you will *not* repress, but indulge them; you will never acknowledge to yourself the real ground of your resentful feelings (as you do in the case of an injury), but you will find out some other ground, real or imaginary; 'it is not that the man adheres to his own original views, but that he maintains them with uncharitable violence; it is not that I grudge him his success, but that he is too

much puffed up with it, or he is not fully deserving of it,' &c.

If you cultivate in the right way the habit of forgiving injuries, you will acquire it; and not else.

And if you are *content* with *this*, and do *not cultivate* that candour which I have been speaking of, you will be deficient in that; for be assured it does not *grow wild* in the soil of the human heart.

And the groundlessness and injustice of the feelings which will grow there, is a reason, not why you should *neglect* to extirpate them, but why you should be the more ashamed of not doing so.

March 1854.

ON CONCEIT AND MODESTY.

I SUPPOSE everyone would describe *self-conceit* as consisting in a man's *over*-estimating himself in something, and would say that he is modest who does not 'think more highly of himself than he ought to think, but thinks soberly' (moderately); yet, in practical judgments, very few act on these principles. They reckon a man conceited who thinks *highly*, and modest who thinks *lowly* of himself, without any exact reference to the *ratio*.

E. g., there was my worthy tutor, W. B., whom I suppose all his many intimate friends would describe as a remarkably modest man. Amiable he was in the highest degree, and certainly he did not rate

himself high in point of abilities or attainments; yet he overrated himself to a great degree, else he would never have undertaken the office of college-tutor, for which he was as utterly incompetent as I am to command a fleet in the Baltic. He did not, I am sure, reckon himself a very good tutor, but he did think himself competent to lecture in Euclid, when in truth he did not understand the elementary principles of geometry. E. g. I remember a learner asking him what was meant by 'quantities of different kinds,' and he gave a wrong answer: 'Triangle and parallelograms!' Yet he lectured, among other things, in Aristotle's 'Ethics,' which he never attempted to explain a word of; and was no more qualified to do so than his pupils to him; indeed much less.

On the other hand, what Miss E. Smith says of a woman is in a greater degree true of a man: that she must have a vast share of gentleness, &c., to be *forgiven* for possessing superior talent and knowledge. And one condition, I think, of forgiveness is to appear, or at least pretend, to *underrate* yourself.

Ostentatiousness is, of course, a real fault, though distinct from conceit. A woman who is really beautiful, and is always making a show of herself, or a really great general who is always talking boastfully of his victories, &c., would be justly censured as ostentatious.

But a man who is truly modest, i. e. not ostentatious, not overrating himself, not disdainful, and ready to learn from, and to listen to, others, and to

own any error he may commit, will still, I think, never be accounted modest, supposing him to have actually high qualifications, unless he appears to underrate them.

December 1854.

ON OPPOSITE JUDGMENTS OF THE SAME MAN.

It is curious to observe what contrary views sometimes are taken of the character of the same individual by different persons.

I do not mean when it is merely that the same course is approved or disapproved by different persons according to *their own* opinions as to that *course*; but when the same man is thought by some to be in some points the opposite of what others think him. E. g. a protectionist politician is approved by protectionists, and a free-trader disapproved, and vice versâ. But if the same man is considered by some to be a protectionist, and by others a free-trader, this is the kind of opposition I mean.

I have known a man—a son of my father—who was regarded by nearly half of his most intimate acquaintance as excessively *sanguine*, and by rather more than half as very *desponding*. A phrenologist in examining his skull gave a description which might explain this strange discrepancy: 'Very enterprising, very persevering, not at all sanguine.' This

judgment was based on 'hope, small; cautiousness, large; and again, firmness, conscientiousness, veneration, benevolence, constructiveness, and the reflective organs, all large.' The latter organs made him devise schemes for the public good (in which firmness insured perseverance), and to *try* at them as a matter of *duty*, even when the chance of success was small, since duty consists in *trying*, not in succeeding; and the former organs led him to anticipate failure.

Again, that same person was regarded by some (though not many) of those who knew him well, as very opinionated, pertinacious, contemptuous towards opponents, and intolerant of dissent; and by most, as very hesitating in forming his judgment, very open to conviction, and eminently tolerant.

The cause was, I conceive, that the strongest *assertions* unsupported by *proof*, and the ten-thousandth iteration of such assurances, had no weight with him at all; and moreover, that the more numerous, and pertinacious, and able were those who differed from him, the more he adhered to his opinions, when his *reasons* for them had been given, and remained *unanswered*; because in proportion to the number, and the zeal, and the ability of the opponents, the probability is the stronger that some flaw in the argument would be detected, if any there were. Some doctrines which I have maintained have been before the public, with my reasons in support of them, from fifteen to thirty years, and have attracted no small attention.

That the majority are opposed to them, and have been all along, confirms my adherence to them more and more every year; because no answer at all, or none that deserves the name of an argument, has ever appeared. And this some regard as a proof that I hold cheap all who differ from me, when in truth it proves the very reverse; since I consider that they *would* have found a refutation in all that time, had refutation been possible.

I have mentioned, in the notes on 'Bacon,' the case of a minister who was thought by some to have a very favourable, and by others a very unfavourable, opinion of mankind; the fact being that he never believed in — or *expected* — any real nobleness of character.

There was a man at Oriel who was in manner so positive, and impatient at contradiction, as to be voted a bore; and he was supposed by most to be excessively conceited. I alone declared that he greatly underrated his own abilities, and was consequently always suspecting that people took him for a block-head. And I said if he could get a prize he would be greatly improved. Everyone else said *that* would make him quite intolerable. He was persuaded by me, with *extreme difficulty*, to write for a prize. He gained it most triumphantly, in 1811; and everyone then avowed that my prediction was fully verified. He had no longer that troublesome impatience to prove that he was no fool.

In some men, however, there is such a real in-

equality as makes opposite descriptions in a great measure both true; e.g. Dr. H—— (I have heard say), at the College Historial Society, would sometimes give a discourse full of genius, and at other times mere twaddle; and no one could tell beforehand *which* it would be. I suspect that in some such men there is an inequality in the opposite lobes of the brain, and that at one time the better, and at another the worse organ would be in action.

April 1857.

ON SECONDARY VULGAR ERRORS.

I HAVE noticed in 'Annotations of Bacon,' one of a large class that may be called 'Secondary Vulgar Errors,' i.e. those resulting from a *reaction* from the errors of the 'hoi polloi.' Because the great mass of the most vulgar-minded are apt to exaggerate any wrong from which they have themselves suffered, hence those who are a few steps higher think it a point of generosity to regard such a wrong as none at all, and to select as an object of especial favour one who has treated them in a way which would have deprived him of all claims to esteem, had his misconduct been toward a stranger (e.g. see the 'Heir of Redclyffe'). It is much commoner, they say, to overrate than to underrate the magnitude of wrong done to oneself. But if one disease be more common than another, that is no reason why we should not avoid *both* when we can, and prefer health to either. 'But

after all, it is an error on the right side,' as if there could be *any right side* to what is wrong! The less of two evils is to be chosen then, and then only, when there is no other *alternative*. But to the same class of secondary vulgar errors (which are the more worthy of notice as besetting those who have a desire to do what is right, though with dim and imperfect perceptions) belongs, I think, asceticism. 'The vulgar are prone to sensual indulgence and luxury, and shun pain; therefore let us starve and scourge ourselves.' *

I knew of a school in which a son of the master's was a pupil, and the rule was that whatever punishment was awarded to a boy for any offence, the master's son, if he incurred the penalty, was to have it *doubled*; ten stripes to him for five to others. This was apparently on the supposition that the boys had no notion of strict *justice*, and it was not likely to teach it them. Because *partiality* to a son was likely to be the fault of the meanest of mankind, therefore the son was to be used unjustly!

Again, it is a fault, and a common one, to pay too much deference to the opinion of a supposed wise and learned man; and to avoid this fault, I have

* An old man between eighty and ninety, who worked in my garden at Halesworth, laid before me this concentrated summary of his long experience: 'I've observed, sir, that everything as is right bitter is wholesome.' A notion which might have cost him his life, if he had come in the way of strychnine, colocynth, or eleterium.

known a man utterly refuse (as I have recorded in the 'Annotations') *all intercourse* with a man of whom he had that opinion!

I have also noticed there, in another place, the excess with which some people guard against the danger of being too much led away by another's ability and eloquence. If he is a *very* powerful reasoner, they feel bound to let everything he may say *go for nothing.*

Again, because one may sometimes be too much influenced by personal partiality to listen with undue favour to a person one has a regard for, some people bend the twig too much the contrary way, and bring themselves to cherish a strong prejudice against every opinion, proposal, plan, measure — in short, every person and everything that finds favour with him, and to think the better of whatever and whoever is most opposed to him. And if they find that this gives him pain, the pain they themselves feel in consequence is an additional proof to them of their own excessive partiality. It appears to them as a temptation which they are to guard against the more sedulously, by forcing themselves to judge as *un*favourably as possible of all he says or does. And having brought themselves to view things *reversed*, like an object reflected in a mirror, every danger which besets them on the *left* side they guard against by fresh precautions on the *right.*

This may perhaps be sometimes one of the causes why a prophet hath no honour in his own country.

I know a person whose relatives, who had a real regard for him, were all under a kind of infatuation which led them to act (undesignedly) as if they had conspired to injure his character. In speaking of him to others, they thought themselves bound to guard against the partiality which they felt (and which they acknowledged) by exaggerating his defects and extenuating his good qualities. Strangely enough it never occurred to them that all their hearers would make allowance for their supposed partiality, and would take all the evil that they spoke of him at a *premium* and all the good at a *discount*, when in truth it ought to have been just the reverse.

With a view to expediency, his best course would have been to come to an open rupture with all of them, and then probably they would have done him justice. As it was they very greatly, though quite undesignedly, damaged him.

One of the secondary vulgar errors is (since the *most* vulgar divide all mankind into angels and fiends, and can see no failing in those they admire, nor any good in those they disapprove) to *extenuate* every *great* fault or great merit, and *exaggerate* every *small* one.

A man once asked me for a living, avowedly on the ground that he had always been my strenuous adversary; and I had thus, he said, 'a fine opportunity of showing my magnanimity.' He had heard, probably, of my being a whimsical person who was above personal resentment; and of deliberate *esteem*

and *disesteem*, founded on principles of justice, the vulgar have no notion. They can understand 'bearing malice,' and they can understand 'forget and forgive;' but to *forgive* without *forgetting* seems to them a contradiction.

Do my Lord of Canterbury
A shrewd turn, and he is your friend for ever.
Shakespeare's Henry VIII.

March 1857.

FALSE ALARMS: A FRAGMENT.

THERE was a mode of hunting deer (alluded to by Virgil) among the ancients, and used in later times —perhaps still—in Sicily. They inclosed a large space with a string stretched on sticks, and garnished with red and white feathers, placed so as to flutter in the wind, and a herd of deer being driven into this inclosure were chased round and round, exposed to the shots of the hunters, and afraid to cross the line of feathers. Their dread of an unreal danger overcame their fear of a real one. This resembles the case of the British nation a few years ago, alarmed by the Roman Catholic *titles*, which were but a string of fluttering feathers, while they overlooked the real danger of seductive arts.

December 1859.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

My views of morals is unpleasing to those who, while differing from Paley on other points, have adopted his theory of the absence of a moral sense. And many of these, who are zealous in proclaiming the goodness of God and the sinfulness of man, are disgusted at seeing it proved that their theory nullifies both. They call their system that of total depravity.

But moreover, the study altogether is not popular, nor likely to be so.

1. It is not professional—not what will advance a man in the world; like chemistry, anatomy, various branches of natural philosophy, languages, &c., no one gains a subsistence by it.

2. There are many whose life is such as to indispose them to thoughts about duty.

3. Some well-meaning people consider the Bible as designed to teach us all that is to be known about morality, and think a treatise on the subject must be meant as a rival to Scripture.

4. Many have heard so much of the *danger* of trusting to good works, and so little else about good works, that they dread the very name, and consider that the less they think about them the better. The word virtue sounds to them heathenish. Their teachers doubtless do not design this result; but their safest course would be to give people *just notions* of morality. They would then learn that—1. The

payment of a *debt* cannot be pleaded as a merit; 2. That it is no *benefit to God* that we observe His laws; 3. That it is through His aid that we *can* do so.

Those who think good works a title to immortal life, are—1. Those who mean thereby pilgrimages, and penances, beads, &c.; 2. Those who (like Dirk Hatteraick in 'Guy Mannering') have some *one* supposed virtue, which is to atone for all deficiencies and claim reward besides; and 3. Those who would represent good works as having a kind of *hypothetical* claim: i.e. that a perfectly virtuous life would deserve reward; though *they* make no pretension to it, but trust to God's mercy: like an able-bodied beggar, who believes that he *could* earn bread by labour, but prefers living in idleness on the bounty of others. But as for a man earnestly setting himself to lead a life of Christian virtue, and trusting to earn Heaven by the merit of it, you will not find many cases of that.

5. Many think that whatever may be the difficulties, in some cases, of *practice*, all that relates to morality is so simple and easy, that no one need study or think at all on the subject unless he has a fancy for metaphysical speculations. These persons probably would be sorry not to be far above the lowest of the vulgar in manners, in taste, in dress, and domestic arrangements, and in general cultivation of mind: but in all that relates to morality, they are content to be on a level with a day-labourer.

From these various causes, the study is not a popu-

lar one; but the time *may* come when it shall be regarded as an essential part of the rudiments of a liberal education.

December 1859.

FOOD.

THE diversity prevailing in different nations in reference to articles of food seems to confirm, in its literal sense, the proverbial saying, that 'one man's meat is another man's poison.'

Many an article of food which is in high esteem in one country, is regarded in others with an abhorrence which even famine can hardly surmount.

In the Shetland Islands, it is said that *crabs* and *lobsters* abound, which the people catch for the London market, but refuse to eat, even when half-starved.

The *John Dory* is reckoned by epicures one of the choicest of fish; but in Devonshire, where it abounds, and also in Ireland, it used to be thrown away as unfit for food. There seems to be some superstition connected with this, as it is said that a Devonshire cookmaid flatly refused even to dress it.

Eels, which are abundant and of good quality in Cumberland and Westmoreland, and also in Scotland are regarded by the people there with as much disgust as snakes.

Skate, which is in high estimation in England, in Ireland is hardly ever eaten except by the fishermen.

Scollops, on the other hand, which are reckoned a dainty in Ireland, are hardly ever eaten in England; and though they are abundant in many of the coasts, few have any idea that they are eatable.

The *cuttle-fish* — that kind which produces the inky fluid—though found on our coast, is not eaten by us; but at Naples it is highly esteemed; and travellers report that it tastes like veal.

The *echinus*, or sea-egg, is also unknown to us as food, but is reckoned a delicacy in the West Indies.

The *hedgehog* no one in England thinks of eating (either *à la sauce piquante*, or otherwise) except the gipsies, and some who have joined them, and who report that it is better than rabbit.

The sailors in the English and Dutch whale-ships do not eat the flesh of the *whale*; but those in the French whalers, with their well-known national skill in cookery, are said to make a palatable dish of it.

By almost all the lower classes in England, *venison* and *game* of all kinds are held in abhorrence; and so are *fresh figs*.

By the Australian savages, *frogs*, *snakes*, large *moths*, and *grubs* picked out of rotten wood, all of which the English settlers turn from with disgust, are esteemed as dainties; but they are shocked at our eating *oysters*.

Milk as an article of food (except for sucking-babies) is loathed by the South Sea Islanders. Goats have been introduced into several of the islands; but the people deride the settlers for using their milk, and ask them why they do not milk the sows. On the other hand, *dogs* and *rats* are favourite articles of food with them.

These last (as is well known) are often eaten by the Chinese; who also eat salted *earthworms*, and a kind of *sea-slug* (Holothuria), which most Europeans would turn from with disgust.

In the narrative of Anson's voyage, is a full account of the prejudice of the South Americans (both Creole and Indians) against *turtle*, as poisonous. The prisoners captured in the prize-ships warned our sailors against eating it, and for some time lived on bad ship-beef: but seeing that our men throve on the turtle they began to eat it; at first sparingly, and at length heartily. And when set ashore and liberated, they declared that they blest the day of their capture, which had introduced them to a plentiful supply of wholesome and delicious food. *Horse-flesh*, which most Europeans would refuse to eat except in great extremity, is preferred by Tartars to all other: and the flesh of a wild *ass's colt* was greatly esteemed by the ancient Romans.

As for *pork*, it is on religious grounds that Jews and Mahommedans abstain from it (as the Hindoos do from beef); but the Christians of the East seem to have nearly an equal aversion to it: and the like

prevailed to a great degree, till lately, in Scotland also. (See 'Waverley' and the 'Fortunes of Nigel.')

The large *shell-snail* called *escargot* was a favourite with the ancient Romans, and still is so in a great part of the South of Europe; though most Englishmen would be half-starved before they would eat it.

It is said that in Vienna the large *wood-ants* are served up and eaten alive! And small *land-crabs* are eaten alive in China.

The *iguana*, a large species of lizard, is reckoned a great dainty in some of the West India Islands: and the *monkey* and the *alligator* are eaten both in Africa and in South America; and some travellers who have overcome their prejudices have pronounced them to be very good eating. A large crocodile or alligator, indeed, is said to have a strong musky flavour, but a young one tastes much like a skate.

Even when the same substances are eaten in different countries, there is often a strange difference in the mode of preparing them. Both we and the Icelanders use *butter*; but *they* store it up without salt, till it is rancid and sour.

We agree with the Abyssinians in liking *beef*, but they would probably object as much to the '*roast* beef of old England' as we should to the half-living morsels of raw beef in which they delight.

Maize has been introduced into New Zealand by the missionaries, and the people cultivate and highly esteem it. But their mode of preparing it for food is to Europeans most disgusting. They steep it in

water till it becomes putrid, and then make it into a kind of porridge, which emits a most intolerable stench.

Human flesh has been, and still is, eaten in many parts of the world, and that by people considerably above the lowest rank of savages, such as the Fiji Islanders, and an Indian people called the Batta, who are said even to have a written language.

And even in cannibalism there are great diversities. Some nations eat their enemies, and some their friends. Herodotus relates that a Persian king asked the Indian soldiers that were in his service, what reward would induce them to *burn* the dead bodies of their friends as the Greeks did, instead of eating them. They replied by entreating him not to mention anything so shocking (εὐφήμειν αὐτὸν ἐκέλευον).

On the other hand, the New Zealanders, before their conversion, who seem to have considered that 'the proper diet of mankind is man,' seem to have eaten only their enemies. Among the Australian savages, on the contrary, it is said that if a mother finds a young baby troublesome to carry about, she will eat it (although she would not allow anyone else to do so), under the full persuasion that she has merely deferred its birth, and that the next child she bears will be a reappearance of the eaten one. When remonstrated with by the Europeans, she will reply 'Oh, massa, he plenty come again.'

November 1861.

ADVICE GRATIS.

I HAVE not often been a candidate for the 'Fig at Rome,' which, according to the Spanish proverb, is 'kept for those who give their advice unasked;' and when I *have*, I have seldom an encouragement to repeat the experiment.

Once a person in high office spontaneously asked me to tell him whenever I thought he was taking a wrong step. I have no idea that he was consciously insincere; only, he did not bring before his mind the case of my actual finding any fault in his measures, but thought only how desirable it would be to be able to appeal to my tacit and implied approval.

I, however, took him at his word, and expressed my objections to some measure; and the way in which this was received, deterred me from ever doing the like again. I was reminded of one of the 'Miseries of Human Life,' viz. 'Dropping in to dinner at a friend's house, on the strength of an earnest and repeated *general* invitation; and finding, from your reception, that you had better have *waited for a particular invitation.*'

I believe the like holds good with an invitation to give advice. If, when consulted on some *particular* case, you give some advice that is unpalatable, and escape creating displeasure, you may reckon yourself well off.

The truth is, a man does not like to believe, or to have it believed, 1. That the course he pursues is

not the best; nor, again, 2. To think, and to let others think, that he is not *open to admonition*: and so he tries *round about ways* of objecting to it, without owning he does so.

The ways are chiefly these two:—1. To complain of the mode of the admonition as too blunt, or harsh, or dictatorial; 2. To interpret it as implying *much more* than is actually said—a much *stronger* censure than the words express. Either of these may be understood as a hint to keep silence.

September 1860.

WHISPERING.

EVERYONE perceives that there are two sorts of letters which correspond respectively with each other:—S, T, P, K, Sh, Ch, F, to Z, D, B, G (hard), J (as in the French 'je'), G (as in Gin), V.

Of these the former list are called by some the *hard* sounds, and the others the *soft*; but some say the reverse. I remember the question being once discussed in Oriel College common-room, and the company were about equally divided. I produced (which one might have thought impossible) an *argument* on the point, viz., that the name of *zed* seems a manifest contraction of *izard*; by which name it is still called in the remote parts. Now *izard* seems plainly to be *S hard*.

However, there can be no absolute right and

wrong in what is manifestly a *metaphor*, for no sound can be *literally* hard or soft.

It would be something nearer the mark to call the letters the *forward* and the *backward*. For if you pronounce, e. g., such words as '*dad*' and '*tad*,' you will find that in the former, the tongue is moved *forward*, and the latter, *backward*.

But the most exact description is, that, B, D, &c., are sounded in the *larynx*, and P, T, &c., only in the *mouth*; so that they might be called, respectively, the *laryngal* and the *oral* letters.

When anyone has *lost his voice*, through a cold, but retains the use of his tongue, he speaks in a *whisper*; which is what some call speaking *not above your breath*. And then, and at any time when one whispers, you may observe that he cannot utter B, D, &c., but makes them as P, T, &c. Whispering, therefore, is not simply speaking in a *low voice*, but speaking with the mouth and the breath only, without calling into action the muscles of the *larynx*.

PREVAILING RELIGION.

THAT any endowed or otherwise *prevailing* religion is likely to have among its nominal followers a large proportion of the irreligious and of the indifferent, is what any man of sense would antecedently conjecture, and is confirmed by daily experience. And yet how

often it is practically overlooked! Careless thinkers are very apt hastily to conclude that there must be some intrinsic inferiority in a church many of whose members seem to care little or nothing about religion. Yet it is obvious, upon a few moments' consideration, that those who know little and care less about the distinction between one religion and another will be likely to swim with the stream, and to adhere (nominally) to the church which is established, or in which they have been brought up, or which is that of the majority, without troubling themselves to make any further inquiry. Many of them are even ready to censure anyone who acts otherwise. A late distinguished statesman used to declare that 'no *gentleman* would ever change his religion;' and he proclaimed in Parliament his attachment to the Church of England, as 'that of his *ancestors*,' not going so far back, it is to be presumed, as to those of his ancestors who lived before the Reformation, or to those still more ancient who were worshippers of Thor and Woden.

Such a sentiment is far more common than many persons suppose. Indeed, one might expect from the very nature of the case, that most of those who act on such a principle would avoid openly proclaiming it. Anyone who thinks it allowable and right to disguise, with a view to the supposed benefit of the multitude, his real opinions, would be likely to have no scruple at concealing or denying that disguise. The wonder is that there should be so many as there are who avow and openly defend the system of what is called,

in modern phraseology, phenakism, double-doctrine, economy, or reserve: and it may not unfairly be suspected that there are others who act on that system, without acknowledging it.

As for those who have no belief in revelation at all, they are not unlikely to be even intolerant. They may be convinced that *some* form of religion is necessary for the vulgar, and may perceive the convenience of a universal agreement in it; and they will be most unwilling to see the tranquillity of society impaired by the contests about different forms of superstitious delusion. And as to scruples of conscience about professing what one does not really believe, having none such themselves, they are the less likely to make any allowance for that in others. Brydone the traveller strongly concurs in the censure passed by an Italian gentleman on a Protestant, for refusing to kneel to the Host, on the ground that he did not believe in transubstantiation. 'No more do I, sir,' said the other, 'and yet you see me kneel.' An Irish gentleman, who, though an avowed unbeliever, was a staunch Orangeman, used to break forth into a paroxysm of rage at the very mention of the removal of the Roman Catholic disabilities: 'They deserve,' he used to say, 'no pity at all for the inconveniences they may suffer through their own perversity; why can't they conform to the religion of the country as by law established?'

Then, again, an *endowed* church has, in that circumstance, a claim to preference from those who

think chiefly of their purse. A party of farmers at a public-house were overheard discussing what may be called a religious question; one of their number having determined on joining the Methodists, while some of the others were labouring to dissuade him. The only argument that was used, which was entitled to as much weight as repetition could give it (for it was repeated many times over), was, 'Well, what I say is, *one* religion is enough to pay for.' The opponent probably thought that he *paid* for the established religion; not considering that if his land were let tithe-free, he would have so much the more *rent* to pay for it. On the other hand, any one who voluntarily pays towards any object, is likely, from that very circumstance, to prize that object. He does not like to think, nor to let others think, that he is indifferent about that to which he chooses to contribute.*

* Those who are under what is called the 'Voluntary system,' sometimes reproach the members of an endowed church with being under a *hired* ministry, and boast that *they* are not; which is exactly the reverse of the truth. For those who are maintained by an endowment are no more hired than are the head and fellows of a college; but those who are paid by their congregations *are*. This is no matter of just *reproach* to them, for 'the labourer is worthy of his *hire*;' but facts ought to be stated as they really are. But when cases occur, as of course they now and then will, of carelessness in a minister of an endowed church, the unthinking are apt not to consider that if such a man were stimulated to activity by his maintenance depending on it, that activity would be likely to do more harm than good. Such a

But one who pays, or who erroneously imagines that he pays, a *compulsory tax*, will be very often disposed even to grumble at such payment; like the farmer whom Cowper describes in his 'Tithing Day.'

> Quoth one, A rarer man than you
> In pulpit none shall hear:
> But yet methinks, to tell you true,
> You sell it plaguy dear.

Then, again, an out-party will generally have more zeal and more mutual attachment among its members, than an in-party. These latter are like the occupants of a besieged town, of whom a large proportion are non-combatants, wishing only to be let alone; while the besiegers are all soldiers, full of active hostility.

The members of a *small* body, again, have each a sense of his own importance; while a member of any large community feels himself to be but a drop in an ocean—to have but a slight connexion with each other drop, and to be but an insignificant part of the whole ocean.

All these considerations are, as has been said, frequently overlooked by that large proportion of mankind who do not think accurately and carefully; and hence we see that many of them who receive a strong religious impression will at once quit the Established Church for some dissenting body, merely

man would be likely to court popularity, by flattering the prejudices and the faults of his people.

on the ground of the superior activity and zeal that they see in the members of that body.

It does not occur to them as possible that if that body and the Established Church were to *change places*, they might in this respect change characters.

Of course, if anyone comes to the deliberate conviction that the church he belongs to is essentially unscriptural, *that* is a good reason for seceding. But if he has no other reason than the lukewarmness of many of its members, he should consider that this is one which would apply to the *Christian Church* generally, as compared with what it was in the earliest ages, when Paganism was the prevailing religion.

But many a pious man, who is not clear-headed, does not like to be *merely* one of a community many of whose members are very lukewarm ; and therefore, if he does not join some dissenting sect, he will perhaps enrol himself in some party within the Church ; especially, one that assumes some *self-laudatory* title (like the ancient *Gnostics*, who so called themselves, as '*knowing* the Gospel') ; such as the orthodox party, the evangelical, the serious, the maintainers of Church principles, &c. ; and those who have seen the sacraments and the ordinances of a church made by some the occasions of superstition, and treated by others with heartless formalism, are likely to have an association formed in their minds of disgust or contempt, and thence to reject, or at least to disparage, all ordinances and regulations.

The tendency, again, of men to delight in forming

small associations, and the superior zeal and mutual attachment of the members of such associations, was not overlooked by the politic governors of the Church of Rome, that enormous ocean of which each individual Roman Catholic is so small a drop. They encourage, therefore, the formation not only of the several monastic orders, but of several confraternities of laymen. There are several such of which the members combine together to perform, or to pay others for performing, certain religious exercises, and to pay for Masses, for the benefit of that particular society. The danger of party-divisions has not been entirely escaped, as we see in the rivalry between the Franciscans and Dominicans, and the contests between the Port Royalists and Jesuits; but the object aimed at, and for the most part successfully aimed at, has always been, to keep all these societies in subordination to the central authority of Rome.

We should borrow from that Church anything that may be wise and good in their proceedings; and we should endeavour to turn into harmless channels those natural impulses which might otherwise lead to party spirit and schism—to such divisions as the Apostle censures in the Corinthians, who said 'I am of Paul, and I am of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ.' In *our* Church, the division into *parishes* ought to be considered as the formation of certain small societies subordinate to the Church, and in which each individual parishioner is of some appreciable consequence. Men should be trained, if

possible, to take an interest not only in the Church generally, but in the well-being of their own particular parish; in the good conduct of the schools, the creditable state of the Church music, and the good repair and decent appearance of the building. Attention to these things may even be a help towards fostering a suitable attention to what is more important.

Then, again, the Christian Knowledge Society, the Irish Association for the like object, the S. P. G., and the Church Missionary Society, are all of them associations not at all of the nature of parties, and which tend (besides the *particular* good effected by each) to cherish and foster right religious feeling in the members.

And the like may be said of the Young Men's Christian Associations that are springing up in various places. These, when established and conducted upon right principles, give a salutary turn to that tendency of man's nature which has been above noticed—to awaken zeal and encourage friendly co-operation, without producing party spirit and schism.

Under some circumstances, it may be advisable to form such associations composed of persons of different religious denominations; but, as a general rule, it is best that each church should have one for its own members. When the proposed object is improvement not only in secular, but also in religious knowledge, it is best that the instruction given should not be crippled and curtailed by the necessity of keeping

clear of everything that distinguishes one body of Christians from another.

This might tend to suggest the notion that all the points on which Christians differ are matters of no importance; which is a conclusion that *none of them* would admit.

And, moreover, it is desirable that those who do belong to any church should have their attachment to it, not impaired, but cherished and encouraged, as far as this can be done, without exciting feelings of bitter hostility against those of other denominations.

It is altogether a mistake to suppose that a charitable feeling towards other denominations necessarily implies indifference to our own Church.

Even those whom we may regard as very seriously in error, we should treat with charity; but there would be hardly any room for the exercise of charity if all religious errors were to be considered as of little or no consequence.

SUCCESSIONS OF PLANTS AND OF SYSTEMS.

It is observed in the American woods, and elsewhere, that if a wood of any particular kind of tree is destroyed by fire or otherwise, and the ground left alone, a wood grows up almost always of some *different* kind of tree; and this, not at random, but each tree having its own regular successor.

Thus a wood of *oak* is succeeded by one of *beech*; a pine wood by a poplar wood; and so forth. Thus does nature point out the rule which the agriculturist observes, of 'rotation of crops.'

Something analogous may be found in the successions of modes of thought and of conduct. Each system, when overthrown, will usually have its own proper succession.

One very common and very natural successor of Romanism (with the thoughtful and intelligent) is infidelity. A tenet of the Roman Church, which often clings to a man even after he has ceased to believe in a God, is, that a Divine *revelation* necessarily implies an *infallible interpreter*, accessible to all; inasmuch as a revelation is (they say) no revelation to those who cannot be certain *what* it is that is revealed. Now, a thoughtful man will be likely to perceive that there is no ground for the belief that there *is* such an infallible interpreter, and that the Church of Rome is it (which must be the belief of a steady Romanist); and that even if the arguments for this were ten times stronger, they would still prove nothing: since it is a manifest contradiction to refer us to *reason* and to Scripture, after having declared that we *must not trust* our reason, and that we are incompetent to judge what is the sense of Scripture. This is like first blindfolding a man, and then bidding him look around him. Hence they do not usually think (after having seen the futility of the Romish claim) of looking any further,

but conclude that there cannot possibly be any such thing as a Divine revelation.

Another successor, more among the vulgar, of Romanism when rejected, is Antinomianism; such as that of the Munster Anabaptists, and other extravagant sects, which arose about the time of the Reformation. Men who had been disgusted with the doctrine of the supposed justifying merit of good works, thought it best to get rid of good works altogether.

Then again, the superstitions attached to the Sacraments and the *Sacerdotal* character, assigned to the Christian Priesthood by the Roman Church, naturally led to the Quaker reaction, of rejecting all Sacraments and all Ministers.

German Rationalism again, on the other hand, has often, when men grew weary of questioning everything, and roaming from one wild conjecture to another, been succeeded by Romanism.

Of Calvinism, especially when pushed to the extreme of Antinomianism (which some have called Calvinism run to seed), the most usual successor is *Unitarianism*. This took place to a great extent in the very Church over which Calvin presided, at Geneva. It also took place in England, among the trustees of Mrs. Hewlett's endowment for independents; which was the subject of a difficult legal question a few years ago. And in the United States a large proportion of the Independents (Congregationalists) are Unitarians. Harvard College, Massachu-

setts (which was founded by a high Calvinist) is chiefly in their hands.

On the other hand, those who have been brought up Unitarians, very commonly, in the second or third generation, become either Churchmen or Infidels. *Scripture* and *Unitarianism* appear to any thinking person so utterly irreconcileable, that he cannot adhere to both.

Mr. Woodward has pointed out, in one of his essays, how large a proportion of the children of religious parents, of the evangelical (Calvinistic) party, turn out ill. The causes may be different in different cases; in some, *over-strictness* may have led to a rebellious reaction; in others, *over-negligence*, leaving *all* to be done by Divine grace, while neglecting *means;* and sometimes Antinomian *principles*, so explained away by the parents as to be harmless, may have been *practically* adopted by the children.

August 1861.

VICE-ROYALTY.

As it seems now not likely that I shall live to see any attempt to abolish the office of Lord-Lieutenant, it is as well to leave my opinion on record.

I have been under thirteen vice-royalties; and have about as many times, or more, been Lord Justice. Being of no political party, I have been ever ready

to strengthen the hands of *any* lord-lieutenant; and I have been on friendly terms with all.

My conviction is that the office is not only useless, but most mischievous; and the same is the opinion of a very large quantity of the most intelligent and best-informed among those who have no personal interests to bias them. Some are persons who have themselves held the office.

1. The *union* can never be complete while there is a viceroy. It is a suitable office for a distinct kingdom, or a *province* with a distinct *legislature*; but utterly *unsuited* for a part of one united kingdom. It tends, therefore, to keep up the idea of a *Kingdom* of Ireland; and partly for that reason it is that it is so strongly advocated by *repealers*. The Act of Union is most emphatically a *half measure*. Retaining the vice-royalty, while there is but *one kingdom*, is an *inconsistency*.

2. The Lord-Lieutenant is *ostensibly* the representative of the *Sovereign*; but in reality is well understood to be the representative of the *ministry* for the time being. His main object must be to obtain *votes*, so as to secure a parliamentary majority for his ministry. There can be no real *loyalty* felt towards a Lord-Lieutenant, and there could be none towards the sovereign, if the sovereign were to be *changed with each change of the ministry*. The evil of the office would be—though still very great—much less if some nobleman, unconnected with party, were appointed for life. But as it is—

3. The Lord-Lieutenant is a sort of *hostage* placed by ministers in the hands of their opponents; who have an opportunity of thwarting and teazing, through him, the ministry they dislike. Then—

4. The *short tenure* of office, which naturally results, makes each Lord-Lieutenant constantly *a beginner*. If he is a candid and intelligent man, he will be just beginning to learn who is, and who is not, to be trusted, and how Ireland should be governed, by the time his vice-royalty comes to a close. At first —and, if he is not a very wise man, throughout— he is beset by persons studying to mislead him; and it will take time to find them out.

5. It has been said that a ruler resident in Ireland is likely to be the best judge of the deserts and qualifications, for each office, of those around him. He may become such by the time half, or more than half, of his time is expired; but then he is exposed to solicitations, and bullyings, and temptations to jobbing, and to courting popular applause, in Ireland, far more than if he lived in England. 'He has need,' says the proverb, 'of a *long spoon* who sups porridge with Old Nick.'

6. As for the *need* of a local government, as if for a distant province, it is, *now* at least, ridiculous. When a man can easily breakfast in London and dine in Dublin; and when a message can be sent in twenty minutes, such a plea is absurd. But—

7. At all times, it appears that Ireland was just as well governed under *lords justices*, and I have always

found that their time is not occupied for more, on an average, than an hour a week.

8. It is represented that the Irish people are greatly attached to the office, and this is true of a small number of Dublin shopkeepers, and a few empty folks who like levees and drawing-rooms,* and a good many political agitators who wish, for their own sakes, to keep Britain and Ireland as *distinct* as they can. But all these are far from a majority of the Irish people. They are, however, *united* in their object, *zealous* and *clamorous*, and thus prevail over a far greater number, and of wiser and better men, but who do not like to put themselves forward for a task which might seem ungracious, and would expose them to some ill-will, and after all is no particular concern of theirs. A small body of well-disciplined soldiers are an overmatch for ten times their number of a scattered and undisciplined multitude.

April 1861.

MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY.

It is a very nice point to decide when several persons are combined together in a publication, or otherwise,

* But I should much like to see a real *regal* court in Ireland. A residence of the Sovereign for two or three months annually would do more to make Ireland peaceable and loyal than all the bullying and all the coaxing that have been alternately tried.

how far each is to be held responsible for what is said or done by the others.

On the one hand it would be considered unfair that the writer of an article in some review or magazine should be held answerable for all that is said in the other articles. Yet on the other hand, it would hardly be allowed that, when several persons jointly produce a volume, each of them should be judged wholly and solely from what he has himself said, exactly as if it had been altogether a distinct publication.

It seems necessary in this matter to take into account what is generally understood, what is the general impression produced.

Not that popular opinion is to be considered the sole arbiter of right and wrong, true and false; but only so far as general belief attaches a *meaning* to whatever is said or done. For, *the signification of any expression or of any act, must be that which is known and acknowledged to be conveyed by it.* Thus if all men had agreed that 'Yes' should be a negative, and 'No' an affirmative, it would have been right to say 'Yes' in cases where it is now right to say 'No;' and it is allowable to sign oneself such an one's 'obedient humble servant' without designing to perform menial offices for him, precisely because those words are understood as an established form of courtesy. Now the degree in which a person is understood to give his sanction to a review or other periodical to which he contributes, is merely this,—that he is supposed to regard it as not generally of a

seditious, blasphemous, or grossly immoral tendency; but he may differ widely from many of the opinions advanced in it, and he may even have published works which have been severely criticised in that very review.

And the reason of this allowance appears to be, that he will very often have no other effectual mode of bringing his views before the public than through the medium of an *established* periodical. Such a periodical is like an established stage-coach or packet, a public conveyance in which a man must take his chance as to his fellow-passengers.

The same view is not taken of an independent volume of which several persons combine to write each a portion. By thus combining, they are understood each to signify his general approbation of the views of the rest, not, indeed, a complete approbation of the exact wording of every sentence, but an approbation of the general drift and tone of sentiment of the whole. The contributors in this case are considered not as passengers in the same packet, but rather as a party of travellers who have associated themselves together to fit out a conveyance for their common use, and have selected each other as companions. Any one of such a party of travellers will be much more liable to be judged of from his companions than any passengers in a public conveyance would be. A person who may have been drawn in to be a contributor to some volume, or some series of tracts for the times, and finds afterwards that some

very objectionable views have been put forth by some of his fellow-labourers, will do well to come forward with a public protest against what he disapproves, for otherwise he will be considered as aiding and abetting it. And since he must *know* that this is the view that *will* actually be taken, he can have no right to complain that it is an unjust one, since, as I have said above, the true import of any expression or of any act, is that which it is known and acknowledged to convey.

And he is also to consider this: that besides the implied sanction which he will be understood to have given to his fellow-labourers by his co-operation with them, his own *expressions* will be also understood in a sense modified by what they have said. If, in a Mahometan country, a man calls himself a 'true believer,' he is understood to be a Mahometan. And in like manner there are many expressions which will be interpreted in a sense considerably modified by what they are understood to refer to. 'Philosophical principles,' 'orthodox views,' 'church principles,' 'evangelical principles,' 'principles of sound criticism,' and many other expressions, may be very variously understood, according to the application that is supposed meant to be made of them. And when a reader finds any of these expressions in the volume before him, he will be likely to interpret them according to the application made in other parts of the same volume. Thus a man will often find that words and acts which of themselves would well admit of a

very harmless meaning, come before the mind of the public with a tinge, as it were, derived from those with whom he has chosen to combine, even as a garment will imbibe and retain the scent of the fumes and odours it has been exposed to.

This kind of judgment is often carried to a most unwarrantable extreme by rash people, who, if you commended any book, consider you as subscribing to everything the author has said in that or in any other book, and take for granted that you agree with all the views of anyone with whom you are personally intimate.

This kind of judgment a man may reasonably complain of and protest against, but he ought not to complain of anything which is the result, and the easily foreseen result, of his own voluntary act.

What has been said of any joint *publication* is applicable to the case of a *party*.

Anyone who proclaims himself, or allows himself to be represented, as a member of a party, will be understood as identifying himself with the rest, and giving his sanction to whatever is said or done, at least by the leaders, or by any considerable portion of the party, except so far as he *expressly* and *publicly protests* against it.

He will be considered as a *partner*, not under the system of 'limited liability,' but according to the rules of ordinary partnership which make each partner responsible for all the acts and all the debts of the firm. And since this is the mode in which it is known

the public will judge, it is vain to complain that it is an unjust mode. A man who, with his eyes open, does that which he knows will convey a certain impression to the minds of others, must be prepared to take the consequences.

March 1861.

MENTAL DIFFERENCE OF THE SEXES.

SYDNEY SMITH says that when little *boys* and *girls* are playing in the dirt and trundling hoops, they are just alike; but that if you *train* one half of these children (as is done) in a certain mode, and the other half in a far different mode, they will thence turn out different characters. He was ingenious, but often rash and inaccurate. It did not occur to him that when they are all taught to *write*, and by the same masters, in nine cases out of ten, people will rightly guess which is a man's hand and which a woman's. This I have adduced (in the annotations on Bacon) as a proof to convince those who deride graptomancy, not only that there must be something in it, but that they themselves think so. Not that there is more character shown in the way in which each person *writes* than in his way of pulling off a glove, or wiping his face, &c., only that in the case of writing there is a *permanent record* of his manner. It is very difficult to trace what are the mental differences of the sexes: because the individuals of each differ so greatly

among themselves. Mr.—— says, that a woman will reason very justly on any A.B.C. case, but that where it comes to practice, she lays aside reason, and acts entirely on impulse. This is no uncommon thing with *men*, though, perhaps, *more* common with women.

—— says, in one of his Reviews, that the feeling of a woman is more *unmixed* and *concentrated* on a single object; whether a husband, a parent, a child, a preacher, a ball or a bonnet: perhaps he might have added '*a party*.' If this be so, one may expect women to be mere thoroughgoing partisans. This would also prepare one to find even-handed justice (which is not common in either sex) to be a harder duty in woman. When anyone is deficient in this, it is not usually from unjust *design*, but from having the whole attention concentrated on *one* side, and the other disregarded. The Irish justice complained that though he could decide well enough when he heard one side, it bothered him to listen to both.

I think I have observed that, on the whole, females *learn* quicker. At a charity school where the boys are occupied in what they are taught during that portion of time in which the girls are at *needlework*, still the girls keep up to them, or even surpass them.

I have seen somewhere an account of a man whose trade was exhibiting learned canary birds, which did wonders. He found that it took him twice as long to train a cock bird as a hen; yet he generally employed by choice the former; because the hens soon

forgot it, and had to be trained over again, and the cock *retained* his lesson.

Though readily attaining proficiency in various departments, women seldom reach the very highest in any. And this cannot be attributed to any difference in Education; for it is found where the difference is on the other side.

E. g. *more* females than males learn *painting* and *music*; and many of them succeed well; but the *tip-top* painters and composers are almost all males.

And the same with cooking. It does appear also that women have little of *inventive* power. They *learn* readily; but very rarely *originate* anything of importance. I have long sought for some instances of invention or discovery by a woman. And the best I have been able to find is Thwaites' Soda-water. A Miss Thwaites of Dublin, an amateur chemist, hit on an improvement in Soda-water, which enabled her to drive all others out of the market. But besides this, some small musical compositions, and some pretty novels and poems, are all the female inventions I can find.

Mrs. Somerville is said to have been one of the five or six mathematicians in the world that understood the works of La Place. But she *discovered* nothing. And we cannot refer their deficiency in invention, in any department, to their not having been *trained* to *that* particular department; for it is remarkable that *inventions* have seldom come from those so trained. The stocking-frame was invented

by an Oxford scholar, the spinning-jenny by a barber, and the power-loom by a clergyman.

Women are thought to have more passive fortitude than men, though less of active daring. Suicide, properly so called (i. e. not resulting solely from the *morbid* craving for self-destruction in some insane patients), is supposed to be much less common among females, though the utterly helpless and hopeless state of distress which tempts to it must be much more frequent among them. There is a feminine figure of speech by which I have sometimes detected, even in a good style, the female hand. In speaking *generally*, a man uses the *masculine* pronoun *singular* when meaning to include each sex: a woman almost always makes a solecism, by using the *plural* as if it were *singular*; e. g. a man would write, 'If any one thinks so and so *he* is much mistaken:' a woman would be apt to say 'they are.'

A female writer of fiction is apt to represent as very admirable a woman who, for the advantage of her family, marries a man she does not care for, when she is attached to another. A *man* regards this with, perhaps, some pity, but more disgust.

Theodore Hook introduces it in one of his tales; but even there it is made to turn out wretchedly. And in the 'Bride of Lammermoor' the victim is represented as hardly in a sane state.

I remember that before the authorship was known of the song of Auld Robin Grey, I pronounced it, on that ground, to be by a woman.

January 1861.

HALF MEASURES.

In some collections of the sayings and writings of Sydney Smith, I find him censuring those who object to *half measures*; by which he seems to understand *keeping the medium* between two extremes; e. g., when a man who has been outrunning his income, retrenches moderately instead of living either extravagantly or penuriously. But he had better have said 'this is *not* what sensible people call a *half measure*, though the unwise, who are apt to run into one extreme or another, often do speak so.' It is no half measure to wear a coat that exactly fits you, instead of one that is either too big or else too little. Properly speaking, a half measure is one which is so far incomplete as to fail of the *very object proposed.* To build a moderate-sized house, which is neither a palace nor a cabin, is not a half measure; but it would be to build a house of several stories, without a staircase, or with an unfinished roof that lets in the rain.

All *moderate* persecution is a half measure, such as the penal laws against Roman Catholics, because the effect is to irritate and not to suppress. The *extermination* of the Moors and Jews from Spain, and of the Huguenots from France, were detestably *bad*, but they were not *half measures.*

A remarkable instance of a half measure was the retention of the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland at the time of the union. It naturally tended to make

the union incomplete. The existence of a viceroy keeps up the idea of a separate *kingdom*, and a *province*, and it may be added that those who adhere to it as an *ancient* institution are completely in error.

A viceroy over a distinct *kingdom*, with a distinct *parliament*, was the institution that existed till the end of the last century. The appointment of a viceroy over a *portion* of one kingdom was a complete novelty and a manifest anomaly.

The agitators for a repeal of the union are, of course, very glad of it, and so are the few shopkeepers who profit by it, and the silly people who delight in a drawing-room at the castle, and those who seek popularity with the above-mentioned. But all sensible and truly patriotic men, who really understand Ireland, would be glad to get rid of it, even if, instead of a saving of the public money, there were to be an increased expenditure.

ALLEGORY.

'WHICH things are an *allegory*' [ἀλληγορούμενα]. These words of our version have been interpreted to mean that Paul did not believe the transactions he alluded to to have ever literally occurred, but that he took the whole narrative as an allegory or parable (these two words are essentially the same in meaning), figuratively representing a certain doctrine. And

thence it is inferred that any or every part of Scripture history may in like manner be understood as a myth, and the whole Bible be regarded (which has been actually maintained) as 'one great parable.'

Now that our translators, though not sufficiently careful in this passage as to the word employed, had any such meaning as the above, is far from credible. But at any rate Paul had not, for he does not use the word (ἀλληγορία) *allegory* at all, either here or anywhere else. The word (ἀλληγορούμενα) which he does employ would have been more properly rendered '*capable of an allegorical application.*' This may very well be the case with real transactions. Thus, Paul himself calls 'Christ our *Passover*,' and speaks of 'putting away the leaven of malice;' though no one in his senses can suppose him not to have believed in the literal sacrifice of a real lamb, and a real feast of unleavened bread. And our Lord points out an analogy between Himself and the brazen serpent, though no one can imagine He meant that there never was really any such serpent.

It is perfectly allowable to bring forward a parable (allegory) *avowedly as such*, and which claims no belief except in the lesson which by analogy it teaches. And again, there is nothing disingenuous in pointing out some analogy, whether real or fanciful, between some true historical narrative and something else. But to relate what *is not true in the sense in which it is sure to be understood*, is what we should call by a very different name from parable.

That such dishonesty should be attributed to our sacred writers by avowed anti-Christians is nothing strange or alarming. But when professed Christian teachers speak this, they attack the very foundations both of religion and of morality.

September 1861.

OF LOVE AND FEAR AS RELIGIOUS MOTIVES.

In all barbarous and semi-barbarous tribes, fear much more than gratitude is the prevailing tie of religion. Even savages or half-savages seem sometimes to have some notion of the Great Spirit who giveth unto all men life and breath and all things.

But the very goodness of His character seems to them a reason for neglecting His worship. He, they think, will be disposed of His own nature to treat them mercifully at all times, and needs no anxious solicitations to engage His good will in their behalf. And hence their whole solicitude in religious matters is turned towards propitiating the malice and averting the spite of the malignant demons—the continual objects of men's dread.

This, as experience testifies, is universally the religion of corrupt human nature; and the law, having to deal with human nature, as yet unredeemed—with hearts unsoftened, and understandings unenlightened by that Spirit of grace which is the peculiar gift of the Gospel—not only set strongly and constantly

before men's minds those stern and terrible attributes of the *Divine* character which make Him the proper object of *fear*, but withdrew, under the cover of figures and dark allusions, from direct contemplation the person and power of the grand enemy of man.

Such as *he is* were the very gods whom the heathens around them *worshipped*; and there was too much reason to apprehend that, if he had been explicitly introduced into their religious history, and presented familiarly to the popular mind as an evil Being of great malice and power actually exerting an influence over them, the vulgar, at least, might be tempted to divide their homage between him and Jehovah, or even forget the Great Supreme in their dread of his malignant foe.

THE JEWS.

Some Jews have maintained that the description I have given of Jesus, as the most remarkable person that ever appeared in the world, applies rather to the Apostle Paul (Rabbi Saul as they call him), inasmuch as he was the chief preacher of the Gospel to the Gentiles.

This objection serves to show how hard pressed they must find themselves; for one can hardly believe that they themselves can consider it as of any real force. A sovereign is said to make a treaty with

another sovereign when he does so by his ambassadors, authorised and instructed by him, and acting in his name. In like manner Paul and Barnabas and the rest of the apostles professed themselves merely ambassadors of Jesus, commissioned by Him, and having received from Him their knowledge of the Gospel, and also the power of displaying those signs without which they could not have obtained a hearing. The Duke of Wellington is commonly said to have defeated the French at Waterloo with great slaughter; and it would be thought strange to deny this, on the ground that he did not slay a single Frenchman with his own hand; or to deny that Romulus was the founder of Rome, because he did not himself build the houses and the walls.

The omission of the sacrifices ordained by the Law constitutes a difficulty which some Jews attempt to get over by citing such passages as, 'I will have mercy, and not sacrifice,' and others to the same effect. But the real meaning of all these evidently must be, to impress strongly on the minds of the Israelites that ritual observances would avail them nothing if they neglected moral duties. For it is undeniable that sacrifices were expressly enjoined in the Divine Law, as well as the observance of the Sabbath, which the Jews acknowledged to be binding.

The long-continued afflictions and dispersion of the nation, and the non-arrival of any such deliverer as they hope for, some of the Jews endeavour to

explain by alleging that some of their nation violate the laws concerning the Sabbath, and concerning forbidden meats, and that it is their sinfulness withholds the deliverance. And it is not unlikely that some such transgressions do occur of the ceremonial law, and also (especially in the case of fraud) of the *moral* law, which is no less a part of the Divine code. But if they are to expect deliverance only when the whole nation has attained sinless perfection, they have not much ground for hope. But it cannot be denied that the ceremonial precepts of the law are, on the whole, pretty well observed by a very large proportion of the Jews, and that many of them are even exposed to persecutions or indignities in the cause of their religion. The proportion of such Jews is much larger than that of the 'righteous' men who, we are told, would have averted destruction from Sodom. The Jews must therefore look out for some other cause to account for the judgments under which their nation is labouring.

May 21, 1861.

WEIGHT WITHOUT SCALES.

In reference to my remarks on the German rationalists (see Chapter of Accidents) it has been suggested that they may have meant (though they don't *say* any such thing), or that they ought to have meant, merely that some *one* lucky hit, or perhaps

two, made by some pretender, may have caused such a strong belief in his superhuman power as to have gained credence for a vast number of tales of marvellous facts that never took place at all.

And it is not impossible, supposing there was a strong and general *predisposition* in favour of this pretender, and that there was no strong body of men to oppose him, some *unprejudiced*, and some prejudiced the other way.

This is perhaps sometimes found among Romanists in any Roman Catholic country where Protestantism has been completely burnt out; but when the circumstances are reversed, of course a reversed conclusion will be the result; e. g. the alleged miracles at the tomb of the Abbé Paris (appealed to by Hume as one of the best parallels he could find to the Christian miracles) were supported indeed by a considerable party (the Jansenists), but opposed by a much stronger party, who were able to point out that out of hundreds of trials, only four or five even alleged cases were produced, and that these were such as could easily be explained by natural causes. And accordingly the Jansenist cause *lost* ground by the attempt.

The like tendencies are apparent in all departments of life; e. g. homœopathy and mesmerism are strongly opposed by a large majority (though a majority daily decreasing) who resort to the hypothesis of accident, or anything that may serve to disparage the pretensions they oppose. These persons, if any patient under the old system of treatment recovers—perhaps

independently of that treatment, or in spite of it—will usually conclude at once that the recovery is due to that treatment; and if anyone does *not* recover, they conclude either that the disorder was absolutely incurable, or that the failure was due to the carelessness of the patient, or the unskilfulness of the *individual* doctor, not to the *system* itself. On the other hand, if case after case be adduced of apparent cures under either of these new systems, then (if the facts cannot be denied) they resort to *accident*, sometimes in defiance of all reasonable calculation; and if any patient fails of a cure, then—though no pretension was made to an infallible panacea that should confer immortality—they regard this as a proof that the whole *system* is a delusion.

I once related to a gentleman a case that had come under my own knowledge, of a boy of the humbler classes who had been in an hospital for white-swelling, and treated carefully by the most eminent men, who at length decided that *amputation* alone could save his life. His mother took him away in despair, as the loss of a leg would sentence him to *beggary*, and implored a homœopathist to take him in hand if there was a shadow of hope. In a few weeks he was cured, and walked about stoutly on his two legs. The gentleman declared his conviction that the cure must have been due to the medicines he had taken in the hospital several weeks before. The hospital doctors had not themselves any such hopes, for *they* were going to cut off his leg!

This is a sample out of a multitude of similar cases. It is indeed conceivable that a patient might in reality be cured through the operation of some medicine which he thought unavailing, and might attribute his cure to some other. But in that case his *authority*, whatever its weight might be, would go to *disparage* that former medicine. And even so a man who had in reality been brought to believe in Christianity through the arguments of Paley, Butler, and Co., but who attributed his conviction to some other cause, would be bearing *his* testimony *against* their arguments.

Now the Christian doctrine had a strong and general prejudice to contend against, among both the Jews and Pagans, the *ir*religious, and still more the religious. And the most credulous, and the worst reasoners—of course, the greater part—were the most ready to be satisfied with *any* explanation, however futile, of *accident*, or magic, or whatever would get rid of the evidence.

If the Christian miracles had rested on no firmer basis than one or two *lucky hits*, we of this day should probably never have heard of them; and no such book as the '*Toldoth Jeschu*' would ever have been written.

It is a thing very improbable, I have heard it alleged, that any man's eternal salvation should ever be made to depend on his being able to distinguish Jesus of Nazareth from the multitude of pretending impositions that have appeared in the world, and to

ascertain the reality of the Christian miracles which are appealed to as the ground on which rest the claims of the Gospel to be received as a revelation from Heaven. If anyone undertakes to prove that this is *not* improbable, and is what we should naturally have expected, his task will be a hard one. But one may easily show that it is not at all *more* improbable than much that is before our eyes in the natural world. We daily see cases in which men are compelled, I may say on *pain of death*, to obtain such knowledge and exercise such judgment as are likely in many to be wanting. If, e. g., a being of some different order from ourselves—an inhabitant perhaps of some distant planet—were told that there are in this world of ours many poisonous fruits and other vegetable productions, tempting to the eye, and often difficult to be distinguished from the wholesome, and that on the distinguishing of them a man's life might often depend—such a being might urge that all this is *improbable*. But whether probable or not, we all know that it is *true*.*

It is curious to observe coincidence in principle between the 'Review and Essay' school and some of those most opposed to them, but who unconsciously favour them. They both represent what has always been called *evidence*—all appeal to the reason as furnishing marks to distinguish Jesus from many impostors that

* Poor Captain Gardiner and his companions suffered the penalty of death by starvation (in Tierra del Fuego) for neglecting to provide themselves with fish-hooks and gunpowder.

have existed, and the Gospel from fanatical dreams—as quite useless; because, forsooth, a *mere* address to the understanding is not sufficient (and no one ever said it is) to make anyone a good Christian, any more than a correct chart would bring a ship into port without wind or steam. And they allow of no ground of right conviction except on *feeling* a certain doctrine to be suitable to our *wants* and *wishes* and *conjectures*. And the perception of this they regard as a special *revelation* from Heaven. Now all this being admitted, a suspicion will arise that all that evidence which is, it seems *useless*, has no real *existence*, and that all the miraculous narratives of Scripture may be explained as parables, myths, exaggerations, mistakes, or pious frauds.

And when each person brings his own *candle to the sundial*, to throw the shadow which ever way he will, there will be endless differences as to the *conclusions* embraced and rejected, precisely because the *principle* is the same, of each following his own fancy and taste.

And a man who does so will perhaps pity and deride the ignorant pagans who worship a god of stone carved by their own hands, but is in fact himself worshipping a kind of idol of his own imagination. He is full of faith and piety, but it is faith in his own conjectures, and pious vindication of himself.

In this and several other points, I observe that a good many men have a mind supplied with *weights*, no *scales*. Anyone who should be furnished

with a series of accurate weights from a grain up to a hundred weight, but without a *balance*, would be greatly astray when he came to estimate the *comparative* weight of two objects by a random guess. When the new metal potassium was first produced, a specimen of it was sent to a chemist of high repute, who, with great wonder, pronounced it 'decidedly metallic, and very *ponderous*.' It is so light as to float even in spirits of wine! But the lustre of the metal misled him by the association with the idea of great weight.

Now there are some men, not wanting in acuteness, who notice all the reasons and all the objections on each side of a question, not overlooking any probability or improbability; but when they come to set *one against another*, are often as inaccurate as one who should consider a handful of gold-dust and a handful of road-dust as of equal weight. Their minds, in short, seem to have weights, but no scales.

I have observed this in some who speak on the question of the Origin of Civilisation. They say that perhaps no revelation, properly so called, was originally given to the first generation of mankind; that is, that no knowledge was imparted from above on any particular point, but that they were endowed by their Maker with a degree of sagacity answering the purpose of the instinct of the brute creation, and sufficient to preserve the first generation from perishing. And afterwards, they say, there arose among early tribes of savages certain individuals, or, according to

conjecture, certain *races* of men, endowed by the Creator with a degree of intelligence and forethought such as is never found in savage tribes now, which led them to seek, and to devise, and to impart to their brethren such arts as would, as it were, set society agoing on the road towards perfect civilisation.

Now the utmost that can be said for this theory is, that it cannot be demonstrated to be impossible. There is everything against it, and nothing for it. We have sundry records and traditions of civilisation introduced *from without*; of its originating *from within*, none whatever. But if the theory *be* true—and it is clearly impossible to prove a negative—there is a *revelation*, though men were inspired unconsciously; there is still a miracle, though not a perceptible one—a miracle in the sense of a departure from the ordinary and now established course of things; since nothing of the kind takes place now, nor ever did, as far as we can collect, since the earliest historical times.

Thus the attempt to get rid of miracles (which, however, was not ———'s design, though he was often a very hasty reasoner) by adopting a hypothesis resting only on unsupportable conjecture, does not after all more than very imperfectly effect the object.

These reasoners, I think, have weights in their minds, but no balance. Those who labour under this defect show it especially in not properly combining several distinct arguments all tending the same way. As Bacon observes, they judge (and sometimes judge

well) 'of particulars one by one,' but not *in conjunction*. Thus they are apt to fall into the *Fallacy of Composition*: 'This case, and that, and t'other (each taken *separate*) may be explained away: *All* the cases are this, and that, and t'other (taken together), therefore,' &c.

It is thus that Captain Bobadil, in the old comedy, purposes, with ten men, to demolish a hostile army: these ten, who are to be most accomplished swordsmen, are to challenge, and fight, and kill ten of the enemy, then ten more, and then ten more, and so on.

E. g. that the New Zealanders—a people of no bad conformation of head—should have remained unchanged for 627 years, from their first to their second discovery by Europeans, is *something* of an argument, though not much, against self-civilisation. But some peculiar circumstances may have checked them. Then the like is the case with the North American Indians, *and* the Fuegians, *and* the Andamaners, *and* the New Hollanders, *and* the Tasmanians, &c. Now all these are like so many distinct, independent witnesses, each not worthy of any great confidence, but all *agreeing* in the *same* story, against which, as the result of accident, the chances are enormous.

It is the like with the Christian miracles; and so also the *compound* improbability that *all* the apostles, and *all* the evangelists, and all their followers in the apostolic age, should have *happened* to abstain from

writing down any *catechism* or *liturgy*, such as must have been in common use among them.

But there are some who seem quite unfit to appreciate the *combined* force of several distinct probabilities or improbabilities. And when two persons, of opposite mental constitution in this respect, are discussing any question, it will be usually found that the reasons of each will make no impression at all on the other, and that the debate is all but lost labour. They will be like the stork and the wolf in *the* fable, one of whom could not dine from a plate of broth, nor the other from a bottle of mincemeat.

December 1860.

DURATION OF LIFE.

MANY attempts have been made—all of which appear to me total failures—to make out the ratio of man's whole life to the portion required for reaching *maturity*, to be the same as with other animals. As far as I can make out, the time for full growth in the other mammals is *one-seventh* of the natural term of existence, and in man ONE-FOURTH at the very utmost. To take eighty as about man's natural term (where acute diseases and accidents do not intervene) is rather the outside; and the full growth of the bones is seldom complete before *twenty*; often not till later.

A horse that has not been *worked* when young

(which nineteen out of twenty, or more, are) is not older at thirty-five than a man at eighty. A dog, which is complete at or before two years old, will live (if allowed) to thirteen or fourteen; and I believe the like ratio will hold good with most of the mammals when fairly used, viz. one-seventh of the life taken up in reaching maturity. Man therefore ought, by the same rule, to reach his regular term at a hundred and forty years: double of the Psalmist's allowance!

As for the physical causes of the long duration of life in the early ages of the world, I think the only plausible theory is that which attributes it to the use of the tree of life by our first parents before they were expelled from Paradise, which was likely to have imparted to the constitution of their descendants a strength which was slowly and gradually worn out in many generations.

With reference to the final cause—the purpose to be answered—great longevity was manifestly of great importance with a view to the invention of the arts of life before writing was in use, that each man might have the benefit of his own experience.

HYPOCRISY.

ROCHEFOUCAULT'S remark that 'Hypocrisy is the *homage* which vice pays to virtue,' has become almost proverbial, and is cited with full approbation by writers of repute. I long assented to it without much reflection, but it will not hold good in the ordinary and obvious sense of the words; i. e. if by 'homage' you understand a sincere acknowledgment that virtue is intrinsically superior to vice. There is only an acknowledgment that most men *like* it better and *trust* it more. Now a crafty knave will often feign not only *honesty*, but *ignorance* and *silliness*, in order to throw men off their guard. He does not like to be thought knowing and clever in most cases. And a skilful general will often disguise the *strength* of some post in order to tempt the enemy to attack it, and draw them into an ambush. You may call this, if you will, the *homage* which intelligence, and skill, and knowledge, and strength pay to ignorance and weakness.

The true homage paid by vice to virtue is the genuine disgust and abhorrence which a bad man expresses and feels for all people's faults except his own, and sometimes just such as he is himself guilty of. Selfish people, for instance, and sharp dealers in money matters, will often comment very freely and very justly and sincerely on those faults in their neighbours.

MEANING WELL.

THERE are some expressions which, according to etymology, convey no reproach, but which in common acceptation are the reverse of complimentary. Perhaps it ought to be actionable as a libel to call a man '*good-hearted*,' which generally implies that he is ill-*behaved*, or that he is a very 'good fellow *at the bottom*.' This last expression may remind one of the story of a gentleman who was riding in a remote Devonshire lane, and seeing a swampy-looking place before him, called out to a rustic who was near, 'I say, master, is there a good firm bottom here?' 'Oh! yeas, sir, that there be.' He rode on, and soon plunged up to the horse's girths. 'Hilloa, you rascal, didn't you tell me there was a good firm bottom?' 'Soa there be, sir, *when you comes to it*, but you bean't half-ways to the bottom yet.' One of these expressions is that of 'well-meaning.' Captain Basil Hall records the saying of an old naval officer, that the service would never prosper till all well-meaning men were shot; and certainly '*well-meaning*' is generally understood to imply '*ill-doing*,' and especially doing something which tends to defeat the very object proposed. Mrs. Meanwell is a conscientious and benevolent mischief-maker. With the kindest design, she goes separately to her two friends A and B, setting forth before each of them, very fully and very strongly, all the failings and infirmities—real or imaginary—of his friend; for whom she professes the

warmest regard, and perhaps something of over-partiality, not considering that hence all her censures would be taken at a *premium*, and all her praise at a *discount*. But she is anxious that a person for whom she has so high an esteem should be as perfect as possible, and she therefore exhorts his friends to be on the look out for faults, and to remonstrate strongly against them. The result generally is that she produces an alienation, and perhaps a downright rupture, between brothers, or friends, or husband and wife. If, again, there is some young man of her acquaintance afflicted with the common and distressing malady of bashfulness, she kindly endeavours to cure him by exhorting him not to be shy, assuring him that it gives him a very awkward appearance—that it prevents him from doing justice to himself, and exposes him to ridicule and censure. This is like trying to quench a fire by pouring oil upon it, for those thoughts—that sensitive consciousness, that morbid anxiety about what is thought of him, and about the appearance he makes—are the very cause of his bashfulness.

Then, again, she is very charitable, and anxious to relieve distress, and accordingly gives liberally to beggars, especially the most squalid and wretched-looking, thus tempting those who are idly-disposed to abandon honest industry, clothe themselves in filthy rags, and resort to beggary.

She is also very anxious that her children shall be religiously brought up, and accordingly takes them

to church, and obliges them to sit very quietly during the service, long before they are capable of at all understanding it; and by way of making them familiar with the Bible, she uses it for their spelling-lessons, and if they misbehave, she sets them as a punishment to learn by heart collects and hymns. Thus she exerts an early and strong association, in their minds, of religion with tediousness, irksome toil, and punishment.

The well-meaning advocates of 'peace at any price' take the most effectual means to bring about war, by persuading our ambitious neighbours that there is a numerous and strong party who will submit to anything rather than resist. They thus encourage such insolence and aggression as at length drives us into a war in self-defence. The deputation which waited on the Russian Czar, professing to be the representatives of a strong party in England, of boundless non-resistance, if they did not actually bring on the war, by encouraging him to persevering encroachments, at least did everything that could conduce to that result. And if anything could bring on a war between England and the United States of America, it would be the belief that the Americans might practise any amount of insolence and aggression with impunity. These well-meaning peace-makers, if they could persuade *all* states to abstain from aggressive war, might leave the question as to the right of *self-defence* as a merely speculative matter, not needful to be discussed for practice; since there

would be no outrages to resist. And if they could but induce any *one* state to refrain from *aggressive* war, this would be a benefit as far as it went. But if they could induce *some* states, but not *all*, to renounce the right of self-defence, these peaceful states might be subjected by some ambitious neighbour, and yet would not obtain peace after all. For it has always been the policy of a conqueror to make the subdued people instruments to still further conquests, by recruiting his armies from them.

And if all the *adults* steadily refused to serve as soldiers, and resolved rather to brave torture or death, he would take the most promising of their male *children* to be trained as his soldiers. The Turkish corps of Janissaries originally consisted of the children of Christian parents, taken from them and trained up as Mussulman soldiers. And the pacific people accordingly would have the mortification of seeing thousands of their finest children serving in the ranks of an ambitious conqueror. In this then, and in a multitude of other cases, the unwise well-meaners do everything to defeat the very object they are aiming at. The best course for these well-meaning advocates of peace would be to '*hold their peace.*'

Some well-meaners, again, being laudably anxious to promote brotherly love and harmony among men who differ in opinion, seek to make them unite and cooperate not only (as is very right) in matters where those differences do not interfere, but most particularly in such as will most prominently bring forth

those differences and make them a cause of dissension.

These differences may perhaps be such as neither party would consider to be of vital importance, nor likely to lead to any hostile opposition as long as each was left to pursue his own course.

But when men are brought into such close contact that one must give way to the other, vexatious disputes would be likely to arise. In like manner two men may be very friendly as neighbours, of whom one likes to dine at two o'clock and the other at six —one likes the windows shut and the other open: but if they are compelled to be members of the same family a contest must ensue.

January 10, 1862.

OF HOT WATER.

It has been said that 'an Englishman is never happy but when he is miserable, a Scotchman never at home but when he is abroad, and an Irishman never at peace but when he is fighting.' Certain it is that there are some persons (both Irish and others) who delight to *live in hot water*; who seem to enjoy themselves and thrive in the midst of perpetual contests. And if a man is always in hot water, there is some *presumption* that he is either one of these, or else so injudicious in his measures as to provoke hostility. But a presumption does not imply full proof, nor even a strong probability; it only

... the burden of proof into the opposite side. ... may be called upon to show how it can be that, ... without being of a pugnacious disposition, he may ... be often in hot water. And this I think *may* be ... shown.

1. A man in public life who belongs to no *party*, and openly avows his disapprobation of parties, will be likely to incur the inveterate hostility of all party-men, who are a large portion of mankind. It is remarked by Thucydides, in writing of the civil contests in Greece, that those who steered a middle course were destroyed by both parties, in resentment at their not joining them, or from grudging them an escape. This is one way in which a peaceably disposed man may incur hostility.

2. If he attempts to make peace between those who are contending, he is likely to verify the Scotch proverb that 'the redder gets aye the worst stroke in the fray.' If he decides completely in favour of one of the parties, he will, of course, have the other against him; and if he perceives that each party is somewhat to blame, though somewhat less so than their opponents represent, he will be likely to have both of them upon him. For those who are engaged in contest are apt to see no evil on their own side and no good on their opponents.

3. If he is an enemy to jobs and abuses of all kinds, he will incur the hostility of all those (and they are not a few) who from these derive some advantage. And he will probably be disliked, not only by those

whom he has immediately to deal with, but also by others who may suspect that their turn will come next: even as pickpockets, when not actually detected, hate the sight of a policeman, and rats have a universal antipathy to a ferret.

4. A large portion of mankind have something of sham about them: something of disguise or pretension, and profession of one motive while another, the real one, is suppressed. All such persons feel an instinctive aversion and dread towards anyone whom they believe to see through them. They remind one of a sort of fairies of Scandinavian mythology, who had the appearance of beautiful damsels and endeavoured to allure an incautious stranger, but in reality were hollow, like masks, and were therefore most cautious not to let anyone behind them, and thus detect their emptiness.

5. Anyone who is so far ahead of his age as to foresee future dangers and difficulties, and needs, that are overlooked by most of his neighbours, will be almost sure to be vehemently denounced by them as a dangerous innovator for proposing precautionary steps. And if anything does take place which he had predicted and forewarned them of, they will perhaps be even the more displeased with him on account of the superior foresight which he has displayed, which they feel as a kind of reproach to themselves.

From any of these causes, and much more from all of them combined, it may happen that a peaceable man will often be in hot water.

May 1862.

ANOMALIES IN LANGUAGE.

THERE are in our language sundry anomalies, some of them of recent introduction, and some of long-standing.

1. In colloquial language, it is common to hear persons say 'I won't do so and so more than I can help,' meaning 'more than I can *not* help.'

2. There is an impropriety which one may meet with not only in conversation, but even in books, of using 'don't' instead of 'doesn't.' 'I don't think so,' i. e. 'I do not think so,' is good English. But we should not say 'he don't think so,' but 'he doesn't think so,' i. e. 'he does not think so.'

3. *Mutual* is often used improperly instead of *common*. Two persons may afford mutual assistance, i. e. assistance to each other; but we ought not to speak of their having a mutual friend, i. e. a friend common to both of them.

4. *Own* is often improperly used in the sense of 'for one's self.' A person is often said to make his own clothes—to damage his own character, &c.; meaning, to do these things for himself. Properly, to make his own clothes is to distinguish it from his making another person's clothes—to damage his own character, from damaging another's, &c.

5. The American use of the word 'realise' is very much creeping in.

In proper English, to realise a large fortune, or a comfortable situation, means to acquire it. In the

Yankee, it signifies to think a great deal about it. In their country many a slave probably realises the happiness of freedom, i. e. forms for himself a vivid picture of it; but in the language of Old England, it would be confined to those who have obtained their freedom. This anomaly has been vindicated on the plea that we have no *one* word answering to the American sense of 'realise;' but circumlocution is better than ambiguity.

6. An anomaly of very ancient standing is the use of the word 'either' in the sense of 'each.' 'A man may carry a watch on either side' would properly denote that he may wear it on the right side, *or else* on the left; not that he may carry two watches, one on each side, i. e. one on the right *and* one on the left; yet this latter is the sense in which the word is used in our Bible version and elsewhere.

7. 'By no means' is continually used in the sense of 'not at all.' Thus, it is very proper to say, 'I can by no means effect this,' i. e. there are not any means by which I can effect it. But it is an anomaly to say that 'This article is by no means costly,' for you could not say that there are not any means by which it would be costly. 'The sermon was by no means a long one' should have been 'The sermon was far from being a long one.'

8. The use of 'as though' in the sense of 'as if' is an anomaly of very old standing. It is regular to say, 'I form my decision in this case as though I had consulted no one,' i. e. as I should have done even

though I had not consulted anyone. It is regular to say, 'You treat me as though you thought me culpable,' which would imply 'as you would do even though you thought me culpable.' It should be 'as if you thought me culpable,' i. e. as you would do if you thought me culpable.

9. Avocation means properly interruption, calling off from what we are about, but is often improperly used in the sense of occupation.

10. We often hear of such a one's two eldest children, instead of his eldest two; or, singing the four first verses of such or such a Psalm. I never could find but one first verse in a Psalm.

11. It is an anomaly to talk of 'ever so many,' 'ever so much,' instead of 'never so many;' this is a modern corruption which does not occur in our Bible version. In the account of Dinah, in the book of Genesis, the Prince says, 'Ask me never so much dowry in gift, and I will give it,' that is, ask me so much as there never was so much asked before; but 'ever so much' is quite an anomaly—if the word *be* used, the phrase should be 'ever *as* much,' not 'ever *so* much.'

12. We often hear the expression, 'Would to God so and so were the case.' In our Bible version we read, 'Would God my lord were with the Prophet that is in Samaria,' that is to say, 'Oh that God would grant.' The anomaly seems to have arisen from the French 'plut à Dieu,' i. e. may it be pleasing to God.

13. There is an anomalous use of the plural for the singular which is more common among women (even the best educated) than among men. 'If anyone thinks so and so, *they* are very much mistaken.' A man will generally say 'he is;' but women, it would seem, do not like to use the masculine pronoun, and therefore use the plural '*they*,' which is of the common gender. It is very common to hear people say, 'the least of two evils,' 'the best of the two horses,' &c., instead of 'the less,' 'the better,' &c.

14. Many people, instead of saying 'I have a headache,' 'a toothache,' &c., are accustomed to say 'I have *got* a headache,' &c., to which the proper answer would be, 'It is well if we can get anything in these hard times.'

15. There is a solecism not uncommon even among educated people. 'Is he taller than me?' 'You are as old as him.' 'Whom say ye that I am?' 'They like him better than me,' and 'they like him better than I,' are both good English, but have quite different significations.

March 1862.

THE CHURCH OF ROME A PARTY.

THE Church of Rome is of the character of a party, and ours is not; because that is *indefinite*, and ours is definite. Our Church lays down (whether rightly or wrongly) what its members are expected to assent to,

and binds them no further; but a member of the Church of Rome has, in fact, subscribed to an *et cetera.* He must comply with whatever the Church *may hereafter decree.* That Church accordingly laid down a new dogma a few years ago, and may another next year.

Now this indefiniteness is just the distinguishing mark of a party.

The Church of Rome (and it is the case with other *parties*) is of the character of an ordinary partnership, in which a man is fully answerable for *all* the acts, and all the debts, of the body.

Our Church, on the contrary, and all associations similarly constituted, is like those partnerships founded on the system of *limited liability*, in which no one is liable for more than what he stakes, and everyone knows beforehand what that is.

The 'Times,' and the vast mass which it represents, speaks of free judgment as the 'principle of our Church,' and thence they infer that a man may enjoy its revenues and freely oppose its doctrine. They might as well say that, because there are no *slaves* in our country, a hired servant may take his master's wages, and set his orders at nought.

But when men decide wrongly, it is generally from bringing before the mind what is not really the question at issue—as in the case of Cyrus and the two coats.

'But when,' say some, 'different parts of our for-

mularies are at variance with each other, we are free to choose *which* to adhere to.'

Now it is notorious that there are many passages of Scripture which may be *brought* to bear a sense that contradicts other parts.

And so it is also with the formularies of the Church, and with everything.

When a man joins, for instance, a political party, though we are bound in charity to suppose that he approves of their general principles, he cannot foresee what particular measures he may be called upon to support, or to oppose, on pain of being called a deserter. And so it is with all other *parties*, properly so called.

There is, however, an important distinction between the Church of Rome on the one hand, and most other religious parties on the other. *She* requires you to *profess* your membership, your complete surrender of your private judgment, and your implicit submission to her decrees, while most other religious parties will generally be found requiring the direct contrary; requiring you to disavow all *party*, and to *profess* an unbiassed exercise of your own judgment. This is, in fact, putting upon you *two* yokes instead of one. You are not only to think, and speak, and act as others dictate, but to declare—and, if you can, believe—that this is your own free and unbiassed decision. But very frequently a man succeeds in convincing himself that

he really *is* independent of party, and thus he submits the more patiently to this double yoke.

A rector once said to his curate (whom he rather suspected of a party bias) that he did not require him to agree with him on every point, but only to judge on each point as well as he could according to the merits of the case, and not to take any opinions *in the lump*, as parts of a human-party-system. He solemnly assured him that this precept was what he always adhered to. But a year after (when they had had many discussions together) he told him that he now felt convinced that he had been under the influence of a party, though quite unconsciously.

This disavowal of party, in those who are really partisans, renders the approaches of party spirit the more insidious. In conferring with one who teaches this disavowal, especially when it is done with perfect sincerity, there is greater danger of being yourself drawn in little by little, and, like a ship drawn in by a whirlpool at sea (as I have elsewhere observed), not to perceive your danger till escape is next to impossible. And if you feel fully confident that you are in no danger of party, this very confidence places you in the greatest danger.

One person to whom (among others) I had shown this article, replied to me by displaying, as a ground of safety, the very *self-confidence* for which I had been endeavouring to substitute *self-distrust*: setting forth with solemn earnestness the most vehement and uncalled-for protestations of sincere conviction and entire

independence of party: as if it had not been my very object to point out that this is one of the requisitions of party, that you are required to protest, and if possible to believe, that every opinion dictated to you is your own perfectly independent judgment! Of so little use it is to pour water over a thoroughly kindled mass! Some however declare, on the contrary, that everyone must be of *some* party, if he does not disagree in opinion with everybody in the world. But an agreement between two or more persons, in their unbiassed opinion, does not constitute them a *party*.

This also is to be observed, that in any conference between a partisan and an independent thinker, the former is the more likely to gain ground upon the other, when other things are equal. If he brings you over to his opinion upon any point, it is likely that he will have gained that point *permanently*; but if, on the other hand, you convince him on any point, you will find him next day just where he was before;—you will have been writing on the sea-sand what will be washed out by the next tide.

June 1860.

INFLUENCE OF NAMES.

Far from unreasonable was Pistol's objection to the odious word '*steal.*' '*Convey*, the wise it call.' Truly wonderful is the amount of influence that *names*

have. Our legislators would have shrunk from the *name* of *spoliation*, *robbery*, or *confiscation*; but they just *transferred* the burden of supporting the town-clergy from the houses that used to pay minister's money, to the Ecclesiastical Board, and *appropriated* part of its revenues (which were designed for other objects) to that purpose; just *robbing*, in fact, that fund of 1,300*l.* per annum!

1. The Romans, from the time they expelled their kings, could never endure the idea of being governed by a *king*. But they submitted to the most abject slavery under an *emperor*. And Oliver Cromwell did not venture to risk disgusting the republicans by calling himself king, though under the title of Protector he exercised regal functions.

2. The American colonies submitted to have their commerce and their manufactures crippled by restrictions avowedly for the benefit of the mother country, and were thus virtually *taxed* to the amount of all they in any instance lost by paying more for some article than it would cost to make it themselves, or to buy it of foreigners. But as soon as *a tax* was imposed *under that name*, they broke out into rebellion.

3. It is a marvel to many, and seems to them nearly incredible, that the Israelites should have gone after other gods, and yet the vulgar in most parts of Christendom are actually serving the gods of their heathen ancestors. But then they do not *call* them *gods*, but fairies or bogles, &c.; and they do not apply

worship to their veneration of them, nor *sacrifice* to their offerings. And this slight change of name keeps most people in ignorance of a fact that is before their eyes.

4. Others, professed Christians, are believed, both by others and by themselves, to be worshippers of the true God, though they invest Him with the *attributes* of one of the evil demons worshipped by the heathen. There is hardly any professed Christian who would not be shocked at the application of the word *caprice* to the acts of the Most High. And yet His choosing to inflict suffering on His creatures '*for no cause*' (as some theologians maintain) 'except that *such is His will*,' is the very definition of caprice.

But when Lord Byron published his poem of 'Cain,' which contains substantially the *very same* doctrine, there was a great outcry among pious people, including, no doubt, many who were of the theological school which teaches the same, under other *names*.

Why and how any evil comes to exist in the universe, reason cannot explain, and revelation does not tell us. But it does show us what is *not* the cause. That it cannot be from *ill-will* or *indifference*, is proved by the sufferings undergone by the *beloved* Son.

5. Many probably would have hesitated if it had been proposed to them to join a new *Church* under that *name*, who yet eagerly enrolled themselves in

the Evangelical *Alliance*; which is in fact a church; with meetings for worship, and *sermons* under the *name* of *speeches*, and a *creed* consisting of sundry *Articles of Faith* to be subscribed; only not called by those *names*.

6. Mrs. B. expressed to me her great dread of such a medicine as tartar-emetic. She always, she said, gave her children *antimonial* wine. I explained to her that this is tartar-emetic dissolved in wine, but she remained unchanged.

7. Mrs. H. did not like that her daughters should be novel-readers; and *all novels* in *prose* were indiscriminately prohibited; but *any* thing in *verse* was as indiscriminately allowed.

Probably a Quaker would be startled at any one's using the very *words* of the prophets, 'Thus saith the Lord;' yet he says the same things in the words, 'The Spirit moveth me to say so and so.' And some again who would be shocked at *this*, speak of a person—adult or *child*—who addresses a congregation in extempore prayers and discourses, as being under the *influence of the Holy Spirit*; though in neither case is there any miraculous *proof* given. And they abhor a claim to *infallibility*; only they are *quite certain* of being under the guidance of the Spirit in whatever they say or do.

Quakers, again, and some other dissenters, object to a *hired* ministry (in reality, an *un*hired); but their preachers are to be *supplied* with all they need; like the father of Molière's Bourgeois, who was no *shop-*

keeper, but kindly chose *goods* for his friends, which he let them have for money.

THE TURKEY TRAP.

THE turkey (an *American*, not a *Turkish*, fowl, named from its call of turk ! turk !) is a silly bird; and the French call a person *Dindon* whom we, with less propriety, call a *goose*; that being very far from a silly bird. In America, they are said to entrap the wild turkeys through their silliness. On a slight slope, just at the edge, a kind of pen is made of sticks, and covered over. At the lowest part an opening is left, sufficient to admit a turkey; and corn is strewn within and without the pen to entice them in. When they have entered, they might escape by simply descending to the entrance, and walking out the way they walked in. But, instead of this, they vainly beat against the sides of the pen, till the trapper comes and despatches them.

Many featherless bipeds are like these turkeys. When it is plainly proved that you have formed a rash judgment, or taken an unwise step, the right course manifestly is to confess this, and retract, and retrace your steps. But most men are too much of turkeys to do this. Usually, when a man finds himself *in a pen*, and that there is *no thoroughfare*, rather than *descend* so far as to own a mistake, and *walk*

out of the error the same way he had walked into it, he will resort to every kind of shuffle. He will insist on it that he was quite right all along, but that there has been a change in some of the people, or in the circumstances. Or perhaps he will flatly deny that he ever said so and so; or maintain that he was misunderstood. Anything rather than retract and acknowledge an error.

And yet a man who does this frankly, will usually obtain great applause for his candour and good sense; even more perhaps than he would have had if he had avoided the error from the first. Yet even this will not tempt most men to take this ingenuous and wise course. They are too much of turkeys.

NON CAUSA.

In former times, the plant called borage, which is still sometimes used to flavour 'cool-tankard,' was in high repute as a *cordial*. In the *Salernian Rhymes* we have 'Ego borago guadia semper ago,' which Master Gerrard (says old Parkinson) 'hath not illy translated "I Borage always give courage."' Our simple forefathers prescribed that it should be infused *in wine*, and the infusion would greatly cheer the spirits! If the wine employed was *hock*, the exhilaration was 'propter hock.'

The fallacy which logicians call 'Non causa pro

causa,' or 'Post hoc, ergo propter hoc,' is one peculiarly apt to mislead men in their conduct.

Sometimes an effect is attributed to what has no more efficacy, either way, than the borage probably had; and sometimes to what is a *hindrance*. Of this latter kind are almost all the cases of legislative interference with manufactures and commerce. Well-meaning, but unwise, legislators, in various countries, attributed, for ages, all the prosperity (often rapidly increasing) of their people, to laws which had no effect but to *retard* the advance of prosperity. To the *inert* class belong most superstitious observances; *inert*, I mean, not that superstition is without *any* effect (far otherwise): but without any effect as to the *immediate object* aimed at; as, e. g. the sacrifices offered up to the north wind by Xenophon's '*ten thousand.*' The wind, he says, which had distressed them, sensibly abated *after* the sacrifice. In one of Marmontel's tales, a Brahmin (very naturally) expresses his wonder that the English stranger who had afforded him the most generous protection, should never have heard of Vishnu and his nine metamorphoses.

Many things, however (it should be observed, by the way), are usually called *superstitions*, which are not such in the strictest sense, being unconnected with any *religious* belief, as, e. g. the notion about the borage; the carrying about with you what is called the *cramp-bone* of a leg of mutton (the *patella*) as a preventative for cramp; making nine bows to a magpie to avoid ill-luck; *telling the bees* of every

event that occurs; the ill-luck of transplanting *parsley*, and of *spilling salt*, &c.*

In a majority of cases you could give a person *no decisive proof* that the effect which takes places is *not* caused or foreshown by that which he considers as a cause, or as a sign, except by an *induction*, and a considerably large one. It will not be enough to defy him to *explain how* this can be; since there are many things which we are forced to believe, though quite unable to give the *how*. A very eminent clock-maker was labouring hard at a time-piece, which he was anxious to make as perfect as possible. He sat before it and watched it for hours, and found that it was *unlucky* to wear his wig. When he sat before it in his night-cap, all went well; but when he had his wig on, there was always some irregularity. He ascertained the fact long before he could account for it. And if he had never found the solution at all, he would not have been justified in thereupon disbelieving a well-established fact. But, at last, he discovered that the steel spring which fastened on his wig had, by some chance, been *magnetised*, and exercised its attraction on the works. But if you can show a very great number of cases in which the effect *has not* taken place, and where the like event has taken place in *the absence* of the supposed cause, this will convince—not indeed the vulgar-minded—but those open to reason.

In my garden at Halesworth, there were several

* See page 349, *et seq.*

trees whose trunks had evidently been split when young, in order to pass a child through the opening, as a cure for rupture. The tree is then to be closed and carefully bound up; and if the cleft heals, as it usually will,* the child will recover, as infants oftener do than not. But in some of my trees the wound had *not* closed. I pointed out one of them to an old man who was working in the garden, and he told me that that very tree he had himself split, and passed a child through, and the child, he told me, got well, which it ought *not* to have done.

It is not safe to run counter, without necessity, to popular superstitions. If you transplant a bed of parsley, in a country where this is fully believed to be unlucky, your cattle and fences and fields will be neglected by your labourers through despair; and when any disaster arises through their negligence, they will attribute this to the parsley.

There are *two* baronets—Sir *Robert* Wilmots—in Derbyshire; and of course much inconvenience results. But the belief is, that the title can in each case be transmitted only through a *Robert*. And it is said that, whenever the eldest son has any other name, he dies in infancy.

In some cases, however, you can prove (to any one who is not *proof-proof*) that what he attributes to the belief in a certain tenet, *must* be the effect of some other cause. For instance, the *consolation* which a *fatalist* of any kind attributes to his conviction,

* See White's *Natural History of Selbourne.*

that a certain future event is *fixed, one way or the other*, may be proved (as I have shown in the Appendix to Archbishop King's 'Discourse') to be the result of his conviction, that it is fixed *in the way* that is the *favourable* one to *himself*. The knowledge that an important law-suit, involving wealth or ruin to you, is *decided*, one way *or* the other, is no satisfaction, except you are confident that it is decided in *your favour*.

MISERS.

A MISER is a character very generally and not undeservedly regarded as odious and contemptible. Yet in the present state of society, a miser occasions no loss to the community, but rather a benefit. For it is but seldom that he buries his money in the ground, and thus withdraws it from use, as was the practice in earlier ages. He generally puts it out at interest, and thus lends it directly or indirectly to those who employ it in trade, agriculture, or manufactures; so that nothing is lost in his lifetime, and at his death his accumulations go to some one who may make a good use of them; so that he half starves one worthless individual for the public good.

On the other hand, one who lives in what is called a liberal style, spending his money on sumptuous entertainments, costly buildings, and race-horses, is often accounted a public benefactor, because he furnishes employment to a great number of persons.

But, though the labourers he employs in building him a fine mansion, in grooming his horses, and in cultivating his flower garden, cannot be called unproductive labourers, since their labours earn their own subsistence, yet their labour is unproductively *consumed*, not adding anything to the wealth of the community, as it would, if they had been employed in agriculture, or in manufactures; in which case the money expended on them would have come back to their employer, who might employ it again and again with the like result. The supposed liberal spender, therefore, though he wrongs no one, cannot be considered a public benefactor, since his unproductive expenditure diminishes so far the public wealth.

But of all modes of expenditure the one most admired is *benevolent* liberality. And if this is directed by discreet judgment, it is as useful as it is amiable. To relieve the blind, the sick, and the helpless diminishes the amount of human suffering, and hurts no one; and to help the struggling and industrious in their well-directed efforts to help themselves, is not only a benefit to them, but is an encouragement to honest industry in others. But, on the other hand, to relieve the idle, the worthless, and the improvident, tends to demoralise others, by the encouragement it holds out to idleness and carelessness, and is one of the most mischievous of all possible modes of expenditure.

It has been found that in those parishes in which there are the largest bequests for the relief of the

poor, there the poor-rates are always the highest. The town of Bedford is almost ruined by the vast amount of such bequests, being crowded with people who, instead of exerting themselves for their own maintenance, seek to eat the bread of idleness by obtaining a share of these bequests.

Guy, the well-known founder of the hospital which bears his name (who by the bye is said to have been very penurious), accumulated a very large fortune; and having no near relatives, left it to trustees for the endowment of an hospital; leaving them at the same time a discretionary power to apply any surplus which might exist, beyond the demands of the hospital, to the relief of any relatives of his who might from time to time be in distressed circumstances. They soon had applications for such relief; the next year they had more; and every succeeding year the number of applications increased. They endeavoured to meet these even by stinting the hospital; but they were so far from affording effectual relief, that so long as this system continued *no Guy was ever known to prosper*. Those who engaged in any kind of business were sure to fail; doubtless from being encouraged in carelessness and profusion by having such a resource in view. At length the trustees, finding that their donations did more harm than good, discontinued them altogether, and devoted to the hospital the whole of the revenue. Thenceforward the Guys were left to their own exertions, and probably fared neither better nor worse than their neighbours.

The monomania of avarice (for it sometimes seems to amount to a kind of insanity) sometimes assumes very strange forms, but in all it is so much at variance with happiness as to justify the application, in the etymological sense, of the word *miser*. Indeed, in Norfolk and Suffolk, among the common people, the word *miserable* is the only one in use to signify what we call penurious. Stingy with them has a different meaning (doubtless the original one, as it is apparently derived from *sting*), signifying peevish and cross.

Dr. Johnson is represented in Boswell's Life as controverting, very justly, the paradox some one had put forth, that a complete miser is a happy man, as he is constantly occupied, though in an ignoble pursuit, and enjoying his success in it. But though the miser has pleasures of his own, he has pains of his own, which more than counterbalance them; for he is grieved at every penny he is forced to expend; and *something* he must spend, in order to subsist, however hardly. And it would be a mistake to suppose that he does not feel the pains and privations he endures; he probably suffers as much from cold and hunger as other people, only that he would suffer much *more* from a greater expenditure on food and clothing.

A remarkable instance of this was afforded by an extraordinary miser, who had a small curacy in the county of Berks. He had a salary of fifty pounds a year and the glebe-house, the rector being non-resident. And it is said by one of his parishioners, who

well knew him personally, that for a great number of years he never expended one farthing of his salary, but subsisted entirely on the surplice fees, which averaged half-a-crown a week. His salary and about thirty pounds a year, the produce of a small patrimony, he regularly invested from time to time in the funds. For the first year after his entering on the curacy, he boarded at the house of one of the farmers, where he partook freely of their homely fare; and at this time he was rather inclined to corpulency; but when he took to keeping house for himself, he soon became excessively lean. One quartern loaf was his allowance for a week, and this with a thin slice of bacon was the whole of his food. Besides this, he had the luxury of tea, of which a small spoonful discoloured a large quantity of water. His firing (such as it was) was supplied by dry sticks and dead weeds casually picked up; but he used frequently to call on some of his parishioners for the sake of getting a good warming at their fires. As for clothing he had a tolerably decent coat for Sundays, but for week-days' use, he is said to have worn for thirty years the same coat with which he came to the parish. Of course it often needed patches, which he supplied by cutting off pieces from the skirts; so that the coat gradually degenerated into a jacket. On one occasion, as the narrator confidently asserts, he observed a scarecrow which had a hat better than his own, and therefore took the liberty of making an exchange. As for his habitation, the rector would not keep the

glebe-house in repair; so that the rain came in, and drove the curate successively from room to room, till at length he was confined to the kitchen, which for many years was his sole habitation.

The man who was thus accumulating wealth of which he made no use, was so far from enjoying unalloyed happiness in so doing, that he was thrown into the deepest distress by the reduction of interest on a portion of the government stock belonging to him; and fretted excessively at having on one occasion to pay the postage of a letter.

When after many years he was dismissed from the curacy, he resolved to visit his own country, Wales, and see what relatives he had surviving. As soon as this became known, it was surprising what a number of cousins made their appearance, all vying with each other in their hospitable attention to the old man. He was overwhelmed with invitations to their houses and tables. But the sudden change of diet proved fatal to him. Ample and substantial meals after such long abstinence, in which the digestive organs had had so little to do, brought his life to an end within the year.

Another and a very curious instance of a miser's life is the following:—A man who was well known to several persons now living, began life with a handsome fortune; he lived a life of extreme penury, denying himself everything beyond the barest necessaries; he lived to a great age without having suffered any losses, or having ever given away anything;

and at his death he did not leave enough to pay for his funeral, but was actually buried at the parish cost.

It may amuse the reader to exercise his ingenuity in guessing how this was brought about.

It was remarked, near the beginning of this article, that in the present state of society, a miser seldom withdraws anything from use, since he does not usually bury his money, as was done in former times, but puts it out to interest. Sometimes, however, exceptions to this rule occur. One remarkable instance came under the knowledge of the writer of this article. An old woman, who had accumulated a handsome fortune in the pawnbroking business, on retiring lived with her son, a clergyman, in a frugal style. But she had a perfect passion for buying bargains. Anything that was to be sold cheap, however useless to her, had an irresistible attraction. At any sale of a bankrupt stock, or smuggled goods seized by the revenue officers, she was sure to be found; and the articles which she bought cheap became ultimately very dear purchases, taking into calculation the loss for many years of the interest of purchase money; for she neither sold them nor used them, but simply hoarded them up in concealment. At her death her magpie-hoards were brought to light, and publicly sold. And it was a strangely miscellaneous collection. There was a store of mops and brooms, and pots of blacking, sufficient to supply for many years the town she lived in; there were casks of spirits

bought at the sales of smuggled goods that had been seized, in one of which was found, in a state of high preservation, a rat which had been drowned in it several years before. There were enormous piles of blankets; and concealed in the folds of them numerous articles of plate, silver tea-pots, coffee-pots, trays, and spoons. She had never used any of them, and it was with difficulty her son prevailed on her to allow him the use of a solitary tea-spoon. Then again, though she herself ordinarily dressed like a scullion, there were found a great quantity of silk gowns, lace veils, and other articles of costly finery.

Such was the curious form which the love of hoarding in this instance assumed.

*A LOST LEAF OF GULLIVER'S TRAVELS.**

SHORTLY after the visit to the Academy of Projectors, in the University of Laputa, which has been above described, I was invited to repeat the visit, being assured that several new projectors had appeared, whose schemes far surpassed those of the

* A manuscript has recently been discovered of *Gulliver's Travels*, containing a passage which was not before published, and which appears to have been lost, through the carelessness of printers, out of the copy sent to the press. Its publication will doubtless prove very acceptable to all who are acquainted (and who is not?) with that celebrated work.

former ones. I went accordingly, and first paid my respects, as bound in courtesy, to the projectors I had formerly seen. I found the one who was engaged in petrifying the hoofs of a living horse, the one who was extracting sunbeams from cucumbers, the agriculturist who was employing swine as ploughmen, and the breeder of naked sheep, all very much as I had left them. The trainer of spiders, however, showed me a pair of silk stockings made from their webs, which, he assured me, were as strong as those of ordinary silk, though very much lighter. His chief difficulty, he told me, was the pugnacious and cannibal-like disposition of his spiders, which were apt to kill and devour one another. He hoped, however, in time, to teach them gentler manners, and to induce them to be content with their proper diet of flies.

On visiting the professor, who had devised a machine for composing books, I found him intent on a scheme which he considered as of far greater importance, the constructing of a machine for performing the most abstruse calculations as accurately as the most expert arithmetician, and far more expeditiously. Good breeding would not allow me to express any incredulity, so I heartily wished success to his invention.

The next projector whom I visited had a scheme for supplying the deficiency of navigable rivers, by canals which were to be carried by aqueducts over rivers and valleys, and through the centre of hills,

which were to be bored for that purpose, to the great advantage of internal commerce. I told him that, in my country, we were accustomed to talk in derision of castles in the air, but that the idea of canals in the air had never occurred to us.

The projector whom I next visited, spoke with scorn of canals, and proposed the contrivance of a huge kettle, the vapour from which was to set in motion a gigantic pair of oars, and thus impel a ship rapidly against wind and tide. He expected also by means of such a kettle, to set in motion the wheels of a carriage, and drive it forward at a rate exceeding the speed of a horse in full gallop.

Another projector announced that he had discovered a new kind of air, much lighter and more buoyant than common air, and this he proposed to enclose in a bag having a kind of basket attached to it, in which a man might seat himself, and thus be borne aloft and sail through the air. When disposed to descend, he might let out some of the light air, and thus come down gently. I asked him whether he had made any provision for his safety in the event of any accident happening to his apparatus, which might cause a fatal fall. He assured me that this point also had not escaped his attention; and he showed me a machine like a large umbrella, to which a man might attach himself and thus descend from the greatest heights, and alight on the ground as softly as a feather.

The next projector I visited was constructing a

huge chest to be filled with air, and let down to the bottom of the sea, with men inside of it, who would be supplied with fresh air by means of barrels-full sent down to them from time to time. They would thus be enabled, he said, to fish up goods from a wreck, or to lay the foundation under water of piers that were to be built.

Another projector informed me that he expected to convert *clay* into a metal as bright and as hard as silver, but considerably lighter, and therefore for some purposes more convenient. I told him that in our country there had been for ages many projectors, who had set themselves to convert lead into silver or gold; but that to convert clay into silver, or into anything at all like it, was a scheme which had never entered their heads. I took my leave of him with hearty wishes for his success.

The next projector that I visited was devising a mode of preparing, by some chemical compounds, plates of metal and sheets of paper, to receive and retain images of buildings or other objects on which the sun was shining, so that one might take a correct portrait of anyone in a few seconds. I could not understand much about his chemical preparations, but took care to express no doubt of the successful result.

I next visited a projector who assured me that he had acquired the art of drawing down lightning from the clouds; and, moreover, of producing a kind of artificial lightning, of which he expected to make

such an application as to be able to convey through the air, or under the sea, messages with lightning speed between the most distant places, so that we should be able hereafter to hold rapid communication with our friends in the antipodes. I told him that, in that case, he would come up to the boast of Puck in 'Midsummer Night's Dream,' who could 'put a girdle round the earth in forty minutes.' He assured me that Puck was but a snail in comparison with his proposed lightning messages, which would accomplish the feat in less than a fifth of the time.

This scheme appeared to be the wildest of all that I had heard of; but I took care not to express any incredulity.

The next projector that I visited (whose name, I recollect, was Dro Nodle) bewailed our having been so long content to light our streets with a feeble glimmer of oil-lamps. He had discovered, he said, a mode of extracting a vapour from coal or wood, which might be collected in a large chamber, and thence distributed through tubes to distant places, and then lighted at the ends of the tubes, when it would produce a brilliant illumination. He had also discovered, he said, a mode of preparing a substance from water which would burn with the most intense heat; and a lump of common lime heated by this would become so brilliantly luminous that it might be advantageously employed in the light-houses constructed for the benefit of mariners.

I assured him that I had no doubt that all these

things, when accomplished, would prove highly serviceable to mankind.

Another projector lamented the waste of time and labour expended on ordinary spinning wheels and looms. He was devising a machine that would spin, with perfect accuracy, a great number of threads at once, and another which would weave them into cloth, so that one man would be able to do the work of more than twenty.

I next visited one of the chemical projectors, who was contriving a composition which would have the effect of rendering the human body insensible to pain, so that a man might undergo the amputation of a limb or any other such operation, without feeling the slightest uneasiness. Most welcome, I assured him, would such a medicament be to all humane persons.

Still more beneficial to mankind was the scheme, if it could but succeed, of a projector who proposed to stop the ravages of one of the most dreadful kinds of pestilence that ever afflicted the human race, a painful, loathsome, and most dangerous disease, spreading by infection from one to another, raging like a fierce conflagration, and threatening to depopulate whole regions. His plan was to infect his patients, while yet in sound health, with a kind of venom obtained from the body of a cow. This would produce, he said, a very slight and mild kind of disease, which would have the effect of fortifying the constitution against that other most dangerous

malady. It seemed to me a very strange notion thus to encounter a disease with a disease; but the projector appeared to have no doubt of its success.

I then proceeded to examine the newly invented telescopes, which greatly exceeded in size those I had before seen in the flying island, and which I have above described; one of them was so large that I was able to walk into it without stooping. The astronomer who had contrived these telescopes, assured me that by the aid of them he had discovered several new planets, two of them very large, and more distant than any heretofore observed, and a great number of very small ones, much nearer to the earth; and he expected hereafter to be able to add to the number of these. He assured me, also, that he could distinguish any object on the moon as large as a good-sized gentleman's house.

Lastly, I paid a visit to the political projectors; among whom was a new one, who greatly interested me by his description of a scheme for the humane and effectual reformation of criminals. He proposed that any one convicted of an assault and robbery, should receive the sentence of a *long term* of imprisonment and *hard* labour, but should be well fed and lodged, should do only a moderate amount of work, and should be released long before the end of the term, and left at liberty, with money in his pocket.

It was expected that the *severe wording* of the sentence would impress his mind with a due sense of

the heinousness of his crime, while the leniency *actually* shown him would call forth his gratitude, and awaken all the good feelings which had been latent in his breast, and thus produce a reformed character.

When I asked the projector, what had been the result of the experiment tried, he was forced to admit that, in most instances, the first use that the released criminal made of his liberty was to commit some fresh outrage. He hoped, however, that in time this humane and generous proceeding would bring criminals to a better mind.

Thus I took my leave a second time of the College of Projectors.

THE BLUNDERS OF THE WISE.

THE maxim of mechanics, that nothing is stronger than its weakest part, fortunately for us, does not apply to the human mind. For so gross are the absurdities into which some have fallen, who were far from being deficient in understanding, generally, that if the whole of their conduct and judgment had been of a piece with these, they would have been reckoned downright idiots.

The instances that might be adduced are innumerable; but a few of the most curious it will be worth while to record.

The well-known historian, Herodotus, states as a piece of natural history, that the lioness produces only one young one in the whole course of her life. An Oxford tutor, who was reading this author with his class, when he came to this passage, began to laugh, at which the pupils appeared surprised. On enquiring of them he found that none of them had perceived any absurdity in it. They appear to have been, like the historian himself, blind to the circumstance, that if each *pair* of lions produced but a single offspring, the whole race would be *halved* in each generation, and consequently would most likely have become extinct long before the days of Herodotus.

An author who was at one time in some repute—Lord Kaimes—in his zeal to disparage Scripture history, maintains that mankind cannot be of one species; and adduces as a proof, a supposed tribe of men in Africa, who, he says, must be of a different species from the rest of mankind, because they are totally void of what is found in all other men, parental affection; they destroy, according to him, all their infants as soon as born, and keep up their numbers by kidnapping boys and girls from the neighbouring tribes. It did not occur to him that, by his own showing, they must have been themselves descended from those tribes, from which they had been stolen in childhood. A rich specimen of the easy faith of infidelity!

A divine of some eminence gives, in a theological

work, a derivation of the word 'incest,' from the negative 'in' and 'cestus,' a girdle; the loosing of a girdle being part of the marriage ceremony amongst the Romans. Most school-boys could readily have told him that it is manifestly compounded of 'in,' not, and 'castus,' chaste.

Another theologian derives the word 'pancake,' the well-known dish of Shrove Tuesday, from 'pan kakon,' all evil; because men, says he, were accustomed, at the opening of Lent, to confess all their sins to the priest. His cook could have told him that it is a cake fried in a pan.

The learned and ingenious Bishop Warburton lays down the doctrine in one of his works, that though all religions ought to be tolerated, and the professors of them not excluded from civil rights, atheists ought to be so excluded, on the ground that an atheist can give no security for his good conduct, and for abstaining from any crime to which he might be tempted. It did not occur to the good bishop that the persons, and the *sole* persons, who would be affected by his exclusion, are precisely the very persons to whom his description does *not* apply; namely, those atheists, if there be any such, who are not destitute of moral principle; since it is evident that those who are thus destitute, would not scruple to make, insincerely, any profession that might be required of them. So that his proposed enactment would fail precisely in every case where the reason given for it holds good.

The most remarkable instance, perhaps, of a widespread blunder, common to the wise and to the unwise, is the belief entertained for many ages, and which is still held by barbarian nations, that the earth is flat like a platter. I have spoken of it not merely as a *mistake*, but as a '*blunder*,' properly so called, because it is contrary to the evidence of our senses, when we see the masts of a ship at a distance before we can see the hull, and the tops of mountains farther off than we can see their base. This is an evidence afforded by our eye-sight, that the earth's surface must be a curve, since this could not be the case if it were flat.

Now, anyone whose judgment generally was of a piece with such blunders as the above, would not be deemed a rational being.

NOTICE OF THE PRETENDED PRINCESS CARABOO.

SEVERAL persons now living can remember the appearance, about forty-five years ago, of a very wonderful impostor who went by the name of Caraboo.

On a high road in the neighbourhood of Bristol, a young woman was found, decently dressed, but in a seemingly foreign garb, speaking a language which no one understood, and making signs of being in distress. She was taken to the house of a Mr. W— in the neighbourhood, who kindly gave her shelter and

provided her with necessaries. Many persons called to see this mysterious stranger. They could not understand her language, either spoken or written; but she contrived by means of signs, and a few words of English which she appeared to have picked up, to convey the idea that she was Princess of some Eastern country, who had been kidnapped and carried away from her native home, and turned adrift, destitute, on the English shores. The visitors conversed freely about her in her presence, taking for granted that she did not understand them; and she availed herself of the hints thus supplied. For instance, they said: 'If she comes from Siam, or from any neighbouring country, she will recognise the picture of an elephant;' they showed her the picture, and she gave them to understand that she knew the animal well. And the like happened in other similar instances.

She certainly exhibited some very curious accomplishments. She bathed in a piece of water that was in the garden, and proved an excellent swimmer. She also shot admirably with a bow and arrow.

A friend of mine in that neighbourhood, at Mr. W.'s request, sent to me, at Oxford, a specimen of her writing. On inspecting it, I observed among many pot-hooks and unmeaning scrawls, several words and some half sentences in *Portuguese*. I had lately been in Portugal and had learnt something of the language. I immediately wrote word to my friend, that he had sent me a specimen of the Hum-

bug-language. I afterwards showed the writing to my friend Hawkins (now Provost of Oriel College), to Dr. Coplestone, who was then Provost, and to Dr. MacBride, the Principal of Magdalen Hall; all of whom concurred in my judgment.

After this, one of the persons who had been prominent in calling public attention to this stranger, had the effrontery to send an article to 'The Times' newspaper, stating, amongst other particulars, that a specimen of her writing had been sent to the University of Oxford, which had pronounced it to be the writing of no known language! The fact is that it was never sent to the University of Oxford at all, but only to a single individual; which individual had at once pronounced it to be the Humbug-language.

Sundry notices of her, however, appeared from time to time in the newspapers, and also a pamphlet with a portrait of her as a frontispiece.

Not many days after my detection of her, a young woman came into Mr. W.'s kitchen, where Caraboo happened to be, and immediately exclaimed, 'Ah, Mary Baker, how come you here?' She declared that she had long known this so-called Caraboo; who thereupon began to speak good English, and acknowledged her fraud.

On being reproached by Mrs. W. she replied, 'It was very kind of you, ma'am, to give me so many things, but if you recollect I never *asked* you for anything;' which was true.

What was her real history, and how she came to

learn swimming and shooting, remains a mystery to this day. She herself, indeed, gave a long history of her own adventures; part of which was related to me by a friend of mine, who appeared to give implicit credit to it. 'But what reason is there,' said I, 'for believing that there is any truth in all this?' 'Oh! she has confessed her falsehoods, and is telling the truth *now*.' 'Is she?' said I. 'I can't give full credit to one who is a confessed and notorious liar.' But some persons appear to consider mendacity as a disease analogous to the measles, from which a person, who has once *had* it, is thenceforward secure.

Some account of Caraboo appeared not long ago in a periodical; to which I thereupon sent a statement of further particulars as given above. This the editor informed me he had put into the hands of the very author of the former article. Of course, I readily anticipated the result; which was that my communication was suppressed, and nothing more appeared on the subject.

ROBINSON CRUSOE.

It is remarkable that two of the most interesting tales that ever were written,—'Robinson Crusoe' and 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,'—are without that which forms the chief source of interest in most other tales—a story.

'Robinson Crusoe,' and 'Gulliver,' are two works which probably will remain as long as the English language. One of them has even introduced a new word into our language; for '*lilliputian*' is often used to denote something excessively minute. And it is remarkable that the authors of these works, Defoe and Dean Swift, who have never been surpassed—perhaps never equalled—in any age or country in their own peculiar art of giving to fiction the air of reality, were contemporaries, and held each other in the greatest contempt and abhorrence.

Their designs were different. 'Gulliver' was of course not expected to be believed, but affords part of its amusement from the striking contrast between the sober, matter-of-fact *style* of the narrative, and the monstrous extravagance of the matter; as where mention is made in his quiet way of the house in Redriff, which brought in a rent of 30*l.* a year; and of the little daughter Betsy, who was sewing her sampler, and who afterwards married and had children.

'Robinson Crusoe,' on the contrary, was originally put forth as a true history (Defoe not being very scrupulous on that point)—and long after, and probably even down to the present time, was by many considered as substantially true, and as being merely the history of Alexander Selkirk on the island of Juan Fernandez; only a little dressed up, and with a change of names. It is possible that Defoe may have heard that history, and that it may have suggested

to him the idea of his tale; but if this be so, it is the very utmost that could be said; for the two histories are totally unlike, except that in each there is an island in the South Sea, with goats upon it. Alexander Selkirk had no tools, or stores, or arms, saved from a wreck; he had no implements except a pocket-knife; and used to capture the goats, on whose flesh he fed, by running them down. He never met with any savages, nor had he any friendly intercourse with any Spaniards; and there were only two remarkable incidents that occurred during his sojourn on the island, neither of which is found in the history of Robinson Crusoe. One was, his being pursued by a party of Spaniards who had landed on the island, and from whom he fled for his life; well knowing that their design was to murder him, as was the practice of the Spaniards with all strangers found in those seas. He escaped by climbing into a tree with thick foliage, where he lay hidden like King Charles in the oak.

His other adventure was catching hold of a goat, just at the brink of a precipice, when they both fell over—the goat (fortunately for Selkirk) being undermost. He was greatly stunned by the fall; and when he recovered consciousness, he found the goat lying dead under him. It seemed to him, from the position of the sun, that it was *earlier in the day* than when he fell over, and that consequently he must have lain there stunned the whole of the day of his fall and the ensuing night. And this was confirmed

afterwards, by his subsequently finding that he had lost a day's reckoning.

Now both these remarkable incidents being wanting in 'Robinson Crusoe,' it is plain that the notion above alluded to, of the one history being taken from the other, is altogether groundless.

One part of the art by which Defoe gives his tale the air of reality, consists in his frequently recording minute particulars and trifling occurrences which lead to no result, aud therefore are just such as you would be likely to find in a real diary, and which most writers of fiction would omit, because there seems no reason at all for mentioning them, except that they really took place.

Another apparent indication of reality is that such improbabilities as there are lie precisely in the opposite quarter from that in which we should expect to find them. A writer of fiction would have been likely (as we may see, for instance, in some of the imitations of 'Robinson Crusoe') to attribute to the hero *more* ingenuity and *greater* success, than is accordant with the rules of probability. With Robinson Crusoe it is just the reverse. His blunders and his failures are recorded; and that even in several instances where the opposite results would have been more probable. To take one instance out of many: he is described as having had a great desire to brew himself some beer; but he cannot contrive to accomplish it. Yet, though he had plenty of grapes, the thought never occurs to him of resorting to the

far easier and more obvious process of making *wine.*

It would be a curious, and not an unprofitable task to draw up a criticism of 'Robinson Crusoe,' showing that there are, in a tale which, beyond all others, has been the oftenest mistaken for a true history, such improbabilities as amount to a complete disproof.

Such a work would be a kind of companion and supplement to the 'Historic Doubts respecting Napoleon Bonaparte." That work shows that at least as great improbabilities as are to be found in Scripture history, and which have been made the ground of anti-christian objections, are to be found in a history of which no one entertains any serious doubt, and which, therefore, on their own principles, infidels would be bound to disbelieve.

On the other hand, it might be shown that the best contrived fiction, which enters into minute particulars, will be found, on close examination, to contain inconsistencies utterly incompatible with belief in its truth: while a true history, on the contrary, will often even derive fresh confirmation (as may be seen in Paley's 'Horæ Paulinæ,' and Dean Graves's 'Lectures on the Pentateuch') from such an examination; while the alleged difficulties will prove, many of them, to be trifling and groundless, and the rest susceptible of explanation.

I have spoken of *entering into minute particulars*, because in a mere *general* statement (such as, that

General A encountered General B and defeated him) it is very easy to frame a fiction which cannot possibly be, by internal marks, distinguished from truth. But when there is a detail of many minute particulars, and when to these we apply a close and, as it may be called, microscopic examination, the contrast between truth and fiction will generally be very striking. Something like this is the difference between the works of Nature and the works of Art. An artificial flower may be so skilfully made, as at first to deceive the eye even of a botanist; but when that and a natural flower are both exposed to the solar microscope, we at once perceive the contrast. The petals of the natural flower, when viewed with the microscope, appear even more delicately veined than when viewed by the naked eye; while those of the artificial flower look like coarse canvas.

Let us, then, apply the microscope to some parts of this tale.

1. Several of the improbabilities (as has been already remarked) are of a character contrary to what might have been expected; and are, therefore, the more likely to escape notice. One instance was given as a specimen: Robinson Crusoe's not attempting to make wine, though he had plenty of grapes, had an evident craving for good liquor, and was thoughtful and diligent in providing for his own welfare and comfort. For he is represented as having none of that depression of spirits, and apathetic langour, which would have been the most natural

result of long solitude, and which, accordingly, Alexander Selkirk experienced.

2. A similar instance is his remaining so long upon the island before attempting to domesticate goats.

3. What is still more improbable is, his never, apparently, attempting to avail himself of any of the *mechanical powers*, with some of which he must have been familiar from childhood. He had no mode of making a plank, except by hewing away, first one side of the trunk of a tree, and then the other. It was more probable that he should have resorted to the employment of *wedges* to split the trunk; wedges of wood or of stone would have answered better than none. But it was still more strange that, when he had made a canoe, and was at a loss how to get it down to the water, he should not have thought of such obvious contrivances as a windlass and a pulley, with which he must have been long familiar on board ship. To construct a windlass, though perhaps a rude and clumsy one, would not have been difficult. The use of the pulley would have been still easier. By the application of these powers he could virtually have increased his strength twenty-fold; and by moving the canoe, though only at the rate of two or three yards in an hour, he would have been sure of bringing it down to the water.

4. The above are very great improbabilities; but his culture of *rice* may be pronounced an absolute impossibility. He threw out, it seems, before the entrance of his habitation, among dust and husks,

some unperceived grains of barley and rice, which grew and came to perfection, and enabled him, thenceforward, to cultivate these crops. Now this is probable enough as far as regards the *barley*; but Defoe was probably ignorant that *rice*, when designed for human food, is divested of its husk by a process which destroys its power of germinating; so that to sow rice in the state in which it comes to market would be as vain as to sow pearl-barley.

Still it must be admitted that now and then, among many thousand grains of rice, one will be found, which by some accident has escaped the process, and retained its husk and its power of germinating. Let it be supposed then, as possible, though not probable, that there were two or three such grains among those he threw out; still these must have come to nothing, because the rice plant requires to be completely overflowed with water; so that the culture of this crop from such a beginning could not possibly have taken place.

5. When Friday is pursued by three of the savages, and they come to a creek, one of them turns back, as being *unable to swim*. Now it is agreed by all travellers that, in warm countries, all savages dwelling near the sea are from childhood perfectly good swimmers. They are allured to it by the refreshment of bathing, and driven to it by the frequent upsetting of their rude canoes; so that a Brazilian sea-coast savage, unable to swim, may be pronounced a total impossibility.

6. But one of Friday's pursuers was armed with a *bow and arrows*, and was about to shoot at Robinson Crusoe, who was coming to the rescue. Now that, when thus armed, and in pursuit of a fugitive who was rather gaining on him, he should never have thought of sending an arrow after him, is utterly incredible.

7. When Robinson Crusoe comes forward to rescue the Spaniards who are about to be slaughtered, he addresses one of them in *Spanish*. If he had even ever been perfectly master of the Spanish language, it is impossible he should have been able to speak it after so many years of total disuse. Alexander Selkirk, after only three years, could scarcely express himself even in his own mother-tongue.

8. But the most wide-spread (if I may so speak) of the improbabilities, though the one the most likely to be overlooked by the generality of readers, is the character ascribed to the savages. They are represented as ferocious, indeed, and ignorant, but intelligent, and docile, and easily susceptible of civilisation. Any missionary who should have made as much progress, after many years of labour, in civilising even the second or third generation of savages, as was here made in a very short time with adult savages, would be considered as eminently successful. But this improbability is, as I have said, likely to be overlooked by those (and the generality of readers are such) who have neither had any personal intercourse with savages, nor have attentively studied the

works of travellers and missionaries. They do not, therefore, fully estimate the brutish stupidity, the childish silliness, and the perverse indocility, of the savage character. If these had been portrayed in a manner conformable to the reality, it is likely that the narrative would have appeared even less probable to most readers than it does now; because those readers have no adequate conception of what a savage really is.* When any one of us attempts to imagine himself a savage, he imagines himself, indeed, to be ignorant of many things which he now knows; but he cannot in imagination divest himself of the habits of thought of a civilised being, nor conceive himself divested of the intelligence, the docility, and the power of improvement, which are found more or less in those who have been brought up in a civilised country. The difficulty is analogous to that of forming a clear conception of the condition of a person *born blind.* It is very easy to imagine yourself in the condition of a person who has *lost* his sight; you have only to shut your eyes, or to go into a dark room: but very different is the condition of a person who has *never had* sight. Bishop Berkeley was considered as advancing a startling paradox when he taught that such a person on receiving sight would not know a cube from a globe when placed before his eyes. Yet when the experiment was tried, he was found to be correct. A blind-born youth who was couched by Mr. Chesselden (an operation which

* See Lecture on the 'Origin of Civilisation.'

had never been performed before in this country) was a long time before he could learn to distinguish, by sight, his dog from his cat, with which he had long been familiar by touch.

A like difficulty occurs, as I have said, in estimating aright the real condition of mind of those who have been brought up from childhood entirely without civilisation. But if we examine attentively all the accounts that are given of savages, by those who have had actual intercourse with them, we shall inevitably come to the conclusion that the representation of savages, as given by Defoe, involves a complete moral impossibility.

And we shall also be warranted in concluding that the most ingenious fictitious narrative, and one which has often been mistaken for a true history, will, if it enters into minute particulars, and if these are subjected to a close investigation, be open to decisive disproof.

PARTY NAMES.

It is curious to observe the different modes in which the names of parties have originated. Sometimes they have been assumed by themselves; sometimes imposed by their adversaries; and sometimes, again, they have arisen from some trifling accident. The name of Tory is said to be derived from an Irish word, and to signify a bandit; being applied first to

the scattered adherents of King James who infested the country with a kind of guerilla warfare. Whig, again, which is the Scotch pronunciation of Whey, was first applied to the persecuted and scattered Covenanters, who subsisted partly on the whey, or skimmed milk, which they procured at retired farmhouses. At present the parties which used to be designated as Tories and Whigs are oftener called Conservatives and Reformers.

The name of Gueux, or beggars, originally given in contempt to the advocates of the popular rights in the Netherlands, was afterwards adopted by themselves. And the like took place with respect to the name of Sans Culottes as applied to the French Republicans. The Jacobins are said to have been so called from their originally assembling in the building of a monastery formerly belonging to an order of monks called Jacobins. A large proportion of the names of parties, both religious and political, have been taken from those of their leaders. As in Paul's time the parties in the Church of Corinth took their names from Paul and Peter and Apollos, so in later times we hear of Arians and Athanasians, Lutherans, Calvinists and Arminians, Wesleyans and Whitfieldians, &c.: and among political parties we have Jacobites, Pittites, and Foxites, &c.

Many names of parties, again, are what Jeremy Bentham calls '*question-begging appellatives*;' that is, words which imply condemnation or approbation. Thus, in our civil war, the name of Rebels applied to

the one party, and that of Malignants to the other, amounts in each case to a sentence of condemnation. One of the most remarkable of these appellatives is the term Catholic, as applied to the members of the Church of Rome. As the word signifies *universal*, it implies that their church comprehends all Christians, including those that they call heretics or schismatics. For these terms imply that they are Christians since Jews and Pagans are never so designated. Now, if Protestants and members of the Greek Church are properly *subjects*, though *rebellious subjects—children*, though *undutifu children*—of the Church of Rome, then there is an end of the boast of unity of doctrine and exemption from error. For to say that all sound and loyal members of the Church admit its doctrines and submit to its sway, is merely to say that all agree except those who disagree; and that all submit to it except those who refuse submission. If, on the contrary, all these are *not* members of the Church of Rome, it cannot be *universal.* It may, indeed, *claim* universal dominion; but that is a very different thing from possessing it. The two pretensions, therefore, to *universality* and to *unity*, are evidently incompatible with each other.

The name of Papists, however, the Romanists object to, alleging that it is a term of reproach; which it certainly is not. It denotes nothing which they deny, but merely adherence to the Pope, which they acknowledge. To call a *Protestant* a Papist would indeed be a term of reproach, because it denotes

adherence to the Pope, which he rejects. So also the name of Mahometan would be a reproach if applied to a Christian, but not when applied to a Mahometan; for a term of reproach is one that denotes something which is denied and thought wrong by the person to whom it is applied. The word Mahometan does not signify a follower of a false Prophet, or of a true Prophet, but simply a follower of Mahomet. So also Papist does not imply submission to a usurped authority, or to a rightful authority, but simply adherence to the Pope. Some, however, seem to forget that several persons may use the same word in the same sense, though they differ widely in their opinions concerning the *things signified* by the word. Thus a Royalist and a Democrat may be fully agreed in the sense in which they use the words royalty and democracy, though each detests that which the other approves. Our forefathers considered the sun as a body that moves round the earth, and we as a body round which the earth moves; but the word sun does not imply either the one or the other; and we and they both use the word in the same sense.

A remarkable instance of those question-begging appellatives is afforded by the sect who reject infant-baptism, and therefore should in strictness be called by the cumbrous title of Antipædo Baptists, but who are called by some Anabaptists and by others Baptists; the former title implying condemnation, and the latter approval. The one implies that they baptise a *second* time a man who joins their communion; which

they deny; since they hold his baptism as an infant to be null and void. The other implies that they alone administer valid baptism; which of course their opponents deny.

The ancient Gnostics applied to themselves a laudatory title denoting that they alone knew the Gospel; which knowledge, they taught, exempted them from all moral obligation.

The title of Orthodox, again, as applied to a party, is one of those appellatives, since it signifies those who hold the right faith, and thus implies a censure on all who differ from them. The same may be said of the title of Evangelical as applied to a party, since it implies that none who do not agree with them adhere to the Gospel. Yet it is remarkable that when the party calling itself the Evangelical Alliance required subscriptions to certain doctrines, and refused admission to those who would not subscribe to these, they vehemently denied any intention of denying them the title of *Christians*. Yet surely the two terms 'evangelical' and 'Christian' are in truth exactly equivalent. Each denotes the reception of the *Gospel* (*evangelium*) of Jesus Christ. It is true there may be various degrees of evangelical religion. A man may be less or more completely a Christian. But just so far as he is a Christian, he must be evangelical. To enquire concerning any Christian whether he is evangelical, seems like enquiring concerning a *man* whether he is *human*.

There is a sect in the United States who call them-

selves simply Christians, and refuse any other distinguishing appellation; but these, if they admit that any who do not belong to their sect can be rightly called Christians, must be forgetting the very use of any distinctive appellation; which is to distinguish one thing from another. It should not be forgotten that Paul censures, along with the other parties of Corinth, those who said 'I am of Christ,' using this as a party designation to distinguish them from others who, equally with themselves, acknowledge Christ. He would doubtless have censured in like manner any party who should have arrogantly assumed the title of Jesuits, as if they alone were properly followers of the Lord Jesus.

Still more objectionable is the title of Bible-Christians, assumed by a sect whose rule is to abstain from the flesh of animals, the use of which is expressly sanctioned by the Bible. It is remarkable, however, that they admit into their cookery the use of *isinglass*, which it is to be supposed they consider as a vegetable, like the Irish gentleman who reported that anchovies grew on trees. Some of them, however, call themselves Vegetarians, which is an unobjectionable title. The Quakers, again, who were so called from their quaking or trembling when they speak, call themselves Friends; which evidently implies that they consider themselves as more friends to the human race, or to each other, than other people.

Sometimes, however, it happens that a favourable title will be acquired by some party without any

arrogant assumption of it by themselves. For sometimes a name which implies nothing discreditable but rather the contrary, such as Puritans or Saints, is applied to some party by their opponents in scornful irony. And then no one can wonder or complain if the others take advantage of this, and gladly accept and adopt the title bestowed on them by adversaries. Persons who thus undesignedly benefit those whom they had intended to damage, may remind one of the apes described in one of the voyages of Sinbad the Sailor. These apes inhabited the tops of lofty cocoa-nut trees; and when pelted with stones showed their resentment by pelting their assailants in return with cocoa-nuts; thus supplying them with the fruit they could not have reached. This is perhaps the case with the name of Rationalists, as applied to a certain German school of theologians, who freely exercised their *reason*, such as it is, on subjects quite beyond the reach of human reason. Certain it is that the title, whether originally devised by themselves or by opponents, is likely to convey the notion that they alone take a *rational* view of all subjects, and are to be alone accounted properly, rational beings.

SUPERSTITIONS.

THERE are many popular superstitions, so called, which perhaps strictly speaking do not deserve the name, as not being—like image-worship—connected with any misdirected *religious* feeling, but merely fanciful and groundless notions leading to absurd practice; such as the supposed unluckiness of spilling salt, or sitting down thirteen to table; which no one would reckon a sin against any supposed superhuman Being.

Some of these superstitions, however, may perhaps have had their first origin in some religious error which has since been forgotten. But of most of them it is difficult or impossible to trace the origin.

Salt was certainly accounted by the ancients as having something of a sacred character, probably on account of its antiseptic quality. And the unluckiness of thirteen at table has been thought by some to have originated in the narrative of the Last Supper, in which Judas formed a thirteenth.

The sacred character attributed in England to the redbreast and the swallow (which it is thought unlucky to destroy), and on the Continent to the stork, which usually builds on the housetops, may be attributed to their placing themselves, as it were, under man's protection. In Ireland, on the contrary, the swallow is called the Devil's bird by the vulgar; who hold that there is a certain hair on every one's head, which, if a swallow can pick off, the man is

doomed to eternal perdition. This superstition is hardly to be accounted for; and so is that which exists in many countries relative to the magpie, a mischievous bird, very destructive to eggs and young poultry. Yet in many parts of the Continent no one dares to kill one. An English traveller in Sweden saw a whole flock of magpies devouring the pigs' food, and having a gun with him offered to shoot some; which he did, and the farmer thanked him heartily for his service, with an earnest hope that no evil might befall him in consequence. In England the rustics account the sight of *one* magpie unlucky, but of two or more a good omen; according to the well-known rhyme, one for sorrow, two for mirth, three a wedding, four a birth. But some of them hold that the evil omen of seeing a single magpie may be averted by making nine bows to it.

In England the wren is considered almost as sacred a bird as the redbreast. In Ireland, on the contrary, they are hunted down and killed on St. Stephen's day by boys, who afterwards carry round the dead birds and solicit contributions.

The superstitious dread of the raven's croak arose, probably, merely from its being a bird that feeds on dead carcases, and which was, therefore, supposed to be calling for its prey. The owl, again, is supposed to be ominous, when flying against the windows of a sick chamber; attracted, doubtless, by the light, as moths are.

In many parts of England the vulgar account it

very unlucky to transplant parsley. A gentleman's gardener in Yorkshire being desired to do so, insisted on *sowing* a bed instead; assuring his master that nothing would thrive with him if he planted it.

With many of the vulgar it is considered unlucky to see the new moon for the first time through glass. A knife, or other cutting instrument, must never be given, which would be an omen, they think, of the severance of friendship; some money, no matter how small a sum, must always be paid for it. A hive of bees, again, must never be *bought*, or they will come to no good; but if given or stolen they will thrive very well.

There are several other very curious superstitions relating to bees. It is a popular belief that an angry dispute carried on near the bee-hive will cause the bees to perish, or to go away. And the like, it is thought, will happen if any remarkable event occurring in the family, such as a marriage, birth, or death, is not formally announced to them. A peasant will gravely go to the bee-hive and say, my father or my wife is dead, and will thereupon put them in mourning by putting a piece of black crape on each hive. Again, many, even of educated persons, cannot bear to leave an egg-shell with one end unbroken, lest a witch should make use of it as a boat.

In Spain, if any one should go into a baker's shop and ask him for a bit of the leaven with which he is about to raise his bread, he would kick him out with indignation. They have a full belief that any mali-

cious person getting hold of a small piece of the leaven, can, by performing certain magical ceremonies, infect the remainder, and spoil the whole batch of bread. If some leaven is wanted for a poultice, which is sometimes prescribed (as yeast is with us), the family send to the baker they deal with, and humbly beg him for a piece of leaven; assuring him that no improper use shall be made of it.

In some parts of England it is believed that if, in a house infested with rats, one is caught alive and released with a note tied round his neck, directed to some neighbour's house, he will repair thither and be followed by all the rest.

It is counted unlucky to pass by a piece of old iron which one meets with; it should be picked up and carried home. And if it be a horse-shoe, this is great luck; a horse-shoe also is often nailed to the threshold of a door, or to a ship's mast to keep away witches. To fling an old shoe after a person who is going out on any business is supposed to bring them good luck. And it is also lucky to put on one of your stockings the wrong side outwards, provided it be done undesignedly, and that you let it remain so.

There are two kinds of insects frequenting old wood-work, each called a 'Death watch,' from making a peculiar kind of ticking noise, supposed to forebode a death in the family.

Superstitious remedies for various ailments are numerous. Our ancestors thought to staunch blood, or heal a wound, by applying a salve or sympathetic

powder to the weapon which had inflicted the wound, or to a handkerchief stained with the blood; a practice which Sir Walter Scott alludes to in the 'Lay of the Last Minstrel.' Gilbert White records that certain diseases of cattle were supposed to be caused by a shrew-mouse running over the part affected. The only remedy was to stroke the part with the twig of a shrew-ash; the tree was to be endued with this marvellous property by having a hole bored in it, and a live shrew put in, with certain mysterious ceremonies, and securely plugged in.

A man riding on a piebald horse is supposed to have the power of curing the whooping-cough, if whatever he prescribes is done to the patient. It is not supposed that he has any superior medical knowledge, or that what he prescribes would have any virtue except from its coming from a man sitting on a piebald horse. Accordingly a man who used, when asked, to reply in derision, 'Tie a rope round the child's neck,' was strictly obeyed, and the rope tied accordingly.

A like superstition prevails respecting a seventh son without any daughters intervening; and still more a seventh son of a seventh son. Such an one is supposed to have the power of healing all diseases, not as possessing any superior medical skill, but by a certain magical efficacy. And one when an infant has been made to stroke with its little hands the face of a sick man, as producing an infallible cure. The touch of a hanged man's hand is very generally

esteemed a cure for a wen. It is probable that this, and also the royal touch for scrofula, have sometimes really had an effect; because a very strong feeling of awe or of horror is known to act sometimes on the absorbents. As a preservative against cramp, what is called the cramp-bone of a leg of mutton (that is the patella or knee-cap), worn about the person, has long been in repute. Another preservative which an old woman has been known to prescribe, is to lay your shoes upside down at the bed-room door. There is a curious remedy in high repute for rupture in an infant; an opening is made, by means of wedges, through the middle of the stem of a young tree; and the infant is passed a certain number of times, to and fro, through the opening; the tree is then carefully bandaged, and if its wound heals the child will recover. There are, or were, in the garden of the Rectory of Halesworth in Suffolk, several trees which had undergone this operation. In some of them the cleft had healed up, in others not. Sometimes, instead of cleaving a tree, they passed the child under a bramble that grows into the ground at both ends. Passing a child under the belly of a donkey nine times is also practised as a remedy for whooping-cough.

It is believed that a child that is born with its head enveloped in the membrane which is known as the *caul*, is exempt from all danger of being drowned. This, as some one wittily observed, seems to proceed on the idea that a person who comes into the world

with a cap over his face, is destined to go out of the world in the same manner; that is, to be hanged; since, according to the well-known proverb, he that is born to be hanged will never be drowned. But this mysterious membrane is believed to protect from drowning not only one who is born with it, but any one who carries it about his person. And accordingly one may occasionally see advertisements in the papers of a child's caul to be sold.

Other instances might be found of superstitions of the class we have been speaking of, namely, those in which there is no religious element. Of the other class, namely, those which have this element, there are great numbers in various parts of the world; as, for instance, the veneration paid and the offerings made to fairies; these being in fact the very gods that were worshipped by our heathen ancestors.

SUPPOSED HARMLESS ERRORS.

It is maintained by some sensible persons, that those of a naturally good disposition, who may have embraced some religious system of a mixed character —containing, along with much valuable truth, a good deal of superstitious error, such as might be in itself noxious—will adhere to and profit by the good, and the bad will be inoperative and harmless to *them*. They will be, it is thought, like Mithridates, who had

so fortified his constitution by antidotes, that he could swallow poisons with impunity. But to trust to this universally would be unsafe. For the most expert poisoners usually mix a few grains of strychnine or arsenic with several ounces of wholesome food. Falsehood, and all evil, are received chiefly through a mixture with truth and goodness. But there are some cases in which the process described does, and some in which it does not, take place.

1. When anyone is converted *from Paganism* to some (more or less) corrupted form of Christianity, he has made an *advance*, and is somewhat a gainer, even if he advance no farther. And in such a case the result is not unlikely to be what was described above. He probably embraced the error *for the sake of the truth* mixed with it, and does not know how to separate them. And if the good portion be that which is congenial to his mind, and the bad not, the poison may remain dormant and innocuous. He may resemble those whose constitution is not susceptible of some infectious diseases, such as small-pox or scarlatina. And his embracing (suppose) the Roman Catholic system, or one that naturally would seem to lead, and often does lead, to Antinomianism, may produce little or no ill effects upon *him*.

2. The same may be the case (in a minor degree) with one who has been *brought up* in some such mixed system of truth and error. All his earliest associations have combined in his thoughts and feelings, the one with the other; and yet, though unable

or unwilling to undertake the task of winnowing the chaff from the wheat, he may practically embrace the one, and let the other lie dormant. Both of these persons may shrink from the work which Martin (in the 'Tale of a Tub') found so difficult, of picking out, thread by thread, the embroidery with which the coat had been deformed, in fear and trembling lest he should damage the coat itself. And so they leave the coat in the condition in which they had received it.

3. But far different is the case of one who had once had the coat clear, and then consented to have it overlaid with this embroidery; viz., the man who having been brought up in a purer faith, afterwards *adopts* one corrupted with an admixture of human devices. He, unlike the others, has evidently not adopted the errors for the sake of the truths mixed with them—truths which had been already laid before him unadulterated – but *for the sake of the very errors* themselves. And one may accordingly expect to find him much *more* zealous for them, and more practically under their influence, than those who had been *brought up* in the system. In such a one you may expect to find the evils of the system in their most exaggerated and most active form.

The enquiry which a clown is apt to make, when you ask your way—'Where did *you come from*, Sir?' —is not an impertinent one in this case. Those who have just embraced, or have always held, some truth that is mixed with falsehood, are in a far different

Sometimes a recent convert to the Romish Church, or to some other party, causes surprise and even alarm, in those who have always belonged to it, by the excess of his zeal for some things they had thought but little of, and the boldness with which he follows up their principles to their consequences. But they would find it difficult to undo what they have done:

> She opened; but to shut
> Surpassed her power.

Suppose, e. g., the case of one who has been brought up in some party, and has been always taught that it is right and necessary to belong to a party, but who is superior in intelligence to most of the members of it, and very superior in knowledge, and in liberality and freedom from bigotry, and has less of real party-spirit than some who disavow being partisans at all; he (or she) will probably regard some of the dogmas of the party as of no great practical importance, but will have received them as part of the *lot*; some he may perhaps not admit at all; some, which are capable of a very pernicious application, he will perceive no danger in, having never made such an application, and being, like a skilful artisan, trained from childhood in the dexterous use of various edge-tools, which, in unskilful hands, may do dreadful mischief. He induces, perhaps, another person to *join* this party; and then is astonished and grieved to see his convert adopt *all* the doctrines of

the party, and in the most exaggerated form, and condemn or despise all who do not; and follow up the principles to dangerous conclusions, and manifest a most thorough-going party spirit. And while the original partisan is perhaps softening down, the convert will be proceeding like those English settlers in Ireland, of whom we are told that they became '*more Irish than the Irish themselves.*'* In short, the plants taken from their original soil, and transplanted into new and rich ground, astonish him by the fearful luxuriance of their growth.

A person who independently adopts a certain doctrine which is held by certain others, or joins them in some definite measure, is responsible *only so far* for what he does or induces others to do. He is like a partner with *limited liability*, who stakes only the fixed sum he contributes. But one who joins, or induces others to join, a party, is a partner who has made himself responsible for *all* the acts and all the debts of the firm, and has staked his *whole* property.

INFLUENCE.

WHAT is the proper meaning of *Influence*? Originally it certainly was used to denote some subtle mysterious agent *flowing in* upon some person or thing, something in the way that we conceive of an electric current, &c. Since, its meaning has been greatly extended; but

* See *Cautions for the Times*, No. 26, p. 465.

still, we do not extend it to *every* cause. As we should never speak of the *influence* of a stream carrying a man off, or of men who drag him to prison by physical force, so neither should we speak of a man's being '*influenced*' by the demonstrations of Euclid. But in moral concerns we do speak of his being influenced by *arguments*; though we should oftener speak—and should consider ourselves as speaking more strictly—of the influence of various *passions*. But we always use the word, I think, in those cases to which our ancestors *confined* it: viz. when we speak of one man having gained an *influence* over another of which no account can be given: when he sways him independently of the amount of love, fear, respect, &c., felt, and beyond what can be referred to his reason, or to regard for his interest, or to any intelligible motive. I think there must be a certain mesmeric power possessed by some people in reference to some others. Some can thus influence one, or a few; some, a great many; and some, none at all.

Mr. Phillips, my schoolmaster, had a wonderful influence over his boys; and it was this that has long since led me to speculate on the subject. He was not at all above par in point of ability; nor was he thought so by the boys. He was, though not contemptible in point of learning, far from eminent. He was not skilful in conveying knowledge; and in speaking to the boys, his style was laboured, stiff, pedantic, and such as often to excite ridicule. His kindliness of character would account for his being

greatly beloved, and his indomitable firmness for his being feared. But the unaccountable thing was the power that he had over the minds of the most dissimilar characters. He brought them to think with him, and to feel with him; to honour whatever he honoured, and to regard as contemptible whatever he despised. Had he been a man of superior judgment, he might have done wonders. But he was like a child intrusted with a magician's wand. He used his influence sometimes very foolishly, and seldom in the way to produce the most important and best results.

His son-in-law, Parsons, for a time assisted in the school. In good judgment, in scholarship, and in skill as a teacher, he was vastly superior; and if Mr. Phillips would have consented to act in conformity to his wishes—to be the steam-engine of the carriage, and let Parsons be the driver—it might have been made such a school as was seldom seen. But Mr. Phillips was quite unconscious of his own inferiority of judgment, and was self-confident and utterly obstinate. He never would take any advice from anyone. And Parsons not liking to be a mere agent to follow the directions implicitly of a man of inferior qualifications, left him, and set up a school of his own. It was a good and successful one; but with all his high moral and intellectual qualifications, he never came near Phillips in the *influence* he exercised over the minds of the boys.

I have heard Hinds (who was at Phillips') remark

—as one proof of the unaccountable character of that influence—that anyone who (seeing him succeed so well, in this or that) attempted to *imitate* him, was sure to fail. It was as if anyone seeing you lift up a piece of iron with a magnet, should exactly copy your action, only employing an *un*magnetic bar, to all appearance perfectly similar.

I myself never had, in the strict sense of the word, any influence at all with anyone. Whenever I have induced anyone to think or to act in any way, it has always been by some *intelligible* process; either by his seeing the force of the reasons given, or (which is not at all less of a logical process) by his thinking that I was to be trusted for knowledge or judgment on such and such points, on which he had good reason for so trusting me. I may perhaps have convinced some persons who have been themselves influential; but I have never had any *direct* influence; that is, I have never produced any effect that could not be *clearly accounted for.*

I remember a very early occasion of the subject having been brought before my mind; a subject on which I have often reflected at various times since. When I was about thirteen, the boys at my school had a fancy for playing at soldiers, hoops being the representatives of horses; and they performed beautifully many of the evolutions of cavalry. The colonel of the regiment was a very stupid boy, and I don't think anyone thought him otherwise; but they obeyed all his commands with readiness. I, who

acted as major, had to instruct him, *in the presence of the boys*, what to do and to say; and when he had had it beat into his dull brain, *he repeated the very words* they had heard me *dictate to him*, and all went on well. But if *either* of us was absent, nothing could be done. When *I* was away, the boys were indeed as ready as ever to obey him; but he was utterly at a loss to give a word of command. If *he* was absent, none of the boys would mind the word of command from *my* mouth, and all fell into confusion!

LOVE AND LIKING.

WHAT is sometimes called, in a different sense from the ordinary, love (or, a different species of love; for this depends on the definition you give of the word), is more properly called *Liking*.

1. One whose welfare we wish for, and are desirous to promote, we *love*; if very much, we are ready to make great exertions and sacrifices for him: one whose company is agreeable, and the idea of whom we contemplate with pleasure, we *like*.

2. The two feelings are not necessarily combined, nor when they are, do they necessarily correspond in their degree.

3. Yet each tends to promote the other. We are *disposed* to love one whom we like, and *vice versâ*.

4. Neither feeling, any more than any other feeling,

is under the immediate and direct control of the will; yet, like other feelings, we may indirectly operate on them; for instance, by contemplating anyone's good qualities and services done to him; and as this arises, it will tend to make us *exert ours lves* for his benefit and for his gratification; and to do this, tends to generate a liking for him. A man must be very disagreeable indeed who is not in some degree liked, sooner or later, by those who, from whatever cause originally, are continually watching for opportunities to serve and please him. Kings, accordingly, and other great personages, gain the advantage of this. Again, by whatever way we cultivate a good taste, a character for appreciating the best qualities, moral and intellectual, we are so far training ourselves to like those who possess such qualities, or to feel disgust for the reverse. The better self-training anyone has, the less will he be prone to *like* those whom he cannot or ought not to esteem. And, of course, on the other hand, the more anyone gives himself up to the lower propensities, the more he will come to relish the society which would once have disgusted him.

5. It is natural to wish to be both loved and liked, especially by such as have any especial claims on our regard, and whose good-will and favourable feelings are of the most consequence to us.

6. It is happily the case that it is *particularly easy* in general to excite these feelings, in some of the very persons in whom those feelings are of the most consequence to us. A baby has only to smile and

crow, and stretch out its arms, to win the hearts of the parents and nurses, who are just everything to that baby. And a child will generally be liked as well as loved by his parents, though he may have very little of the qualities that render him an acceptable companion to people in general, if he is but attentive to their advice and instruction, and treats them with full confidence. It is true, however, that parents do sometimes show unreasonable partialities, both in loving and liking; generally towards the most *promising* or the most *unpromising* offspring; the genius, or the simpleton, and the ne'er-do-well, and as often, perhaps, the one as the other. Perhaps the cause is the same, *extra anxiety*; the parents' *thoughts* are habitually the most occupied with the daughter, who is expected to marry a duke; or the son, who is to be chancellor, or again with the one who is always on the verge of some dreadful scrape.

7. When a person finds himself less liked than he thinks it desirable and suitable he should be, by some particular person, if he has good sense, he will study to make himself agreeable, by striving to comply with, and to forestal every wish that can be innocently humoured. And in this practice (supposing that he is not by gross hypocrisy currying favour for interested purposes with one he secretly despises or dislikes) he will find his *own* liking towards the person increase (as above said), and this will itself breed a reciprocity; for liking generates liking.

8. But if he wants practical good sense, and has a mixture of a certain kind of pride, with a certain kind of humility combined with vanity, he will be led by a combination of resentment and dread to shun all close intercourse with the object, and to prefer the society of those who amuse him, and are or pretend to be amused with his; even though he may be aware that they have no great real friendship for him, or may even suspect that they are only flattering him for their own purposes.

A weak man of this kind is likely to end in being a misanthrope, and to complain eloquently that there is no such thing as true friendship, and that he has been all his life regarded with undue disfavour; in short, to turn out that wretched being, 'an ill-used man.'

This does not mean an individual who *has* been ill-used, but one of whose character it is an essential part; one whose *fate* is to be so.

All the world is in a constant conspiracy against him. The cooks contrive to dress every dish so as to have a good flavour to other people and a bad one to him. The sun sets or hides under a cloud when he wants to be up and out, and watches its opportunity to shine when he is in bed. Rain and contrary winds lie in ambush for him on every expedition. If he is driving quietly along the street, a post runs against him. Whenever he is on a jury, he is sure to meet with eleven obstinate blockheads. All people make a point of being dull and disagreeable in his

company, however pleasant at other times; and, in short, nobody ever *understands* him or does him justice. He is like a traveller in the Arabian deserts surrounded by mirage; a fine lake before him, and another behind him, and always a parched land under his feet.

O thoughts of men accurst
Past, and to come, seem best; things present, worst.
Shakespeare.

DUTY AND METHOD OF INSTRUCTING.

I WAS lately reading in a newspaper an account of a meeting called by some Agapemonists in London. The speakers were cried down—most deservedly—as talking blasphemous nonsense, when they said that 'Brother Prince' was an incarnation of the Holy Ghost, &c. It occurred to me that as Jesus was called a blasphemer for calling himself the Son of God, we should show some *difference* between the two cases; and what difference is there except what is derived from an appeal to the *Reason*? i. e. that the one gave proof by His miracles of the truth of the claim, and the other, none at all.

It cannot be said that we are to decide between the two cases by the *matter* of what was preached; for it was precisely to this that the Jews, who rejected Jesus, did appeal: 'This man cannot be of God because he keepeth not the Sabbath-day; and 'Thou

being a man makest thyself God.' For they did not expect the Messiah to be a *divine* person; as is evident from their being unable to answer why 'David called him *Lord*,' and accordingly they condemned Him under the injunction given in Deut. xiii. 5.

It cannot be said that what He taught, or that what the Agapemonists said, was contrary to the immutable laws of natural *morality*. But if He had not really been a divine person, He would have been justly condemned for blasphemy; and He says Himself, 'If I had not done among them the *works* which none other man did, they had not had sin.' And if 'Prince' had given like proofs, it would not have been allowable for us to reject him, merely on the ground that we have *no reason to expect* any such divine incarnation; for no more did the Jews think *they* had to expect such a Messiah as Jesus in fact was.

No difference, then, can be made out, except the difference of *evidence and no evidence*. The case is altogether one of an appeal to the understanding in judging of evidence.

Of course a sincere desire to obey the truth, a pure and candid judgment, is necessary for a right decision. The understanding *may* be biassed by prejudice and passion, and no *mere* intellectual power will secure us against that; but still, after all, it *is* an appeal to the understanding. It is necessary to wipe clean the glasses of your telescope; but,

after all, it is with your *eyes* you must see; only it is necessary to give your eyes a fair chance.

It is a matter of great patience to hear people talk so thoughtlessly, as some do, of 'appeals to the heart rather than to the head,' on the ground that *mere* intellect is not sufficient (and who ever said so?) to guide us into truth. One may equally well say, 'The *mere* use of the compass and rudder will not bring a ship into port, without sails or steam; therefore get up the steam and set the sails, and throw the rudder and compass overboard.'

No one can doubt that there is much hearty and fervent devotion felt for the Virgin Mary; and, in fact, *she* is applied to by a much greater number than her Son. The difference is between rightly and wrongly *directed* devotion. Impassioned hortatory discourses may get up the steam, but they do not supply the compass and rudder, without which we may as easily as not run upon the rocks.

'Oh, but let them read the Scriptures!' It is very little trouble for those who have the gift of florid eloquence to give exciting exhortations, and then urge their hearers to read the Scriptures, without giving them any warning, any instruction, any explanation, but leaving them to open the Bible at haphazard, and take for their guidance the first passage they chance to light on. Any man of tolerable good sense, in reading any book—except the Bible—which he is anxious to understand thoroughly, does not *dip* into it at random, reading a scrap here and a

scrap there; or taking single sentences, or half-sentences, apart from the context: but considers, while reading (in the order it was written), what was the writer's design? Who, and how circumstanced, were those he was writing for? And what comes before, and what follows each passage? The way in which many read Scripture is, in all points, *just the reverse.* And religious instructors often encourage the error, by compiling books of insulated texts, each 'improved,' as they call it, without reference to the context; or they piece together sundry passages into a system of their own; making what may be called an *anagram* of Scripture. E.g. perhaps they find that 'no prophecy of Scripture is of any private interpretation;' by which it is not unlikely they may understand that they are to take whatever sense is put on Scripture by the Church, which, they read, is 'the pillar and ground of the truth;' and when they consider the question of '*What* Church is it to be?' the unlearned, who have been taught to profess their belief in 'the holy *Catholic* Church,' are not unlikely to conclude that that which is usually called the *Catholic* Church, and which claims to be *the* Catholic Church, must be the one to which they are to pay implicit submission.

By all means let men be urged to read the Bible; for the Evangelists and Apostles will preach the Gospel better than we can; but let them have instruction and explanations for the profitable study of Scripture. This will cost us more pains than mere

eloquent exhortations; but it will do more good, and avoid much harm.

They should be taught that they are not to look on the Bible as *one* book, but a collection of several, written at different times, and for different purposes; and they should be placed as far as possible in the position occupied by the most simple and unlearned of those to whom those books were first addressed, who were familiar with places and with customs which the most learned among *us* can ascertain (and that imperfectly) only by diligent research.

We should endeavour to explain, especially, the differences between the Old and New Testaments, and the connection between them; and anything in the habits of the people, or in the localities, it is worth while to explain, even though there should be no *immediate* connection with a saving faith. Nothing should be regarded as insignificant that can tend to render the study of Scripture more interesting, and to put people, as it were, *at home* in it. For instance, a man may doubtless be a good Christian without knowing that, in the East, the roofs of houses are flat, and formed a thoroughfare; so that he would not at all understand the meaning of 'Let him that is on the housetop not come down,' &c., and that καιρὸς σύκων means the fig-*harvest*; so that the going to seek figs would be an unconquerable puzzle; and that it is the custom in the East to provide *garments* for guests; so that the man who was condemned for want of the wedding garment, which a poor man

could not be expected to possess, would seem to be hardly used, &c.

Let no one say, 'What is the use of this and that?' Whatever is written in the Bible is worth understanding, and therefore is worth explaining to those who would otherwise not understand it.

And it may be added, that many things which are not *in themselves* either important or likely to be interesting to most hearers, may be such that, to know and understand *them*, will make interesting and fix in the memory *other* things that *are* of high importance. The case of the barren fig-tree is an instance; and so is the wedding garment.

Then, again, we should remember that the transactions and sayings recorded in the New Testament are but a very few, *selected* out of a great many that must have taken place. A *complete* account of all that our Lord did and said in one week of His ministry would take up more space than all the four gospels; and if everything had been recorded, 'the world would not have contained the books.' Now, how *dare* anyone say that what the sacred writers thought *worth selecting* to record is not worth our attending to? Some few things, indeed, are recorded that had a local and temporary interest, and none to us, such as 'the father of Alexander and Rufus,' &c. &c., but these are exceptional cases.

Of course the things we are to explain are such as *are* explicable by Man; not divine mysteries beyond what is revealed in Scripture. And yet it is

remarkable that many who will not be at the trouble to learn and to teach what *may be learnt* of things quite familiar to the humblest of the hearers of the apostles, are yet often found ready enough to explain what can be known only by revelation, and is indistinctly revealed; pretending to go beyond the apostles themselves.

And we are not to make Scripture a commentary on some human system; as some do who cite a great deal of Scripture, but make it *subsidiary*; and as it were pull down the temple, and erect another building of its materials; but rather give a human commentary on Scripture.

The others make, as it were, the *warp*, a human system, and interweave a woof of Scripture; which is just the opposite of the right procedure.

And what is said about explanations of what relates to places, customs, &c., will apply to the case of passages imperfectly, or obscurely, or erroneously rendered in our Version, and to words either wholly obsolete, or—which is many times commoner—obsolete in the sense in which they are used, though still in use in a different sense, and therefore much more likely to mislead than if wholly unintelligible.

It is a pity that, when our last Authorized Version first came out, there was not at the same time appointed a standing *committee of revision*, to bring out a new edition every ten years, with such minute corrections as might seem needed. It would not have been desirable to *modernize* completely the

whole diction,—far otherwise; but when a word has become so far obsolete as to mislead ordinary readers, it is no longer a mere matter of taste to leave it, or to change it. And such a bit-by-bit reform would not have shocked and unsettled men's minds, as a thorough reform of our Version now would do.

Even now, something of a gradual improvement might be effected without any dangerous shock to men's feelings. (1.) A manifest misprint, as of 'Strain at [out] a gnat,' should be corrected. (2.) Some of the marginal and text readings might be exchanged, as in Philippians i., '*You* have *me* in your hearts.' (3.) It would be good to put the words supplied by the translators in square brackets [ ] instead of *italics*, which, in all other books, denote the *emphatic* words. (4.) A few of the completely obsolete words might be changed. (5.) Some mistranslations might be corrected by a very slight change, as, '*the* angel,' '*the* mountain,' for '*a*,' and *vice versâ*; 'our only Lord God and Saviour,' for 'the only Lord God and our Saviour;' 'godliness is gain,' for 'gain is godliness,' &c.

But as the case stands, each individual minister is bound to put before his people, to the best of his power, the true sense of *Scripture*, i.e. of the real *original* Scripture, as the sacred writers left it. Let no one presume to say, 'It is of small consequence whether the people understand this or that particular passage.' It is *our* plain duty to explain to the people whatever may help them to the right

understanding of the Scriptures; not presuming to say, 'It matters not much if so and so be not understood, or if they are mistaken as to such and such a trifling matter.' To be pure from the blood of all men, we must not shun to set before them all the counsel of God.

And we must not be deterred from this duty by the fear (so often put forward) of what is called '*unsettling* men's minds' It is true that every man's mind is likely to be somewhat unsettled, if he has been taught to build on a foundation of sand, and you seek to place his building on a rock. If he has been trained by those who assure him that his religion is true, but that an attempt to investigate the 'reason of the hope that is in him' is likely to end in infidelity; if he has been taught to regard our Bible version as the original, or as the only version extant, or as inspired and infallible; or if he has been taught to regard the Romish Legends as of equal authority with Scripture,—no doubt he will be 'unsettled,' and his faith, perhaps, endangered when he is undeceived on these points. But a truly honest and conscientious minister will not *dare* to leave anyone in darkness whom he is able to enlighten; or to practise or to connive at anything of the character of a pious fraud, on the ground of a supposed expediency.

And if he does his duty honestly, because it *is* his *duty*, it will then be given him to perceive that the honest course was also the expedient one, and that

there is much more danger ultimately in the opposite. For when once a man comes to perceive that he has been led, or left, to error, he will distrust, and probably disbelieve, all that comes from the same quarter. The first detected falsehood—the first suggested doubt—is a mortal wound to the faith which has been based on utter ignorance. For example, a man comes to learn, by some chance, that the passage about a 'testament being of force when men are dead,' is a mistranslation; or that that about the 'three witnesses' is allowed by the most learned men to be spurious, &c., and having been from the first taught that the Authorized Version is infallible, he will distrust altogether such teachers; and having heard that certain learned Germans represent our New Testament as a work compiled in later ages from floating and uncertain traditions, he may think this also very likely to be the case, and likely to be *your* opinion, too, all along; though, if the honest course had been taken from the first, it would have been easy to prove, even to the unlearned, the impossibility of such a theory. But this can be done only by one who has shown, at least, a willingness and an endeavour to remove all ignorance he can, and to connive at no error.

If you pursue, in all points, the open and straightforward course, you will find that instead of ultimately unsettling, you will have settled men's faith on a better basis than sand. For instance, the existence of various Editions of Scripture with some

different readings, and of different Versions, by rival and even hostile translators, while all the main facts and doctrines are to be found in *every one*, is a proof of authenticity within the reach of the unlearned.

It is curious that there should be so many who deride the pretence to learning of any one who ventures to offer an opinion as to the right sense of any word in the original, though they have no objection to his *commenting* on a passage as fully as he will. Of course there may be a pedantic and absurd display of knowledge — or ignorance instead of knowledge, and nonsense instead of sense — in either. But these are persons who cannot be brought to perceive that every translator, and indeed punctuator, is, to a certain extent, a commentator.*

If our Church had intended that the translation of the Bible should be open to all, without any help from any one for the understanding of it, she would not have enjoined the clergy to 'instruct the people out of the Scriptures,' nor have required of them any qualification beyond that of being able to *read* the Services. If, on the other hand, she had intended the teaching of the clergy to be authoritative and sufficient, she would (like the Church of Rome) have left the Holy Scriptures in a dead language.

Anyone who fairly tries, in the right way, to give instruction to the uncultivated, will be surprised to find how much more they can be brought to take in by proceeding on the principle of the *inclined plane*,

* See *Cautions for the Times.*

than many would have thought possible. When the 'Lectures on a Future State' were published, a reviewer derided the idea of their having been delivered to a country congregation and understood by them. But such is the fact. He would, probably, have still more derided the idea of conveying to children of the lower order the Elements of Political Economy, of Christian Evidences, and of Logic. But it has been done. By the principle of the inclined plane, I mean that you should observe Aristotle's maxim of *ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν γνωριμῶν*. Begin by what is known, or very readily taken in, by the learners (which can only be ascertained by conversing with them), and thence proceed to something a very little in advance; and so on, leading them upwards gradually and almost imperceptibly.

In giving instruction of any kind to any description of persons, it is necessary to have *conversed* a good deal with them. You must *hear* them, as well as speak to them, so as to ascertain what are their difficulties, prejudices, and habits of thought, and what they have understood or mistaken in what was said to them, and what does and does not interest them, &c. Without this converse and examination, or without a great deal of it, it is impossible for anyone to be a good instructor (whether by oral lecturing or written discourses, or in printed books) to that class of persons with whom he has not had such *practice*. He will be like a physician who should have studied medicine theoretically, but never attended clinical

lectures, never visited sick beds, or felt a pulse, or examined a patient's tongue. The Laputan tailor who, instead of measuring Gulliver for a suit of clothes, and *trying on* each garment from time to time, took his altitude with a quadrant, and calculated the dimensions, made the clothes a complete misfit.

And in conversing with those whom, and the like of whom, you wish to instruct, you should not limit yourself to the subjects of your instruction, but encourage them to open their minds on *any* that interests them (precluding, of course, scandal against their neighbours), so as to gain an insight into the character of their minds, and see what *kinds* of fallacy are most likely to mislead them, and what kinds of illustrations they can best take in, &c.

Moreover, when they see you taking an interest in whatever interests them, they will attend to you the more. And you will have a great advantage if you possess some knowledge of agriculture or horticulture, or of the principles of any mechanical art, or anything else relating to the matters in which the learners are necessarily conversant. If they find that you are not quite a stranger to the things they are occupied in, and especially if you should be able to give them now and then a useful hint thereon, they will listen the more readily to what you say on matters belonging to your own department.

*ON SPIRITUALISM.**

I AM greatly perplexed, and so are the intelligent friends whom I consulted, about Mr. Home's proceedings. In the midst of this perplexity I would observe, that when one side of an alternative may possibly lead to something evil or dangerous, and the other cannot, it is prudent to keep on the safe side.

The invocation of departed saints in the Church of Rome (to which, by-the-by, Mr. Home's proceedings appear to have a tendency) I have heard some defend on the ground of its being the safe side. 'I am not quite sure,' I have heard a Romanist say, 'that the saints can hear us, but I like to take my chance of it; and at any rate there is no harm done.' But, in truth, the opposite is the safe side. For we are quite sure that God can hear us; and we cannot be equally sure that the invocation of saints may not be a sinful encroachment on the claims of the 'jealous God.'

Now with respect to this necromancy (for that is the right name of an attempt to hold intercourse with

* NOTE BY EDITOR.—This article, though not inserted in the Commonplace Book, may well find a place here, as it is of the same character. It was dictated by the writer, a few months before his last illness commenced, as a 'Memorandum' on a subject which had been occupying the attention of several of his friends; and it has been thought that this, almost his last expressed opinion, may be valuable and interesting to many of those whose attention has been drawn to the wonders of Spiritualism.

spirits of the departed), which is the safe side? It must surely be quite safe to keep aloof from it; but it would be very bold to pronounce confidently that it is impossible it can lead to anything that is not allowable and safe. There can surely be no objection to abstain from it. It does not profess, like mesmerism, to heal diseases. It does not pretend to reveal new religious truths, or to predict future events. It claims only what Paley calls an 'otiose belief,' that is, one which leads to no practical results.

Not that I would reject, as some do, every enquiry whose practical utility is not at once apparent. Some which had been originally pursued from the mere thirst for knowledge, have led most unexpectedly to important practical benefits. But then we should be quite sure that there is no possible risk of evil. Now supposing it granted that there is no harm at present in this necromancy, and that the spirits merely amuse themselves with tossing about nosegays and ringing bells, and that they even make godly professions, we should remember that any evil being, whether man or demon, who designed to lead men ultimately into something evil, would not show himself at once in his true character, but 'transformed into an angel of light.' The Mormonites began by pretending to very pure morality, but afterwards gradually led their disciples into all kinds of enormities.

On the whole, therefore, I think it is the safe course to have nothing to do with any necromantic practices.

POETICAL REMAINS.

THE following fugitive pieces were written by my father at different periods of his life, and have been collected without much regard to subject. Most of them were written during the earlier part of his Oxford residence.

THE FARMER'S COMPLAINT.

ONCE I loved a dainty lass as ever eye did see,
But now she is too much in the fashion for me;
Scornful she rejects all my kindness with disdain,
'Cause I'm a farmer-lad so homely and so plain.

She likes a scented coxcomb, she says he's so polite;
But ere she went to boarding school, oh! I was her delight.
We play'd at blindman's buff, all round a Christmas fire;
Now she's a lady fine, I hardly dare go nigh her.

She plays upon the music, and draws like anything,
And dances fit to be a partner for a king;
So airy too of late, and so genteel she grows,
When she is fully dressed, she scarce has any clo's.

She learns French and Italian, and so much now she knows,
She's learnt to quiz her Catechis, and laugh at Parson Prose;
Yet knows not how to milk a cow, or make an apple tart,
Oh! such a farmer's wife, I'm sure would break my heart.

Chemistry, geology, and botany beside,
And twenty more outlandish things, are now her joy and pride;
All this has made her grow so proud and so airy,
She'll never condescend to see about the dairy.

Then I'll look out a country lass, and her my wife I'll make,
Who knows no more of chemistry than how to brew and bake;
She'll need no French accomplishments her cheese and eggs to sell,
And nothing shall she draw but water from the well.

SALAMANCA.

(*Metre*—'Battle of the Baltic.')

Now the fierce meridian blaze
Gives place to milder light,
And the sun's declining rays
Show a grand and gallant sight,
The French and British hosts in array.
Thousands ne'er shall fight again,
But on Salamanca's plain,
'Mid the gory heaps of slain,
Fall to-day.

See! our foes their lines advance,
And their numerous ranks extend;
From the force of haughty France,
Who now shall Spain defend?
See! the Hero of the West braves the war;
Albion's sons beside him stand,
A small but valiant band,
Who to force a foreign land,
Come from far.

Brave youths who thirst for fight!
Now's the time for noble deeds;
Up the steep and slippery height
Now spur your gallant steeds,
For 'tis Wellington that gives the command;
'Charge! charge! (or all is lost)
On the close-embattled host,
And drive them from their post,
Sword in hand!

Have ye seen the thunder cloud,
Rolling murky through the sky,
Then bursting fierce and loud,
While the vivid lightnings fly?
So rush the British host upon the foe;
Firm and close their troops advance,
On the bayonets of France,
Then the sabre's lightning glance
Deals the blow.

They yield! the French retire!
British heroes, now press on;
Now charge with spur of fire,
And the victory is won!
On the left the foe are scattered in dismay;
Still they strive, upon the right,
To maintain the stubborn fight,
Till the friendly shade of night
Part the fray.

Lusitania's sons, awake!
On! ye gallant bands of Spain.
Ample vengeance shall ye take,
For the plundered and the slain,
Or in your country's cause nobly bleed:
Shall the Gaul, himself a slave,
In a tyrant's cause be brave?
Spaniards, fight! yourselves to save,
And be freed!

Now evening closes fast,
Yet fiercer glows the fight;
Hark! the shouts, on every blast,
Urge the French to headlong flight.
Now rages louder yet the battle's roar;
'Mid the gloom the cannon flash,
While swords with bayonet clash,
As the fiery chargers dash
Through the gore.

How the grape-shot's deadly hail
Strews their ranks upon the plain!
Then the horse their rear assail,
Trampling o'er the heaps of slain.
All is carnage, wild confusion, and affright:
Hostile blades behind them gleam,
In the moon's uncertain beam,
As they ford the rushing stream
In their flight.

In darkness all is lost,
As we aim the doubtful blow;
Scarce the troops of either host
Can distinguish friend from foe.
The enemy fly, broken and forlorn:
Then awhile suspend their fate;
Soldiers, halt! 'tis midnight late;
Armed and ready, let us wait
Till the morn.

Oh, when did dawning sky
Such a scene of blood disclose!
Piled in heaps promiscuous lie
Men and steeds and friends and foes.
Here many a gallant chief is stretched in death;
While the wounded, strewed around,
Lie weltering on the ground,
And, in low convulsive sound,
Gasp for breath.

'Britons! check the starting tear,'
Each expiring comrade cries;
'On! pursue your brave career
Till the Tyrant prostrate lies;
Then Spaniards by our death shall be free
Captured flags shall o'er us wave;
And those we died to save
Shall inscribe upon our grave,
Victory.'

LA BELLE ALLIANCE.

ARISE! arise! Britannia's sons, arise!
And march once again to repel the haughty foe;
For our arms again presumptuous he defies,
And once more would make the world a scene of woe.
But the warriors of Albion, his fraud and force disdaining,
Again shall be victors, their old renown maintaining;
Then boldly we'll advance to chastise the pride of France—
Again the Gallic host shall be routed from each post,
And Wellington, great Wellington, fresh laurels obtain.

Then huzza! huzza! huzza! huzza! huzza, boys!
Our conquering arms shall the freedom of the world
regain;
Huzza! huzza! huzza! huzza! huzza!
Since Britannia rules by land as on the main.

The tyrant forth his mighty legions pours,
In hopes to overwhelm our small but gallant
band;
But in vain the cuirass gleams, the canon roars,
British heroes all their fury can withstand.
Now charge, lads, in turn, while the Frenchmen are
retreating.
Hark! shouts of conquest proclaim, the foe we're
beating;
Now they've lost the bloody day, and are scattered
in dismay—
At La Belle Alliance we have quelled the pride of
France,
And Wellington, great Wellington, fresh laurels shall
gain.

Then huzza! huzza! huzza! huzza! huzza, boys!
Our conquering arms shall the freedom of the world
maintain;
Huzza! &c. &c.
Since Britannia, &c. &c.

Full many a chief lies welt'ring on the ground,
Whose brave blood was spilt for Britannia's God and right;
But the tyrant's best are piled in heaps around,
And the rest forsake the field in coward flight.
Great Edward and Henry, renown'd in British story,
And Marlb'rough, whose arms won from France immortal glory;
The palm now must yield to a more victorious field,
For La Belle Alliance has subdued the pride of France,
And Wellington, &c. &c.

No more shall nations bow to lawless might,
Since Albion has taught them their freedom to defend;
And no more for spoil invade their neighbour's right,
Since justice proves triumphant in the end.
For Albion, who conquers for peace and for security,
Writes in French blood a dread lesson for futurity;
And the sword which he draws, in freedom's holy cause—
At La Belle Alliance has tamed the pride of France,
And Wellington, great Wellington, immortal fame shall gain.

Then huzza! &c.
Our conquering arms shall the freedom of the world maintain;
Huzza! &c.
Since Britannia rules by land as on the main.

THE ELBA KING.

'Tis merry thro' Europe far and wide,
For freedom and peace returning;
For they've sent in exile, to Elba's Isle,
The wretch who caused her mourning.

Up spoke each moody islander,
Who wrought in Elba's mines,
'Shall our caverns hide his fallen pride,
Who his blood-stained crown resigns?

'Our harmless race this dire disgrace
Has not deserved to feel;
For the hard iron-ore that our workmen bore
Is soft to his heart of steel.

'The fruits of our toil will the tyrant spoil,
And waste our children's blood;
Oh! cursed be the ship that bears o'er the deep
That fiend in gore imbrued!
And that flag deck'd with bees, that flaunts in the breeze
To our island bodes no good.

'Those bees must be meant to represent
His people's cruel doom;
For men take as a tax all the honey and wax,
And with powder the bees consume.

'Up! islemen, up! to yon monster hie
(For who can call him man?),
And force him far from our land to fly,
With scoff, and threat, and ban.

'Lay on him the curse of the widow's groan,
The curse of the orphan's cry,
Till he fly to some spot where his name's unknown,
And there lie down to die.'

THE TRANSPORT FOUNDERED.

GAY was the scene, when the fleet, all in motion,
Prepared to set sail from our dear native land;
Brave were the warriors that launched on the ocean
To far distant climes, at their country's command.

High beat our hearts with the fond hope of glory,
And joyous we cheered as we quitted the shore;
England, alas! when she hears our sad story,
Shall mourn the brave hearts that must never beat more.

Foul rose the tempest, the fleet soon was scatter'd;
Of all the good transports not one is in sight;
Rent is our rigging, our main-mast is shatter'd,
We drive all alone through the dark stormy night.

Hark! louder yet roar the wild waves around us;
All hands to the pump! for the leak gains apace;
Darkness and danger conspire to confound us,
And ghastly despair sits enthroned in each face.

Comrades! I burn for the thunder of battle,
Where heroes lie strewed on the blood-streaming plain.
Bold as we charged, 'mid the cannon's dread rattle,
Our foes should have owned that we fell not in vain.

Glorious our death; and each friend, in bewailing,
Had mingled with triumph the tear that he shed.
Vain are our wishes! the storm is prevailing;
Soon ocean's dark waters shall close o'er our head.

Parents and kinsmen fond hopes still shall cherish,
Still vainly await our return to their shore;
No tidings shall reach them to tell how we perish;
The fleet was dispersed, we are heard of no more.

Wide is the ocean that now roars between us;
Sad friendship's last office we never must share;
Wrecked on our own native coast, had they seen us,
They had then the comfort, at least, of despair.

Oh, as they sink on the tear-watered pillow,
May some pale ghost arise from his dark oozy bed!
To tell them we sleep sound, tho' rock'd by the billow,
Till ocean be summoned to render his dead.

THE NIGHTINGALE.

Now the sun's broad glare declining,
Gilds the west with crimson light;
See, with milder radiance shining,
Rises slow the Queen of night.

Hushed in leafy covert slumbers
Daylight's gay and noisy throng;
One alone, in dulcet numbers—
One sweet bird renews his song.

Hark! those notes of rapture swelling!
'Tis the love-sick nightingale:
He, beside his nest, is telling
To his mate his amorous tale.

Pausing now, now soft renewing,
Low at first his tender lay.
Louder now his note pursuing,
Kindling in wild ecstasy.

'Fear no ill that can betide thee,'
Warbling sweet, he seems to say,
'Tis thy true love sits beside thee,
Far from thee he ne'er will stray.

'What has night to do with sleeping?
Night has other joys to prove.
O'er thee, dear, my watch I'm keeping,
Whilst I sing this strain of love.'

'Thus all night in varied measures,
Rich melodious notes he pours;
Still, recounting all his pleasures,
Soft beguiles the moonlight hours.

Light his heart as downy feather
Under which that heart doth beat:
Where, 'mongst men, are found together
Heart so pure and song so sweet?

THE DREAM.

O SLEEP, once again from my anguish relieve me!
Once more, sweet enchantress, deceive me;
'Tis the chief bliss below
Our ills not to know,
And to gain for a time an oblivion of woe.

So sighed the poor wand'rer whom fancy, in dreaming,
Had transported with visions bright beaming,
And seemed to restore
On his loved native shore,
To the home and the hopes that await him no more.

He thought that kind fortune had blessed him with
treasure,
And crowned every wish in full measure;
For he dreamed he possessed
The maid he loved best;
And he thought never mortal like him e'er was
blessed.

His sighs were no longer disdain'd and neglected,
No more his fond suit was rejected;
And the friend, now no more,
Whom he used to deplore,
To his arms did the magic of fancy restore.

Alas! he awakes; disappears the fair vision;
How sudden, how chill the transition!
Now, poor and forlorn,
His friend he must mourn;
And pine with the love that shall meet no return.

Yet, bethink thee, sad exile! this world and its
pleasures
Must dissolve like a dream's fairy treasures,
At the dawn of that day
Which, when earth shall decay,
May crown thee with blessings that fade not away.

ELEGY INTENDED FOR PROFESSOR BUCKLAND.

MOURN, Ammonites, mourn o'er his funeral urn,
Whose neck ye must grace no more;
Gneiss, granite, and slate, he settled your date,
And *his* ye must now deplore.
Weep, caverns, weep with unfiltering drip,
Your recesses he'll cease to explore;
For mineral veins and organic remains
No stratum again will he *bore.*

Oh! his wit shone like crystal; his knowledge profound,
From gravel to granite descended;
No *trap* could deceive him, no *slip* could confound,
Nor specimen, true or pretended;
He knew the birth-rock of each pebble so round,
And how far its tour had extended.

His eloquence rolled like the deluge retiring
Where mastodon carcases floated;
To a subject obscure he gave charms so inspiring,
Young and old on geology doated.
He stood out like an Outlier; his hearers, admiring,
In pencil each anecdote noted.

Where shall we our great Professor inter,
  That in peace may rest his bones?
If we hew him a rocky sepulchre,
  He'll rise and break the stones,
And examine each stratum that lies around—
For he's quite in his element underground.

If with mattock and spade his body we lay
  In the common alluvial soil,
He'll start up and snatch those tools away
  Of his own geological toil;
In a stratum so young the Professor disdains
That embedded should lie his organic remains.

Then exposed to the drip of some case-hardening spring,
  His carcase let stalactite cover,
And to Oxford the petrified sage let us bring,
  When he is incrusted all over.
There, 'mid mammoths and crocodiles, high on a shelf,
Let him stand as a monument raised to himself.

December 1, 1820.

LORD SIDMOUTH'S STYLE OF ORATORY.

[Bishop Coplestone once gave me a description of Lord Sidmouth's style of oratory, which for his amusement I put into verse.]

Who has not seen a paper kite,
Pulled by the string, commence its flight?

It waves its tail, it flaps its wings,
And, soaring graceful, upward springs.
So Sidmouth speaks, his periods rise,
And mount, majestic, towards the skies.
But as the paper kite foresaid,
If 'tis too heavy in the head—
Soon throws a summersault most scurvy,
And pitches downwards topsy-turvy,
So Sidmouth's periods, hapless fate!
Fail in their flight through too much weight;
He blunders, hesitates, and stops,
Repeats, corrects—and down he drops.

YE MISTY HILLS.

[Words written to the Highland air, 'We return no more.' Supposed to have been sung by the inhabitants of one of the mountain districts in the Highlands, when compelled to emigrate to America.]

Ye misty hills and heathery braes,
Whose soil the Saxon churls despise,
Our fathers' home in early days,
Your wild retreats I dearly prize.
On these bleak moors, for ages past,
With active foot and valiant hand,
Our fathers dwelt; now we, the last,
Are exiled from our native land.

Content we'd live on frugal fare,
Thin clad we'd brave the winter's blast;
Might we still but breathe our native air,
And repose in our native glen at last.
But the Saxon is come to possess the glen,
And the Gael must depart for a distant shore.
We shall ne'er behold yon hills again,
To our own lov'd land we return no more.

Farewell, thou chief of an exiled clan!
The glory is lost of thine ancient line.
Of all our race there was not a man
But would blithe have given his life for thine!
Enjoy thy pelf! thou hast gold for men;
Thy sires would have scorned thy sordid store.
Now herds are spread o'er the wasted glen,
And the Gael is gone to return no more.

TRANSLATION OF THE ORIENTAL PROVERB,

Standing is better than walking; sitting than standing; lying is better than sitting; sleep is better than waking; and death is better than life.

Τοῦ *βαίνειν στῆναι κρεῖσσον, κρεῖσσον δὲ καθίζειν*
Τοῦ *στῆναι, τούτου δ' ἔτι λώϊόν ἐστ' ἀνάκεισθαι.*
Τοῦ *ἀγρύπνειν ὕπνος κρεῖσσον, θάνατός τε βίοιο.*

AN INSCRIPTION.

[Inscription sent in 1846 to be inserted in the Travellers' Book at the *Valhalla* in Bavaria.]

CLARORUM effigies jactet Valhalla virorum,
Inclyta quos genuit patria, quosque colit.
Unus abest, quem (laus potior!) miremur abesse;
Mirum! vox una est; inde Lutherus abest.

Translation by the same.

Valhalla's walls its numerous ranks displays
Of German worthies, deck'd with well-earn'd bays;
But one is wanting; his the praise more rare,
That all men wond'ring ask, why Luther is not there?

THE LORD'S PRAYER.

THOU to whom all power is given,
Here on earth, above in heaven;
Jesus, Saviour, mighty Lord,
Be Thy holy name adored.

In our hearts all sovereign reign;
All the world be Thy domain!
May redeemed man, we pray Thee,
Like th' angelic hosts obey Thee!

Thou who dost the ravens feed,
Grant us all our bodies need;
Thou in whom we move and live,
Daily grace sustaining give.

Pardon us, our sins confessing,
Keep us from afresh transgressing;
May *we* pardon one another,
As becomes a sinning brother.

In temptation's dreadful hour,
Shield us with Thy gracious power;
From Satan's wiles our hearts defend,
Saviour, Comforter, and Friend!

Glory to Thee on earth be given,
Christ our King, the Lord of Heaven!
Glory to Thee, great First and Last,
When this world, and time, are past!

EVENING HYMN.

The first verse of this hymn was written by Bishop Heber.

Air—*Ar hydd y nos.*

God, that madest earth and heaven,
Darkness and light,
Who the day for toil hast given,
For rest the night—
May Thine angel-guards defend us;
Slumbers sweet Thy mercy send us;
Holy dreams and hopes attend us,
This livelong night!

Guard us waking, guard us sleeping;
And when we die,
May we, in Thy mighty keeping,
All peaceful lie.
When the last dread trump shall wake us,
Do not Thou, our Lord, forsake us,
But to reign in glory take us
With Thee on high.

VERSES INSPIRED BY NOTHING.

A LADY asks me, and I can't refuse,
To court in her behalf a tardy muse.
I'm left to choose the subject of my verse,
Which only makes the difficulty worse.
All that's worth saying has been long since said,
By poets living, or by poets dead;
Yet must I strive to tax my prosy brain,
And sing of Nothing in laborious strain.
All hail, then, Nothing! when thy aid I ask,
Behold ten lines accomplished of my task!
That is half finished which is once begun;
A few more couplets and the work is done.
Now let me count: twelve lines: and now one more;
I'll be contented to complete a score.
Ten couplets I should think she'll reckon plenty.
Courage! the work proceeds: I'm near the twenty!

See Nothing does my labouring quill befriend,
And brings the promised poem towards an end.
Now, while I'm scribbling, here are five more feet:
Hurrah! my work is done! see twenty all complete!

FRENCH AND ENGLISH DEBATES.

WELL does the *Gallic* name the nation suit;
Well may John Bull be deemed a surly brute.
Of cackling, crowing, sparring French debate,
And England's grumbling roar each paper's full.
What, after all, does each of them relate,
But tiresome stories of a Cock and Bull?

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NEW-STREET SQUARE

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THIS little volume of the 'Commonplace Book' will be readily welcomed by the many who are grateful to Archbishop WHATELY for the intellectual assistance which he has afforded them, and also by the few who cherish a more particular and personal recollection of the man himself — his quaint, original, powerful style of thought and language, his manliness, his love of truth, his crotchets, and his weaknesses. It is as thoroughly characteristic as any record of the fresh and natural impressions of a man of his genius was certain to be. For it is to be remembered that WHATELY was in no degree a collector of other men's thoughts. What most of us call a commonplace book, is a collection of facts and sentiments derived from others' writings, which readers note down with a view of using them on the proper occasion. To WHATELY such a process would have been impossible. His 'Commonplace Book' preserves merely the first rapid flow of thought as it occurred to himself on any subject which attracted his fancy. . . . They will afford abundant materials for farther thought to any one who peruses them, besides the mere enjoyment of the practical sense and mother wit with which they overflow.

From the SATURDAY REVIEW, *October* 29, 1864.

MISS WHATELY is well performing her office of literary executor to her father. In giving to the world these Remains, she is erecting the best monument to her father's memory. The volume will enable those who are curious in literary history to compare the rough-hewn thoughts of the Archbishop, as they appear in the earlier pages of the Commonplace Book, which was his constant companion, with their fuller development in his published works; and they who, with ourselves, think the broad outlines of thought and theory more valuable in the rough than in their elaborated and sometimes emasculated fulness of statement, have here a storehouse of lively notions and very lively illustrations, which will take their place beside *Guesses at Truth*. . . . These are not at all either livelier or more characteristic extracts than might be made from almost any page of Miss WHATELY's singularly interesting little volume. Perhaps for the first time we here see WHATELY very much as he saw himself. Even in matters which occupied his serious attention for years, and to which he devoted large volumes with inexhaustible liberality, we prefer his embryo octavos as they appear here, sometimes in an essay of a couple of pages, sometimes in a pithy sentence.